ellauri132.html on line 111: (PST: Kuka on Sam Harris?) Samuel Benjamin Harris was born in Los Angeles, California, on April 9, 1967. He is an American author, philosopher, neuroscientist, and podcast host. His work touches on a wide range of topics, including rationality, religion, ethics, free will, neuroscience, meditation, psychedelics, philosophy of mind, politics, terrorism, and artificial intelligence. — Sam Harris rejects the dichotomy between spirituality and rationality , favoring a middle path that preserves spirituality and science but does not involve religion.
ellauri159.html on line 1411: Solidarity of causes in the world, 216. The human mind abstracts in order to explain, 219. Different cycles of operation in Nature, 220. Darwin's distinction between causes that produce and causes that preserve a variation, 221. Physiological causes produce, the environment only adopts or preserves, great men, 225. When adopted they become social ferments, 226. Messrs. {xvii} Spencer and Allen criticised, 232. Messrs. Wallace and Gryzanowski quoted, 239. The laws of history, 244. Mental evolution, 245. Analogy between original ideas and Darwin's accidental variations, 247. Criticism of Spencer's views, 251.
ellauri171.html on line 1078: Tamar was assertive of her rights and subversive of convention. She was also deeply loyal to Judah’s family. These qualities also show up in Ruth, who appears later in the lineage of Perez and preserves Boaz’s part of that line. The blessing at Ruth’s wedding underscores the similarity in its hope that Boaz’s house “be like the house of Perez, whom Tamar bore to Judah” (Ruth 4:12). Tamar’s (and Ruth’s) traits of assertiveness in action, willingness to be unconventional, and deep loyalty to family are the very qualities that distinguish their descendant, King David.
ellauri499.html on line 216: Why the Bible still calls the other side “wrong” The biblical authors are writing identity-creation literature: they want a clean theological boundary (“Yahweh alone”) and therefore portray rival worship as rebellion, spiritual danger, or moral failure. Redaction can sharpen the blame, but it also preserves the community’s political-theological agenda—so the direction of the polemic is not an accident.
xxx/ellauri114.html on line 636: Almost all ancient Greek manuscripts show signs of trying to normalize this text. For instance, the peculiar Codex Bezae renders both versions with ηλι ηλι λαμα ζαφθανι (ēli ēli lama zaphthani). The Alexandrian, Western and Caesarean textual families all reflect harmonization of the texts between Matthew and Mark. Only the Byzantine textual tradition preserves a distinction.
xxx/ellauri485.html on line 529: Seeing the bride fully before certain ritual steps (like the chuppah/consummation) can imply the completion of the marriage rite or remove the ritual suspense; the veil/sheet preserves the fun in the transitional moment of penetration. Modesty (tzniut) hierarchy: Many traditions treat public visual exposure of a woman's body or face as a greater breach of communal modesty than private, consensual tactile intimacy between spouses; the visual is socially signifying. Control of appearance vs. private acts: Visual familiarity connects a person's social identity and honor (how she appears publicly) to others; tactile acts are framed as private and confined to the marital domain or extramarital under the table or behind the barn, so they're regulated differently.
xxx/ellauri485.html on line 531: It all goes back to Laban's dirty trick with Leah. The bedeken (veiling) ritual reenacts the groom’s verification of his bride to prevent deception like Jacob’s — the groom lowers the veil and confirms the bride is the intended woman before the marriage is finalized. The sheet/veil used later in some folk practices isn’t meant to cause confusion; it preserves modesty and the ritual transition while still allowing checks against fraud (in many communities the groom sees the bride’s face or peeks thru the hole briefly during bedeken or under the chuppah).
xxx/ellauri495.html on line 170: I get why it sounds primitive if you reduce it to “God could stop it but didn’t.” In Aquinas-style theodicy, the point isn’t that God is helpless or that He’s doing trial-and-error; it’s closer to:     God doesn’t cause the creature’s wrong choice. He allows creaturely agency to produce real consequences.     Once an angel’s will makes its definitive turn away from God, there isn’t an “edit this moment” correction that preserves what Aquinas thinks makes the choice morally real (and, classically, that choice is not like a human who can genuinely change course later).     So “what could God do?” doesn’t mean “whack/bang/ouch” as if God is improvising; it means “why allow a universe where created wills can definitively commit themselves,” and classical theology says that’s the cost of genuine agency and a meaningful ordered cosmos—not a clumsy mechanic. If you tell me what exact Aquinas premise you’re relying on most (immutability of angelic choice, permission vs. causation, or something else), I can give the cleanest argument for why that premise implies “no redemption-first” without making God seem reactive.
xxx/ellauri495.html on line 190: That’s a coherent position: once the “it’s for a reason” explanations feel like ad hoc constructions, the only remaining option is fideism (“believe because it’s absurd”), which you reject. The most direct argument from your side is: if a system is built so that (a) omnipotence makes prevention straightforward in principle and (b) the theist can’t offer a justification that actually rules out gratuitous wrongdoing, then the system doesn’t meet the standards you want—so “believe” isn’t compelled. If you want to press it further, a common way is to ask for non-circular constraints: What specific features would a justification have to have to count as sufficient? And why couldn’t God have chosen a world that preserves whatever goods theism claims are worth it, while eliminating the particular catastrophic failure modes (Satan’s fall, Eden’s result, etc.)? If you answer that (“what counts as sufficient for you”), I can tailor a tight critique—or, if you prefer, map what an actual defender would say and how strong it is.
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