ellauri042.html on line 804: Euclid’s fifth proposition in the first book of his Elements (that the base angles in an isosceles triangle are equal) may have been named the Bridge of Asses (Latin: Pons Asinorum) for medieval students who, clearly not destined to cross over into more abstract mathematics, had difficulty understanding the proof—or even the need for the proof. An alternative name for this famous theorem was Elefuga, which Roger Bacon, writing circa ad 1250, derived from Greek words indicating “escape from misery.” Medieval schoolboys did not usually go beyond the Bridge of Asses, which thus marked their last obstruction before liberation from the Elements.
ellauri080.html on line 492: This relates directly to CelebrityTypes’ observation of “NTP Knowing and NTJ Willing”, though my proposition is that this in fact applies across all types in the form of these judging axes, albeit with varying degrees of appearance. I believe that in the sense above, the FE/TI axis is more naturally wired to seek abstract knowledge, while TE/FI is more naturally wired to make concrete its visionary will.
ellauri089.html on line 459: § 27. The common argument that things are good, because they are "natural", may involve either (1) the false proposition that the "normal", as such, is good;
ellauri089.html on line 461: § 28. or (2) the false proposition that the "necessary", as such, is good. …
ellauri089.html on line 487: § 40. yet he gives a proof of the first proposition, which consists in (1) the fallacious confusion of "desirable" with "desired", …
ellauri089.html on line 509: § 51. He then goes on to the far more important proposition that no part of Human Existence, except pleasure, is desirable. …
ellauri089.html on line 546: § 68. Metaphysics, as dealing with a "supersensible reality" may have a bearing upon practical Ethics (1) if its supersensible reality is conceived as something future, which our actions can affect; and (2) since it will prove that every proposition of practical Ethics is false, if it can shew that an eternal reality is either the only real thing or the only good thing. Most metaphysical writers, believing in a reality of the latter kind, do thus imply the complete falsehood of every practical proposition, although they fail to see that their Metaphysics thus contradicts their Ethics. …
ellauri089.html on line 550: § 70. One such source of confusion seems to lie in the failure to distinguish between the proposition "This is good", when it means "This existing thing is good", and the same proposition, when it means "The existence of this kind of thing would be good"; …
ellauri089.html on line 556: § 73. One cause of this supposition seems to be the logical prejudice that all propositions are of the most familiar type—that in which subject and predicate are both existents. …
ellauri089.html on line 558: § 74. But ethical propositions cannot be reduced to this type: in particular, they are obviously to be distinguished …
ellauri089.html on line 572: § 81. and, once this analogy between Volition and Cognition is accepted, the view that ethical propositions have an essential reference to Will or Feeling, is strengthened by another error with regard to the nature of Cognition—the error of supposing that "perception" denotes merely a certain way of cognising an object, whereas it actually includes the assertion that the object is also true. …
ellauri089.html on line 587: § 86. The question to be discussed in this chapter must be clearly distinguished from the two questions hitherto discussed, namely (1) What is the nature of the proposition: "This is good in itself"? …
ellauri089.html on line 595: § 90. and the rest of the chapter will deal with certain conclusions, upon which light is thrown by this fact. Of which the first is (1) that Intuitionism is mistaken; since no proposition with regard to duty can be self-evident. …
ellauri089.html on line 625: § 105. and, if we consider the intrinsic value of each exercise, it will appear (1) that, in most cases, it has no value, and (2) that even the cases, where it has some value, are far from constituting the sole good. The truth of the latter proposition is generally inconsistently implied, even by those who deny it; …
ellauri096.html on line 67: In response to the apparent conflict between freedom and foreknowledge, medieval philosophers denied that future contingent propositions have a truth-value. That´s silly. They took themselves to be extending a solution Aristotle discusses in De Interpretatione to the problem of logical fatalism. According to this truth-value gap approach, ‘You will take a dump tomorrow’ is not true now. The prediction will become true tomorrow. A morally serious theist can agree with the Rubaiyat of Omar Khayyam:
ellauri096.html on line 74: Cod’s omniscience only requires that He knows every true proposition. God will know ‘You will take a shit’ as soon it becomes true – like when the turd is halfway out - but not before. Naah, this is really weak. That takes no omniscience, just a good nose.
ellauri096.html on line 90: W. V. Quine (1953) agrees with Weiss’ conclusion that the teacher’s announcement of a surprise test fails to give the student knowledge that there will be a surprise test. Yet Quine abominates Weiss’ reasoning. Weiss breeches the law of bivalence (which states that every proposition has a truth-value, true or false). Quine believes that the riddle of the surprise test should not be answered by surrendering classical logic. Me too. Right on Willard van Orman Quine! Thumbs up!
ellauri096.html on line 112: Agnostics overestimate how easy it is to identify what cannot be known. To know, one need only find a single proof. To know that there is no way to know, one must prove the negative generalization that there is no proof. After all, inability to imagine a proof is commonly due to a failure of ingenuity rather than the non-existence of a proof. In addition to being a more general proposition, a proof of unknowability requires epistemological premises about what constitutes proof. Consequently, meta-proof (proof about proofs) is even more demanding than proof.
ellauri096.html on line 129: A paradox is commonly defined as a set of propositions that are individually plausible but jointly inconsistent. Paradoxes pressure us to revise beliefs in a highly structured way. For instance, much epistemology orbits a riddle posed by the regress of justification, namely, which of the following is false?
ellauri096.html on line 136: Foundationalists reject (1). They take some propositions to be self-evident. Coherentists reject (2). They tolerate some forms of circular reasoning. For instance, Nelson Goodman (1965) has characterized the method of reflective equilibrium as virtuously circular. Charles Peirce (1933–35, 5.250) rejected (3), an approach later refined by Peter Klein (2007) and championed at book-length by Scott F. Aikin (2011). Infinitists believe that infinitely long chains of justification are no more impossible than infinitely long chains of causation. Finally, the epistemological anarchist rejects (4). As Paul Feyerabend refrains in Against Method, “Anything goes” (1988, vii, 5, 14, 19, 159).
ellauri096.html on line 140: Kyburg might answer that there is a scale effect. Although the dull pressure of joint inconsistency is tolerable when diffusely distributed over a large set of propositions, the pain of contradiction becomes unbearable as the set gets smaller (Knight 2002). And indeed, paradoxes are always represented as a small set of propositions.
ellauri096.html on line 151: If paradoxes were always sets of propositions or arguments or conclusions, then they would always be meaningful. But some paradoxes are semantically flawed (Sorensen 2003b, 352) and some have answers that are backed by a pseudo-argument employing a defective “lemma” that lacks a truth-value. Kurt Grelling’s paradox, for instance, opens with a distinction between autological and heterological words. An autological word describes itself, e.g., ‘polysyllabic’ is polysllabic, ‘English’ is English, ‘noun’ is a noun, etc. A heterological word does not describe itself, e.g., ‘monosyllabic’ is not monosyllabic, ‘Chinese’ is not Chinese, ‘verb’ is not a verb, etc. Now for the riddle: Is ‘heterological’ heterological or autological? If ‘heterological’ is heterological, then since it describes itself, it is autological. But if ‘heterological’ is autological, then since it is a word that does not describe itself, it is heterological. The common solution to this puzzle is that ‘heterological’, as defined by Grelling, is not a genuine predicate (Thomson 1962). In other words, “Is ‘heterological’ heterological?” is without meaning. There can be no predicate that applies to all and only those predicates it does not apply to for the same reason that there can be no barber who shaves all and only those people who do not shave themselves.
ellauri096.html on line 153: The eliminativist, who thinks that ‘know’ or ‘justified’ is meaningless, will diagnose the epistemic paradoxes as questions that only appear to be well-formed. For instance, the eliminativist about justification would not accept proposition (4) in the regress paradox: ‘Some beliefs are justified’. His point is not that no beliefs meet the high standards for justification, as an anarchist might deny that any ostensible authorities meet the high standards for legitimacy. Instead, the eliminativist unromantically diagnoses ‘justified’ as a pathological term. Just as the astronomer ignores ‘Are there a zillion stars?’ on the grounds that ‘zillion’ is not a genuine numeral, the eliminativist ignores ‘Are some beliefs justified?’ on the grounds that ‘justified’ is not a genuine adjective.
ellauri096.html on line 175: If (K-0) is true then it known to be false. Whatever is known to be false, is false. Since no proposition can be both true and false, we have proven that (K-0) is false. Given that proof produces knowledge, (K-0) is known to be false. But wait! That is exactly what (K-0) says – so (K-0) must be true.
ellauri096.html on line 182: Is (K) true? On the one hand, if (K) is true, then what it says is true, so no one knows it. On the other hand, that very reasoning seems to be a proof of (K). Proving a proposition is sufficient for knowledge of it, so someone must know (K). But then (K) is false! Since no one can know a proposition that is false, (K) is not known.
ellauri096.html on line 184: The skeptic could hope to solve (K-0) by denying that anything is known. This remedy does not cure (K). If nothing is known then (K) is true. Can the skeptic instead challenge the premise that proving a proposition is sufficient for knowing it? This solution would be particularly embarrassing to the skeptic. The skeptic presents himself as a stickler for proof. If it turns out that even proof will not sway him, he bears a damning resemblance to the dogmatist he so frequently chides.
ellauri096.html on line 189: Trivially, false propositions cannot be proved true. Are there any true propositions that cannot be proved true?
ellauri096.html on line 191: Yes, there are infinitely many. Kurt Gödel’s incompleteness theorem demonstrated that any system that is strong enough to express arithmetic is also strong enough to express a formal counterpart of the self-referential proposition in the surprise test example ‘This statement cannot be proved in this system’. If the system cannot prove its “Gödel sentence”, then this sentence is true. If the system can prove its Gödel sentence, the system is inconsistent. So either the system is incomplete or inconsistent. (See the entry on Kurt Gödel.)
ellauri096.html on line 225: But secular idealists and logical positivists concede that there are some actual unknown truths. How can they continue to believe that all truths are knowable? Astonishingly, these eminent philosophers seem refuted by a pinch of epistemic logic. Also injured are those who limit their claims of universal knowability to a limited domain. For instance, Immanuel Kant (A223/B272) asserts that all empirical propositions are knowable. This pocket of optimism would be enough to ignite the contradiction (Stephenson 2015).
ellauri096.html on line 249: . Bas van Fraassen (1984, 244) dubs this “the principle of reflection”: I ought to believe a proposition given that I will believe it at some future time.
ellauri096.html on line 265: no test is given by Thursday, the student will find the announcement incredible. At the beginning of the week, the student does not know (or believe) that the teacher will wait that long. A principle that tells me to defer to the opinions of my future self does not imply that I should defer to the opinions of my hypothetical future self. For my hypothetical future self is responding to propositions that need not be actually true.
ellauri096.html on line 287: Since the surprise test paradox can also be formulated in terms of rational belief, there will be parallel adjustments for what we ought to believe. We are criticized for failures to believe the logical consequences of what we believe and criticized for believing propositions that conflict with each other. Anyone who meets these ideals of completeness and consistency will be unable to believe a range of consistent propositions that are accessible to other complete and consistent thinkers. In particular, they will not be able to believe propositions attributing specific errors to them, and propositions that entail these off-limit propositions.
ellauri096.html on line 293: Socrates continues to be praised for his insight. But his “discovery” is a contradiction. If Socrates knows that he knows nothing, then he knows something (the proposition that he knows nothing) and yet does not know anything (because knowledge implies truth).
ellauri096.html on line 710: La reconnaissance de Frantz Fanon en France fut tardive. Fort-de-France possède désormais une avenue à son nom bien que la proposition qu´en avait faite son maire Aimé Césaire, en 1965, eût été rejetée pendant des années. Il faut attendre 1982 pour que s´organise, sous l´impulsion de Marcel Manville, un mémorial international (colloque) en son honneur en Martinique. Peu à peu, plusieurs hommages lui sont rendus dans son île natale. Le lycée de La Trinité est baptisé en son honneur, la ville de Rivière-Pilote lui consacre une avenue et une bibliothèque. En France métropolitaine toutefois, s´il existe de nombreuses rues portant ce nom, David Macey signale n´avoir trouvé aucune avenue Frantz Fanon. En Algérie, dès 1963, une avenue Frantz Fanon est inaugurée à Alger. La reconnaissance dépasse désormais ces deux pays et la mémoire de Frantz Fanon est honorée dans de nombreux pays (Italie, Nigeria, États-Unis) où des centres de recherche ont été baptisés à sa mémoire.
ellauri131.html on line 671: "I was beyond tempted at times. There was no drought, for sure. I was like a kid in a candy store. Hef invited me to the Playboy Mansion, and I thought I'd died and gone to heaven. Women came bouncing on over to me saying, 'Oh my God, Tony Robbins, you changed my life!'" Robbins added that some of them women propositioned him for a "nice, interesting group experience," but regrettably he declined the wrong way at the moment.
ellauri133.html on line 868: According to Jackson's detractors, her marriage was plagued by Hyman's infidelities, notably with his students, and she reluctantly agreed to his proposition of maintaining an open relationship. Hyman also controlled their finances (meting out portions of her earnings to her as he saw fit), despite the fact that after the success of "The Lottery" and later work she earned far more than he did.
ellauri153.html on line 462: proposition, “God is good” and “God is omnipotent” are true in w = (Question Job, disaster) as well.
ellauri153.html on line 865: Schopenhauer’s central proposition is the main idea of his entire philosophy, he states simply as “The world is my representation.” Typerys.
ellauri158.html on line 63: propositionum, definitionum et al. qui in e t h i c e continentur,
ellauri158.html on line 1102: propositionum, definitionum et al. qui in e t h i c e continentur,
ellauri162.html on line 266: En 1949, le ministère de l'Éducation nationale fit savoir à Marcel Aymé qu'il allait être inscrit sur la liste de la prochaine promotion de la Légion d'honneur. Il se souvint alors du « blâme sans affichage » auquel il avait été condamné en 1946 pour avoir vendu sous l'occupation un scénario à la Continental film et refusa. En outre, l'année suivante, il déclina la proposition faite publiquement par François Mauriac de présenter sa candidature à l'Académie française : « Combien d'écrivains auront refusé presque simultanément l'Académie française et la Légion d'honneur ? s'est interrogée Gabrielle Rollin dans le magazine Lire.
ellauri171.html on line 1054: Tamar’s plan is as simple as it is clever: she covers herself with a veil so that Judah won’t recognize her, and then she sits in the roadway at the “entrance to Enaim” (Hebrew petah enayim; literally, “eye-opener”). She has chosen her spot well. Judah will pass as he comes back happy and horny (and maybe tipsy) from a sheep-shearing festival. The veil is not the mark of a prostitute (haha); rather, it simply will prevent Judah from seeing Tamar’s face, and women sitting by the roadway are apparently fair game. So, Judah propositions her, offering to give her a kid (well he did) for her services and giving her his pet seal and staff id (the ancient equivalent of a credit card) in pledge.
ellauri172.html on line 257: — Baruch Spinoza, Ethics, book 2, proposition 49, scholium
ellauri221.html on line 97: Elle dépose le 13 décembre 1945 devant le Conseil municipal de Paris un projet pour la fermeture des maisons closes. Dans son discours, elle ne s’en prend pas tant aux prostituées qu’à la société, responsable selon elle, de la « débauche organisée et patentée » et à la mafia, qui bénéficie de la prostitution réglementée ; le propos permet aussi de rappeler que le milieu de la prostitution s'est compromis avec l’occupant pendant la guerre. Sa proposition est votée et le 20 décembre 1945, le préfet de police Charles Luizet décide de fermer sans préavis les maisons du département de la Seine dans les 3 mois (au plus tard le 15 mars 1946, date qu'a fixée le conseil municipal). Encouragée, Marthe Richard commence une campagne de presse pour le vote d'une loi généralisant ces mesures. Elle est soutenue par le Cartel d'action sociale et morale et le ministre de la Santé publique et de la Population, Robert Prigent.
ellauri221.html on line 99: Le 9 avril 1946, le député Marcel Roclore présente le rapport de la Commission de la famille, de la population et de la santé publique, et conclut à la nécessité de la fermeture. Le député Pierre Dominjon dépose une proposition de loi dans ce sens qui est votée le 13 avril 1946 à la chambre des députés. La fermeture des maisons closes est appliquée à partir du 6 novembre 1946. Le fichier national de la prostitution est détruit et remplacé par un fichier sanitaire et social de la prostitution (loi du 24 avril 1946). Environ 1 400 établissements sont fermés, dont 195 à Paris (177 établissements officiels) : les plus connus comme le Chabanais, le Sphinx, La Rue des Moulins, le One-Two-Two mais aussi les sinistres maisons d’abattage comme le Fourcy et le Charbo… Beaucoup de tenanciers de maisons closes se reconvertirent en propriétaires d'hôtels de passe. La prostitution est alors une activité libre ; seules sont interdites son organisation et son exploitation — le proxénétisme — et ses manifestations visibles.
ellauri236.html on line 479: I will pay you three thousand dollars right now and if you find them, you’ll get a further thirty thousand dollars. That’s my proposition. What do you say?” "The F.B.I. are the best FBI in the world. If they’ve failed to find these hoods, I’ll probably fail too, but I’ll have a try.”
ellauri285.html on line 226: I have also argued (Lasonen-Aarnio 2010, 2021) that there is such a thing as “unreasonable knowledge”: there are also cases in which a subject is negatively evaluable, even to be blamed for believing a proposition p, even if she knows p. Jos voittaa zägällä ei voi saada kiitosta, väittää Mirja. Paskanmarjat, voittaja saa kiitoxet vaikka olisikin tehnyt virheitä (Stalin), häviäjä saa turpiin ettei kotiin löydä (Hitler).
ellauri352.html on line 180: Piru näistä selvän ottaa. Huonosti premissoitu tämä luku. Tunteet on propositionaalisesti tulkittuja tuntemuxia. Tyyppi ei aina izekään tiedä mikä tunne on kyseessä, onko ehkä vain pieru exyxissä. Propositio/tuntemus relaatio on moni moneen. Ajatus askartaa yhdestä tunteesta toisen.
xxx/ellauri075.html on line 519: Hugh Walpole had notable authors in his family tree: on his father's side, the novelist and letter writer Horace Walpole. According to Somerset Maugham, Walpole made a sexual proposition to James, who was too inhibited to respond with his well-meaning old trunk.
xxx/ellauri113.html on line 84: Ex nihilo, nihil fit – is one of the propositions to which great significance was attributed in metaphysics. The proposition is either to be viewed as just a barren tautology, nothing is nothing, or, if becoming is supposed to have real meaning in it, then, since only nothing comes from nothing, there is in fact none in it, for the nothing remains nothing in it. Becoming entails that nothing not remain nothing, but that it pass over into its other, being. – Later metaphysics, especially the Christian, rejected the proposition that out of nothing comes nothing, thus asserting a transition from nothing into being; no matter how synthetically or merely imaginatively it took this proposition, there is yet even in the most incomplete unification of being and nothing a point at which they meet, and their distinguishedness vanishes. –
xxx/ellauri113.html on line 85: The proposition, nothing comes from nothing, nothing is just nothing, owes its particular importance to its opposition to becoming in general and hence also to the creation of the world out of nothing. Those who zealously hold firm to the proposition, nothing is just nothing, are unaware that in so doing they are subscribing to the abstract pantheism of the Eleatics and essentially also to that of Spinoza. The philosophical view that accepts as principle that being is only being, nothing only nothing, deserves the name of 'system of identity'; this abstract identity is the essence of pantheism. - Hegel, 'Becoming', in 'The Science of Logic', 1812. [Kay Sage, 'Arithmetic of Breaking Wind', 1947]
xxx/ellauri170.html on line 634: Mutta jo s 143 lähtien Huisman alkaa kiertää paavinuskoa kuin kissa kuumaa puuroa. Mietin taas mikä antenni se on joka alkaa vastaanottaa uskonsanomaa. Jakkoh-hintikalla K oli niinkö B plus reflexiivisyysaxiooma. Mä vähän epäilen. Toi uskonvarmuus on kyllä jotain muuta, pikemminkin neighborhood-tyyppistä preferenssilogiikkaa, koska se sallii yhteensopimattomia vakaumuxia. Will to believe, siitä siinon kysymys. Uskolla on propositionaalista sisältöä vaan siteexi, se ei oikeastaan ole propositionaalinen attitydi ollenkaan vaan pikemminkin jonkinlainen ruumiinasento, niinkuin optimismi vaikka. Sitä kuvaa parhaiten suisnan uskonahdistus: missä sehdä? Missä sehdä? MISÄ SEHDÄ? Syän muavon. Niäh! Kun riittävästi ahdistaa on apukin lähinnä, se löytyy omasta hypothalamuxesta. Tän luottamuxen tärkein tehtävä on pitää yllä toivoa ja tiimihenkeä. Ihan sama millä kuvioilla, kuten uskontojen kirjavuus jo todistaa. Muze elin on olemassa, ja on ollut ihan matelijavaiheesta, koska sille kelpaa mikä tahansa potaska. Pitäis tutkia missä kohtaa se on muilla eusosiaalisilla lajeilla. Esim ne peilisolut missä niitä on?
xxx/ellauri187.html on line 539: Uskontojen suosimat propositionaaliset attitydit ja puheaktiti,

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