xxx/ellauri148.html on line 124: Yom Kippur was actually a bad choice of day by Sadat, for Arabs were still weak after Ramadan, while Israeli women were staying home and men were in synagogues, so the roads were free and reserves were quickly rounded up from the yeshivas. Prior to the war, Kissinger and Nixon consistently warned Meir that she must not be responsible for initiating a Middle East war. On October 6, 1973, the war opening date, Kissinger told Israel not to go for a preemptive strike, and Meir grumblingly confirmed to him that Israel would not.
xxx/ellauri148.html on line 126: Other developed nations [who? were there any?], being more dependent on OPEC oil, took more seriously the threat of an Arab oil embargo and trade boycott, and had stopped supplying Israel with munitions. As a result, Israel was totally dependent on the United States for military resupply, and particularly sensitive to anything that might endanger that relationship. After Meir had made her decision, at 10:15 am, she met with American ambassador Kenneth Keating in order to inform the United States that Israel did not intend to preemptively start a war. It would be just an accident. An electronic telegram with Keating's report on the meeting was sent to the United States at 16:33 GMT (6:33 pm local time). A message arrived later from United States Secretary of State Henry Kissinger saying, "Don't preempt." At the same time, Kissinger also urged the Soviets to use their influence to prevent war, contacted Egypt with Israel's message of non-preemption, and sent messages to other Arab governments to enlist their help on the side of moderation. These late efforts were futile. According to Henry Kissinger, had Israel struck first, it would not have received "so much as a nail".
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