ellauri009.html on line 870: Ääretön voitto-odotus, kz. Pascalin veto, martingaali, Pietarin paradoxi.
ellauri025.html on line 64: Russellin kritiikki tässä on, että perustelut on jälkiviisautta, koska uskovainen uskoo johtopäätöxeen vaikkei arvostaisi Tompan kohtia (a) ja (b). Russell ize peukutti vapaata liittoa, ainakin niin kauan kun se ei sattunut omaan nilkkaan. Tompan bändärit on vastanneet että (c) Tomppa ei ize kirjoittanut noita typeryyxiä, ne on vaan osa katolista uskoa, ja (d) Bertie ize käyttää Principia Mathematicassa satoja sivuja todistaaxeen että 2+2=4. Ja silti todistuxessa oli virhe, tai paradoxi, joka kulkee Russellin nimellä. Credo quia absurdum. Avioliitossa 1+1=3 tai enemmän, et revi siitä ihmettä. Kyl tää kaikki on aika absurdia, ei tiedä nauraako vai itkeä. Absurdismin mestari Beckettin Sammeli tekee molempia.
ellauri030.html on line 288: Kun arkaaiset ihmiset mietti mikä saa elukat (apinan mukaanlukien) tikittämään, oli 2 vaihtoehtoista analogiaa: 1) siellä on sisällä jokin otus, joka vetää naruista, mutta lakkaa vetämästä kun elukka on vainaja. Silloin voi hyvin kysyä, mitä se otus sitten teki. (Jätetään nyt syrjään se Bertrand Russellin vanha täti-paradoxi, että mikäs sitten sen otuxen lankoja veteli, etc.etc, turtles all the way down.) No joko sekin kuoli (heippa turtselitäti taas), hävis olemattomiin kuin pieru saharaan (mut silloin se oli aika tarpeeton hypoteesi alunperin), muuttui joxkin muux (ditto), tai se meni jonnekin muualle. Tästä analogiasta lähtee kaikki noi sieluhöpinät. 2) Ei täällä ketään ole, elävä elukka on pikemminkin kuin mekaaninen kana tai herätyskello, jonka vieteristä loppuu lopulta veto. Tää vaihtoehto mainitaan Faidonissakin (sielu on kuin soittimen viritys), mutta jostain syystä (mikähän se oli?), se jää tienoheen. Mun ymmärtääxeni tää on tieteellinen näkemys, siis yxinkertaisin oletus saatavilla olevan evidenssin valossa. Tän mä ostin jo ihan pienenä. Vanhoilta on veto käyt.kaz. jo lopussa. Tikketi-takketi tik tak tik - tak sanoi Impi Loiskeen kuhmuinen herätyskello viimeisen kerran, jousi katkesi ja kello vaikeni iäxi.Se on aikaa sitten romutettu, varmaan osina jossain Afrikassa tai Kiinassa. Näin tulee ihan kohta käymään minulle, siis just tälle mulle. Se on voi.
ellauri030.html on line 882: Filosofia muistuttaa ize asiassa standup komediaa. Dialogiformaatti, arkielämysten mätystys ja niiden pohdinta, tunteilun ohittaminen, kriittisyys, epäautoritaarisuus (no hm), kielellä pelleily, paradoxeilla pelailu, nokkeluudella keekoilu. Arvojen ja normien kyseenalaistus. Joo, koulufilosofit ehkä tekee tätä, sit on näitä soveltavia.
ellauri032.html on line 332: Kielellä saa sanotuxi ajatuxia joita ei voi kuvitella, kuten äärettömyys. Aivon neuroverkko on äärellinen automaatti, mutta vaan teoriassa voi sillä tuottaa äärettömän kielen. Teoria lausejoukko seurauxineen, siis kieli, opettaa logiikka. Joukko-opissa ei voi ristiriidattomasti olla rajoittamatonta komprehensioaksioomaa, sen osoitti Russell kolme vuosisataa myöhemmin paradoxixi. Koko ääretöntä ei voi käsittää yhteen läjään, se ajatus puree häntäänsä kuin koira, joka on lukenut ritariromaaneja.
ellauri042.html on line 815: What had Sacks left to Weschler? What did his gift, his command, amount to beyond the dying wish of a magnificent and, by some accounts, paradoxically self-effacing and narcissistic doctor to have yet another book, beyond the 13 he himself had written (three more would come posthumously), to help ensure his immortality? Maybe this:
ellauri042.html on line 943: Donne's style is characterised by abrupt openings and various paradoxes, ironies and dislocations. These features, along with his frequent dramatic or everyday speech rhythms, his tense syntax and his tough eloquence, were both a reaction against the smoothness of conventional Elizabethan poetry and an adaptation into English of European baroque and mannerist techniques. His early career was marked by poetry that bore immense knowledge of English society. Another important theme in Donne´s poetry is the idea of true religion, something that he spent much time considering and about which he often theorised. He wrote secular poems as well as erotic and love poems. He is particularly famous for his mastery of metaphysical conceits.
ellauri048.html on line 225: Mitä paradoxaalista siinä muka oli että Jörkka halvexi

ellauri054.html on line 407: Professor of Law at Columbia University Bernard Harcourt contends that neoliberalism holds the state as incompetent when it comes to economic regulation but proficient at policing and punishing, and that this paradox has resulted in the expansion of penal confinement.
ellauri082.html on line 785: Mikäs paradoxi tämä muka on? Mixi kukaan haluaisi välttämättä tulla nakkisormisexi putkiaivoxi ellei ole pakko, ja opiskella rillipäisenä finniselkäisenä nörttinä alkeismatikkaa nippu kyniä ja laskutikku rintataskussa? Jos niillä on mitään varaa valita, ne valizee jotain muuta. Noissa köyhemmissä maissa pääsee opiskelemaan vaan jos on jostain rikkaammasta perheestä, ja silloin vanhemmat kyllä termentää että meet sit opiskelemaan jotain josta tulee RNAHAA (lausuttuna nenä-äänellä kuin nilkki nilkkipää). Vaikka insinöörixi. Koska ilman rahaa niissä maissa ei ole yhtään mitään. Seuraava tulos vahvistaa tän selityxen:
ellauri088.html on line 77: Tässäpä koko filkan pointti! Kun Luisa Banx alkaa ymmärtää seizenjalkojen kieltä, se alkaa irottautua ajan kulusta. Se näkee tulevan ja nykyajan samaan aikaan (mistä seuraa kyllä aikamatkaparadoxeja, mutta ne ei kuulu lindkvistin expertiisiin). Hepatopodien kirjakieli on ympyriäistä ja jokaista lausetta kuusaillaan kokonaisuutena, mikä helpottaa ajan hahmotusta epälineaarisena. Tää on kyllä höpöhöpöä. Ei kielen oppimisesta seuraa että näkee tulevaisuuteen, sitä varten pitäs vaihtaa koko aivokoppa pääjalkaiseen, noin vähintään.
ellauri089.html on line 519: § 56. and (2) in that he fails to emphasize that the agreement, which he has tried to shew, between hedonistic judgments and those of Common Sense, only holds of judgments of means: hedonistic judgments of ends are flagrantly paradoxical. …
ellauri096.html on line 51: Vapaan tahdon pähkinään liittyy tää ennaltatietämisen ongelma. Ennaltatietämisen ongelma on tämmönen teologinen knoppi, johon liittyy peliteoriasta tuttu tiedon iterointi ja vuorotellen arvailu. Kehäajattelua ja omaa häntäänsä purevia todistuxia. Mise en abime-heijastuxia, Drostepurkkeja, narsisteja kazomassa izeänsä tiukasti peiliin. Logiikka ei pidä sellaisesta, kuten paradoxit osoittavat. Yhtenä vuotena kun olin vähän maaninen olin ymmärtävinäni siitä jotakin. Taisi olla taas pääsiäisen aikoja, sillä ajattelin munankuoria: finiittinen logiikka kuten BA antaa kuoren sulkeutua munaxi, infinitaarinen kuten ZF avaa kuoren auki loppumattomasti kohti taivasta.
ellauri096.html on line 77: Yllätyskokeen paradoxi kuulostaa samalla lailla typerältä kuin kasan paradoxi, tai Akhilles ja kilpikonna. Koe ei voi olla perjantaina, siis se ei voi olla torstaina, jne. Ihan samaa hölmöilyä kuin entisen äijän halkokuorma. Ei yllätyskokeessa ole tärkeetä ettei tiedä milloin se tapahtuu, vaan ettei sitä kerrota etukäteen, niin ettei voi jättää lukemista viime tinkaan. Yllätyxen asettaminen ehdoxi onkin oikeasti ongelma, se ei onnistu:
ellauri096.html on line 104: Those willing to abandon the concept of knowledge can dissolve the surprise test paradox. But to epistemologists, this is like using a suicide bomb to kill a fly.
ellauri096.html on line 106: Our suicide bomber may protest that the flies have been undercounted. Epistemic eliminativism dissolves all epistemic paradoxes. According to the eliminativist, epistemic paradoxes are symptoms of a problem with the very concept of knowledge.
ellauri096.html on line 118: If the eliminativist thinks that assertion only imposes the aim of expressing a truth, then he can consistently assert that ‘know’ is a defective term. However, an epistemologist can revive the charge of self-defeat by showing that assertion does indeed require the speaker to attribute knowledge to himself. This knowledge-based account of assertion has recently been supported by work on our next paradox.
ellauri096.html on line 129: A paradox is commonly defined as a set of propositions that are individually plausible but jointly inconsistent. Paradoxes pressure us to revise beliefs in a highly structured way. For instance, much epistemology orbits a riddle posed by the regress of justification, namely, which of the following is false?
ellauri096.html on line 140: Kyburg might answer that there is a scale effect. Although the dull pressure of joint inconsistency is tolerable when diffusely distributed over a large set of propositions, the pain of contradiction becomes unbearable as the set gets smaller (Knight 2002). And indeed, paradoxes are always represented as a small set of propositions.
ellauri096.html on line 142: If you know that your beliefs are jointly inconsistent, then you should reject R. M. Sainsbury’s definition of a paradox as “an apparently unacceptable conclusion derived by apparently acceptable reasoning from apparently acceptable premises” (1995, 1). Take the negation of any of your beliefs as a conclusion and your remaining beliefs as the premises. You should judge this jumble argument as valid, and as having premises that you accept, and yet as having a conclusion you reject (Sorensen 2003b, 104–110). If the conclusion of this argument counts as a paradox, then the negation of any of your beliefs counts as a paradox.
ellauri096.html on line 144: The resemblance between the preface paradox and the surprise test paradox becomes more visible through an intermediate case. The preface of Siddhartha Mukherjee’s The Emperor of All Maladies: A Biography of Cancer warns: “In cases where there was no prior public knowledge, or when interviewees requested privacy, I have used a false name, and deliberately confounded identities to make it difficult to track.” Those who refuse consent to be lied to are free to close Doctor Mukherjee’s chronicle. But nearly all readers think the physician’s trade-off between lies and new information is acceptable. They rationally anticipate being rationally misled. Nevertheless, these readers learn much about the history of cancer. Similarly, students who are warned that they will receive a surprise test rationally expect to be rationally misled about the day of the test. The prospect of being misled does not lead them to drop the course.
ellauri096.html on line 146: The preface paradox pressures Kyburg to extend his tolerance of joint inconsistency to the acceptance of contradictions (Sorensen 2001, 156–158). Consider a logic student who is required to pick one hundred truths from a mixed list of tautologies and contradictions. Although the modest student believes each of his answers, A1,A2,…,A100
ellauri096.html on line 151: If paradoxes were always sets of propositions or arguments or conclusions, then they would always be meaningful. But some paradoxes are semantically flawed (Sorensen 2003b, 352) and some have answers that are backed by a pseudo-argument employing a defective “lemma” that lacks a truth-value. Kurt Grelling’s paradox, for instance, opens with a distinction between autological and heterological words. An autological word describes itself, e.g., ‘polysyllabic’ is polysllabic, ‘English’ is English, ‘noun’ is a noun, etc. A heterological word does not describe itself, e.g., ‘monosyllabic’ is not monosyllabic, ‘Chinese’ is not Chinese, ‘verb’ is not a verb, etc. Now for the riddle: Is ‘heterological’ heterological or autological? If ‘heterological’ is heterological, then since it describes itself, it is autological. But if ‘heterological’ is autological, then since it is a word that does not describe itself, it is heterological. The common solution to this puzzle is that ‘heterological’, as defined by Grelling, is not a genuine predicate (Thomson 1962). In other words, “Is ‘heterological’ heterological?” is without meaning. There can be no predicate that applies to all and only those predicates it does not apply to for the same reason that there can be no barber who shaves all and only those people who do not shave themselves.
ellauri096.html on line 153: The eliminativist, who thinks that ‘know’ or ‘justified’ is meaningless, will diagnose the epistemic paradoxes as questions that only appear to be well-formed. For instance, the eliminativist about justification would not accept proposition (4) in the regress paradox: ‘Some beliefs are justified’. His point is not that no beliefs meet the high standards for justification, as an anarchist might deny that any ostensible authorities meet the high standards for legitimacy. Instead, the eliminativist unromantically diagnoses ‘justified’ as a pathological term. Just as the astronomer ignores ‘Are there a zillion stars?’ on the grounds that ‘zillion’ is not a genuine numeral, the eliminativist ignores ‘Are some beliefs justified?’ on the grounds that ‘justified’ is not a genuine adjective.
ellauri096.html on line 155: In the twentieth century, suspicions about conceptual pathology were strongest for the liar paradox: Is ‘This sentence is false’ true? Philosophers who thought that there was something deeply defective with the surprise test paradox assimilated it to the liar paradox. Let us review the assimilation process.
ellauri096.html on line 163: Epistemic paradoxes affect decision theory because rational choices are based on beliefs and desires. If the agent cannot form a rational belief, it is difficult to interpret his behavior as a choice. The purpose of attributing beliefs and desires is to set up practical syllogisms that make sense of actions as means to ends. Subtracting rationality from the agent makes framework useless. Given this commitment to charitable interpretation, there is no possibility of your rationally choosing an option that you believe to be inferior. So if you choose, you cannot really believe you were operating as an anti-expert, that is, someone whose opinions on a topic are reliably wrong (Egan and Elga 2005).
ellauri096.html on line 177: The (K-0) argument stinks of the liar paradox. Subsequent commentators sloppily switch the negation sign in the formal presentations of the reasoning from K∼p
ellauri096.html on line 199: Several commentators on the surprise test paradox object that interpreting surprise as unprovability changes the topic. Instead of posing the surprise test paradox, it poses a variation of the liar paradox. Other concepts can be blended with the liar. For instance, mixing in alethic notions generates the possible liar: Is ‘This statement is possibly false’ true? (Post 1970) (If it is false, then it is false that it is possibly false. What cannot possibly be false is necessarily true. But if it is necessarily true, then it cannot be possibly false.) Since the semantic concept of validity involves the notion of possibility, one can also derive validity liars such as Pseudo-Scotus’ paradox: ‘Squares are squares, therefore, this argument is invalid’ (Read 1979). Suppose Pseudo-Scotus’ argument is valid. Since the premise is necessarily true, the conclusion would be necessarily true. But the conclusion contradicts the supposition that argument is valid. Therefore, by reductio, the argument is necessarily invalid. Wait! The argument can be invalid only if it is possible for the premise to be true and the conclusion to be false. But we have already proved that the conclusion of ‘Squares are squares, therefore, this argument is invalid’ is necessarily true. There is no consistent judgment of the argument’s validity. A similar predicament follows from ‘The test is on Friday but this prediction cannot be soundly deduced from this announcement’.
ellauri096.html on line 201: One can mock up a complicated liar paradox that resembles the surprise test paradox. But this complex variant of the liar is not an epistemic paradox. For the paradoxes turn on the semantic concept of truth rather than an epistemic concept.
ellauri096.html on line 227: Timothy Williamson doubts that this casualty list is enough for the result to qualify as a paradox:
ellauri096.html on line 229: The conclusion that there are unknowable truths is an affront to various philosophical theories, but not to common sense. If proponents (and opponents) of those theories long overlooked a simple counterexample, that is an embarrassment, not a paradox. (2000, 271)
ellauri096.html on line 233: Those who believe that the Church-Fitch result is a genuine paradox can respond to Williamson with paradoxes that accord with common sense (and science –and religious orthodoxy). For instance, common sense heartily agrees with the conclusion that something exists. But it is surprising that this can be proved without empirical premises. Since the quantifiers of standard logic (first order predicate logic with identity) have existential import, the logician can deduce that something exists from the principle that everything is identical to itself. Most philosophers balk at this simple proof because they feel that the existence of something cannot be proved by sheer logic. Likewise, many philosophers balk at the proof of unknowables because they feel that such a profound result cannot be obtained from such limited means.
ellauri096.html on line 247: There is no problem with third person counterparts of (M). Anyone else can say about Moore, with no paradox, ‘G. E. Moore went to the pictures last Tuesday but he does not believe it’. (M) can also be embedded unparadoxically in conditionals: ‘If I went to the pictures last Tuesday but I do not believe it, then I am suffering from a worrisome lapse of memory ’. The past tense is fine: ‘I went to the picture shows last Tuesday but I did not believe it’. The future tense, ‘I went to the picture shows last Tuesday but I will not believe it’, is a bit more of a stretch (Bovens 1995). We tend to picture our future selves as better informed. Later selves are, as it were, experts to whom earlier selves should defer. When an earlier self foresees that his later self believes p
ellauri096.html on line 251: Robert Binkley (1968) anticipates van Fraassen by applying the reflection principle to the surprise test paradox. The student can foresee that he will not believe the announcement if no test is given by Thursday. The conjunction of the history of testless days and the announcement will imply the Moorean sentence:
ellauri096.html on line 275: The points made so far suggest a solution to the surprise test paradox (Sorensen 1988, 328–343). As Binkley (1968) asserts, the test would be a surprise even if the teacher waited until the last day. Yet it can still be true that the teacher’s announcement is informative. At the beginning of the week, the students are justified in believing the teacher’s announcement that there will be a surprise test. This announcement is equivalent to:
ellauri096.html on line 287: Since the surprise test paradox can also be formulated in terms of rational belief, there will be parallel adjustments for what we ought to believe. We are criticized for failures to believe the logical consequences of what we believe and criticized for believing propositions that conflict with each other. Anyone who meets these ideals of completeness and consistency will be unable to believe a range of consistent propositions that are accessible to other complete and consistent thinkers. In particular, they will not be able to believe propositions attributing specific errors to them, and propositions that entail these off-limit propositions.
ellauri096.html on line 289: Some people wear T-shirts with Question Authority! written on them. Questioning authority is generally regarded as a matter of individual discretion. The surprise test paradox shows that it is sometimes mandatory. The student is rationally required to doubt the teacher’s announcement even though the teacher has not given any evidence of being unreliable. Indeed, the student can foresee that their change of mind opens a new opportunity for surprise.
ellauri096.html on line 297: The general structure of Meno’s paradox is a dilemma: If you know the answer to the question you are asking, then nothing can be learned by asking. If you do not know the answer, then you cannot recognize a correct answer even if it is given to you. Therefore, one cannot learn anything by asking questions.
ellauri096.html on line 299: Saul Kripke’s ruminations on the surprise test paradox led him to a paradox about dogmatism. He lectured on both paradoxes at Cambridge University to the Moral Sciences Club in 1972. (A descendent of this lecture now appears as Kripke 2011). Gilbert Harman transmitted Kripke’s new paradox as follows:
ellauri102.html on line 384: Eikä siinä kaikki! Työttömyysaste voi olla vaikka kuinka korkea, mutta porukoilla silti köyhyys ovella, ja tän paradoxin selitys on just toi brändäyxen nimellä kulkeva työvoiman halpamyynti: olkaa joka hetki valmiina paskahommiin, joista saatte ainoastaan ropoja. Alhainen työllisyysaste ei ole todiste työn puutteesta, vaan siitä että "työvoiman kysyntä ja tarjonta eivät kohtaa", eli jengi ei enää suostu tulemaan aivan paskahommiin mitä niille enää tarjotaan, kun ei niillä palkoilla edes elä. Kokkareiden vastaisku on ajaa alas tukia, eiköhän sitten routa porsaan aja kaukalolle vaikka siellä oisi pelkkiä ruumenia jäljellä.
ellauri106.html on line 450: During what Henry Luce deemed the American century—the century during which America rises to a position of dominance on the globe—the Americanethos paradoxically plummets, in large part due to the Vietnam War and the Watergate scandal, politically charged events to which Roth pays particular attention in the novel because he sees them as formative of the 1990s moment at which he writes.
ellauri115.html on line 418: In hindsight, it seems unlikely that they were ever going to get along, personally or intellectually. Hume was a combination of reason, doubt and scepticism. Rousseau was a creature of feeling, alienation, imagination and certainty. While Hume's outlook was unadventurous and temperate, Rousseau was by instinct rebellious; Hume was an optimist, Rousseau a pessimist; Hume gregarious, Rousseau a loner. Hume was disposed to compromise, Rousseau to confrontation. In style, Rousseau revelled in paradox; Hume revered clarity. Rousseau's language was pyrotechnical and emotional, Hume's straightforward and dispassionate.
ellauri115.html on line 711: Kun nyt on päätelty aistiesineiden havainnosta ja mun sisäisestä tietoisuudedsta, joka johtaa mut päätellä syistä ja synnyistä syvistä diginatiivijärjellä päätotuudet jotka on mulle ihan need to know tietoa, mun täytyy nyt eziä sellasia käyttäytymisperiaatteita kuin niistä voi vetää, ja sellissiä sääntöjä jotka mun täytyy asettaa oppaaxeni tämän maailman kohtaloni täyttämisexi, mitkä oli mun money makerin meisinki. Käytän yhä samaa mefodia, en johda näitä sääntöjä korkekoulufilosofiasta, vaan löydän ne mun syömmin syvyyxistä, mihin ne on kirjoitettu tulipunaisilla kirjaimilla mitä mikään ei voi kumittaa. Mun tarvii vaan konsultoida izeäni sen suhteen mitä mä haluun tehä; se mikä musta tuntuu oikealta on oikein, mikä mun mielestä on väärin on väärin; omatunto on paras kasvomuisti; ja se on vaan kun tinkaamme omastatunnosta kun meillä on tarve sofistikoituihin argumentteihin. Meidän eka velvollisuus on mua izeäni kohtaan; kuitenkin miten usein toisen äänet kertoo että kun me haetaan omaa hyvää toisten kustannuxella me tehdään pahaa? Me luullaan seuraavamme luonnon opasteita, ja me vastustetaan sitä; me kuunnellaan mitä se sanoo meidän aisteille, ja me haistatetaan huilu sillä mitä se sanoo meidän sydämmelle; aktiiviolento tottelee, passiivi komentaa. Omatunto on sielun puheääni, passiohedelmät on ruumiin ääntelyä. Onko kumma että nää äänet usein kiistelevät kuin Aku Ankan korviin kuiskuttelevat kaxi pikku avataria? Ja kumpaahan meidän olis kuultava? Saat 2 arvausta. Liian usein järki pettää meitä; meillä on erinomainen syy epäillä sitä [jos se nimittäin sattuu olemaan aika heikko]; mutta superego ei koskaan petä meitä; se on miehen ainut tosi opaste; se on sielulle mitä vaisto on ruumiille, [Alahuomio: Moderni filosofia, joka myöntää vaan mitä se voi ymmärtää, varoo myöntämästä tätä hämärää kykyä jota sanotaan vaistoxi joka näyttää opastavan muita elukoita kuin tikanpoikaa puuhun ilman hankittua kokemusta. [No on se meilläkin, lue vaikka Paul et Virginie, tai jos et jaxa kazo sitten leffa Blue Lagoon.] Vaisto, joittenkin meidän viisaiden viisaustieteilijöiden mielestä, on vaan salainen ajattelutottumus, joka on hankittu ajattelemalla; ja siitä miten ne tän kehityxen selittää voisi päätellä että lapset miettii enemmän kuin isot ihmiset: tää on outo paradoxi jota pitäis tutkia. Mut ei mennä tähän nyt, vaikka mun pitää kysyä mikä nimii pitää antaa sille innolle jolla mun koira jahtaa myyriä jota se ei edes syö, tai kärsivällisyydelle jolla se joskus kazoo niitä tuntikausia ja taitoa millä se nappaa ne, heittää ne jonkun matkan päähän kolosta kun ne tulee esille, ja sit tappaa ne ja jättää ne lojumaan. Kuitenkaan kukaan ei opettanut sille tätä urheilulajia, eikä kukaan edes kertonut sille että on sellaisia otuxia kuin myyriä. Taas kysyn, ja tää on tärkeämpi kysymys, mix kun mä uhkailin tätä koiraa ekan kerran, mixe heittäytyi maahan tassut ristissä kuin armonanoja .....ihankuin laskelmoidusti muhun vedoten, asento jonka se olis ottanut, jos mä olisin pitänyt pintani ja jatkanut sen mätkimistä siinä asennossa? Mitä hä! Oliko mun koira, tuskin pentu, omaxunut moraali-ideoita? Tiesikö jo armon ja avokämmenen merkityxen? Millä hankitulla tiedolla se yritti hillitä mun vihaa heittäytymällä mun armoille? [Nojaa, tää vaan osottaa että sellainen käytös on luontaisesti koiramaista.] Jokainen koira maailmassa menettelee melkein samalla tavall samoissa olosuhteissa, enkä mä väitä mitään mitä jokainen ei voi ize kokeilla, hankkia vaan koiran ja jonkun astalon. Voisko filosooferit, jotka niin ivallisestri hylkää vaiston, ystävällisesti selittää tän vaan aistimusten leikkinä ja kokemuxen jonka ne olettaa että me ollaan hankittu? Antaa niiden antaa selitys joka kelpaa joka tolkun äijälle; siinä tapauxessa mulla ei ole enempää sanottavaa, enkä sanokaan enempää vaistosta.] Se joka tottelee omaatuntoa noudattaa luontoa eikä sen tarvi pelätä menevänsä harhaan. Tää on hyvinkin tärkeä asia, jatkoi mun hyväntekijä, nähdessään että mä meinasin keskeyttää sen; anna mun pysähtyä hetkexi selittämään tää paremmin, se sanoi kovempaa ja kiireemmin.
ellauri117.html on line 151: Das Leiden unterbrach seine Laufbahn als Versicherungsangestellter und zwang ihn, die ihm verbleibenden Jahre in Sanatorien und Kurorten zu verbringen. So paradox es klingt, diese Situation machte ihm das Leben leichter, da er jetzt in der Lage war, sich ganz auf das Schreiben zu konzentrieren.
ellauri118.html on line 534: In narratology (and specifically in the theories of Gérard Genette), a paradoxical transgression of the boundaries between narrative levels or logically distinct worlds is also called metalepsis.
ellauri145.html on line 40: Piha-antero julkaisee 1940 Mustan huumorin antologian. Esipuheessa se torjuu käsityxen, et musta huumori tarkottais jotain lakuläppiä, tarbaby cracks. Ei vaan huumori on mielihyvän prinsiipin paradoxaalinen voitto todellisista olosuhteista. Tää formulointi on kyllä kopioitu suoraan Freudin huumorpaperista. Samanlaisia hersyviä huumormiehiä ne oli molemmat.
ellauri147.html on line 692: Aber wir behaupten zugleich auch die Unabhängigkeit von der Welt und schützen uns vor der schmerzhaften Erfahrung von Abhängigkeit, der wir im Wunsch nach Anerkennung doch unbewusst Tribut zollen. Ich vermute, dass wir im Narzissmus etwas davon ausdrücken, was den paradoxen Kern von Identität ausmacht: nämlich einzigartig und unverwechselbar zu sein, sich also vom Anderen zu unterscheiden, und gerade in dieser Eigenschaft von den Anderen anerkannt zu werden. Im Narzissmus zeigt sich gewissermassen, ohne dass wir es wissen, etwas von der intersubjektiven Verfasstheit des Selbst, oder von Identität. Weil eine solche Erkenntnis uns kränken würde, wollen wir davon auch nichts wissen, genauso wie der Säugling von seiner Abhängigkeit nichts wissen kann. Nicht einmal in unserem Narzissmus sind wir jenes unabhängige Wesen, dass wir so gerne sein möchten.-->
ellauri151.html on line 372: religious symbols as paradoxes. She then argues that Wittgenstein
ellauri151.html on line 374: example of a religious paradox in need of a symbolic analysis.
ellauri151.html on line 657: Wittgenstein first interprets Hamann’s ideas as a Russell-type paradox of signs and their objects in light of the logical problems he was discussing in his lectures: how God∈God? Wittgenstein then uses Kierkegaard to interpret religious symbols as paradoxes that express a higher truth. I argue that Wittgenstein
ellauri161.html on line 861: Sivu 201 - Cette doctrine pourra sembler paradoxale sans doute, et même ridicule, parce que l'opinion environnante en impose ; mais attendez que l'affinité naturelle de la religion et de la science les réunisse dans la tête d'un seul homme de génie : l'apparition de cet homme ne saurait être éloignée ; et peut-être même existe-t-il déjà. Celui-là sera fameux, et mettra fin au...‎
ellauri162.html on line 448: "Lopullisen lopun tiedostaminen antaa näkökulman, merkityxen ja jopa toivoa. Se antaa meidän paradoxaalisesti ottaa etäisyyttä jokapäiväisiin huoliimme ja elää täydemmin tässä hetkessä." Tämä myöntää Andrew Pontzenkin: "Maailman loppuminen saa minut hetkexi surullisexi", hän sanoo. "Sitten alan hyvin nopeasti murehtia globaaleja ongelmia joita apinalla on tällä hetkellä. Ajattelen että jotain rajaa. Olemme nyt paljon pahemmassa jamassa kuin universumin lämpökuolema. Se lohduttaa."
ellauri163.html on line 789: Mouchetten kärsimys on luettu uskonnolliseksi vertaukseksi, jossa hänen hyljeksintänsä koulussa, isänsä julma laiminlyönti, kyläläisten vihjailevat katseet ja hänen raastavat kotitehtävänsä ovat risteysasemilla. Mutta olivatpa Bressonin tai Bernadotten hengelliset aikomukset mitkä tahansa, elokuva tarjoaa rajattomat esimerkit elokuvasta ylevimmillään. (Yäk.) Vihaisessa mutta myötätuntoisessa ilmiannossaan maaseutuyhteiskunnasta, joka turmelee ja kellistää epätavallisen enkelin oman edun, moraalittomuuden, alkoholismin ja hengellisen konkurssin vuoksi, ohjaaja johdattaa sinut elämän paradoksin ytimeen. Se paradoxi on että kaikki on niin kurjaa mutta silti mukavaa kun kazoo filmistä muiden kurjuutta.
ellauri172.html on line 235: Mixi tää on edes paradoxi? En ymmärrä. Voishan se heittää lanttia kuin Aku Ankka ja antaa höpsismin ratkaista. Tai jos kaviolla on vaikea käsitellä lanttia, laittaa vaan silmät kiinni. Ja kolmannexi, ei kai siitä mitään haittaa ole, jos noin tyhmä aasi kuolee nälkään, sehän ois sille vaan ansaittu Darwinin palkinto.
ellauri172.html on line 239: Buridanin paradoxi on vanhempi kuin Buridanin aasi. Aristotelestä nauratti Platon ajatus että maa olisi liikkumaton sixi että siihin vaikuttaa yhtäsuuret voimat joka puolelta. Se olisi yhtä epätodennäköistä kuin että
ellauri172.html on line 254: Later writers satirised this view in terms of an ass which, confronted by both food and water, must necessarily die of both hunger and thirst while pondering a decision. Some proponents of hard determinism have granted the unpleasantness of the scenario (not for the donkey, it will end up eating both), but have denied that it illustrates a true paradox, since one does not contradict oneself in suggesting that a man might die between two equally plausible routes of action. For example, in his Ethics, Benedict de Spinoza suggests that a person who dies because he can't decide is an ass, or worse.
ellauri172.html on line 260: Other writers [who?] have opted to deny the validity of the illustration. A typical [citation needed] counter-argument is that rationality as described in the paradox is so limited as to be a straw man version of the real thing. The idea that a random decision could be made is sometimes used as an attempted justification for faith. The argument is that, like the starving ass, we must make a choice to avoid being frozen in endless doubt. Other counter-arguments exist. [This paragraph was total balderdash, if I may say so.]
ellauri172.html on line 263: Social Psychologist Kurt Lewin's Field Theory treated this paradox experimentally. He demonstrated that lab rats experience difficulty when choosing between two equally attractive (approach-approach) goals. The typical response to approach-approach decisions is initial ambivalence, though the decision becomes more decisive as the organism moves towards one choice and away from another. [So what? Kurt should repeat the experiment with donkeys.]
ellauri172.html on line 267: I don't doubt it, but what of it? Must have happened zillion times say with flies trying to decide between staying on a turd and fleeing. He further illustrates the paradox with the example of a driver stopped at a railroad crossing trying to decide whether he has time to cross before a train arrives. Ei tällä höpsästelyllä ole mitään tekemistä apinoiden kanssa eikä niiden jumaloidenkaan.
ellauri196.html on line 841: The academicians of Stockholm have often (though not always) said no to intolerance, cruel fanaticism and that persecuting spirit which turns the strong against the weak, oppressors against the oppressed, rather than the other way round. This is true particularly in their choice of literary works like mine, works which can sometimes be murderously dull, but never like that atomic bomb which is the most mature fruit of the eternal tree of evil, but paradoxically, the best gift ever to the case of peace. It kept Europeans from murdering each other for almost 100 years.
ellauri197.html on line 319: It is also noteworthy that she speaks of “perish[ing] of the cold,” not “in the cold.” This treats “the cold,” or the devastation from the memory, like a disease rather than a weather detail, which furthers the paradox of how the situation remembered is treated. In the first stanza, it “Bloom[s].” Here, it has essentially become a disease. This again mirrors the uncertainty and lack of clarity within the narrator’s thoughts regarding the situation.
ellauri198.html on line 751: Mitä tuubaa! Aivan hanurista! "The paradox of perspectivism is that it depends wholly on the subject/object dualism." Etupiässä takapiässä, takapiässä etupiässä, liikkuuko siitin emättimessä vaiko emätin siittimen ympärillä, ei tiedä ilman viitekehystä, sanoo E. Saarisen suhteellisuusteoria. Milttoni saatana, siinä vasta perspektivisti! Misprision tarkoittaa sanan väärinkäyttöä.
ellauri210.html on line 1318: In the remaining quarter of the text, André distances himself from her corporeal form and descends into a meandering rumination on her absence, so much so that one wonders if her absence offers him greater inspiration than does her presence. It is, after all, the reification and materialization of Nadja as an ordinary person that André ultimately despises and cannot tolerate to the point of inducing tears. There is something about the closeness once felt between the narrator and Nadja that indicated a depth beyond the limits of conscious rationality, waking logic, and sane operations of the everyday. There is something essentially “mysterious, improbable, unique, bewildering” about her; this reinforces the notion that their propinquity serves only to remind André of Nadja's impenetrability. Her eventual recession into absence is the fundamental concern of this text, an absence that permits Nadja to live freely in André's conscious and unconscious, seemingly unbridled, maintaining her paradoxical role as both present and absent. With Nadja's past fixed within his own memory and consciousness, the narrator is awakened to the impenetrability of reality and perceives a particularly ghostly residue peeking from under its thin veil. Thus, he might better put into practice his theory of Surrealism, predicated on the dreaminess of the experience of reality within reality itself. Nadja Nadja soromnoo.
ellauri222.html on line 745: The question arises why Voltaire inserts such a character in the novella, and what functions he performs in the story. On the one hand, Lord Pococurante embodies the then French aristocracy, the social class, surfeited with everything. The author attracts the reader’s attention to a very curious paradox: people, who live in luxury, cannot enjoy it. Though it is not explicitly stated by Voltaire, such people are doomed to failure. At this point, we can say with certainty that Voltaire is prophetic in this novella.
ellauri222.html on line 763: This grooming of the self paradoxically requires looking out for number 1. Nowhere is this fact more vividly portrayed than in Henderson the Rain King. Driven in the beginning by a relentless inner voice that repeats, "I want! I want!," Henderson's egoistic absorption in his material success ironically alienates him from himself. Hitching his family to seek fundamental truths in the wilderness of Africa, he discovers the arse loving relationship that men need with nature and with each other and symbolically surrenders his self by accepting responsibility for a lion cub and an orphan child.
ellauri222.html on line 797: Except for Clara Velde in A Theft, the protagonists in Bellow's novels and novellas are all male. The Bellovian hero typically seeks erotic pleasure, emotional security, and egoistic confirmation from the women in his life. In marriage, his relationships with women are conflicted, and he often retreats from his role as husband to a sensuous but selfish and demanding wife who paradoxically represents both his yearning for freewheeling sex happiness and society's pressure to relinquish the freedom so essential to his self-realization. Like his male characters who all are Saul lookalikes, Bellow's females are often interchangeable and serve roles of little dramatic import. However, although the author has come under increasing criticism for his superficial treatment of women, his depiction of women and male-female relationships serves to reinforce the psychological crisis that each male protagonist must negotiate to empty their scrotums so as to achieve peace and fulfillment.
ellauri256.html on line 46: Rozanov frequently referred to himself as Fyodor Dostoyevsky's "Underground Man" and proclaimed his right to espouse contrary opinions at the same time. He first attracted attention in the 1890s when he published political sketches in the conservative newspaper Novoye Vremya ("New Time"), owned and run by Aleksey Suvorin. Rozanov's comments, always paradoxical and sparking controversy, led him into clashes with the Tsarist government and with radicals such as Lenin. For example, Rozanov readily passed from criticism of Russian Orthodoxy, and even of what he saw as the Christian preoccupation with death, to fervent praise of Christian faith, from praise of Judaism to unabashed anti-Semitism, and from acceptance of homosexuality as yet another side of human nature to vitriolic accusations that Gogol and some other writers had been latent homosexuals.[citation needed] He proclaimed that politics was "obsolete" because "God doesn't want politics any more," constructed an "apocalypse of our times," and recommended the "healthy instincts" of the Russian people, their longing for authority, and their hostility to modernism.
ellauri262.html on line 164: Lewis was raised in a religious family that attended the Church of Ireland. He became an atheist at age 15, though he later described his young self as being paradoxically "very angry with God for not existing" and "equally angry with him for creating a world". His early separation from Christianity began when he started to view his religion as a chore and a duty; around this time, he also gained an interest in the occult, as his studies expanded to include such topics. His main argument against God was theodicy.
ellauri391.html on line 277: Kristus suostui olemaan syntinen ihminen. Hetkinen senhän piti olla synnitön? Tässä on on nyt jotain hämärää, reason to suspect foul play. Me saadaan olla syntisiä kerta jumalakin on. Synti erottaa sen jumalasta eli siitä izestään. Ei helkkari, tää ei nyt oikein pelitä. Taas päädyttiin paradoxiin. Mene vankilaan käymättä kassan kautta. Tän pitää olla joku metafora, äiti ja isä samalla.
xxx/ellauri013.html on line 319: Ei se ihan noin strömsöösti menny Russellilla. Se löysi Russellin paradoxin, joka hölmöydessään jo osoittaa, että matikkaa ei voi johtaa pelkästä logiikasta. Joko se todistaa liikaa (ristiriidasta seuraa kaikki), tai liian vähän, ja pitää lisätä axioomia, jotka ei vaikuta kovinkaan loogisilta (esim. että ei ole suurinta joukkoa, että on olemassa semmoisia ja tämmöisiä funktioita, jne. jne. Eli matemaatikot ja loogikot sanoi lopulta goodbye ja keskittyi omiin ongelmiinsa kumpikin. Russell lopetti matematiikan miettimisen paradoxiin ja keskittyi siitälähin panohommiin ja jokamiehen filosofiaan.
xxx/ellauri075.html on line 81: Dies kommt daher, dass Schestow das Leben selbst als letztendlich in höchstem Maße paradox ansieht. Er hält es für mit Hilfe von Logik oder Vernunft nicht erfassbar. Keine Theorie könne die Geheimnisse des Lebens ergründen. Schestows Philosophie ist nicht „problemlösend“, sondern wirft Probleme auf und versucht, das Leben so rätselhaft wie möglich erscheinen zu lassen. Schestows Philosophie geht nicht von einer Idee, sondern von einer Erfahrung aus.
xxx/ellauri113.html on line 112: No Tapsaa jäi informaatioparadoxi kiusaamaan, eli hukkuuko mustassa reijässä infoa. Menneisyys kertoo ketä olemme. Musta aukko uhkailee nielaista identiteettimme. No useimmille jo muutaman vuoden takainen menneisyys on musta aukko. Vanhalle alzheimerille riittää alle minuutti. Apinat on muutenkin liki identtisiä keskenään. Eli ei tässä suuresta vahingosta ole kysymys. Sitäpaizi heti Hawkingin kadottua tapahtumahorisontin taa selvisi, että info säilyy kuin säilyykin sen reijästä:
xxx/ellauri123.html on line 1152: Remy (or Rémi) Belleau (1528 – 6 March 1577) was a poet of the French Renaissance. He is most known for his paradoxical poems of praise for simple things and his poems about precious stones.
xxx/ellauri128.html on line 300: Rakkaus on paradoxaalisesti asento ja lepo.Eeva KilpiFFUCK!
xxx/ellauri149.html on line 366: Conversely, Howard Thompson of The New York Times wrote, "Broadway and Israel meet head on and disastrously in the movie version of the rock opera 'Jesus Christ Superstar,' produced in the Biblical locale. The mod-pop glitter, the musical frenzy and the neon tubing of this super-hot stage bonanza encasing the Greatest Story are now painfully magnified, laid bare and ultimately patched beneath the blue, majestic Israeli sky, as if by a natural judgment." Arthur D. Murphy of Variety wrote that the film "in a paradoxical way is both very good and very disappointing at the same time. The abstract film concept ... veers from elegantly simple through forced metaphor to outright synthetic in dramatic impact."
xxx/ellauri157.html on line 60: It isn't for the moment you are struck that you need courage, but for that long uphill climb back to sanity and faith and financial security. Only in growth, reform, and change, paradoxically enough, is true financial security to be found.
xxx/ellauri173.html on line 188: Quant aux mystiques, je puis leur soumettre une réflexion naïve, paradoxale, superficielle, s’ils veulent, mais singulière : ― N’est-il pas attristant de penser que si Dieu, le Très-Haut, le bon Dieu, dis-je, enfin le Tout-Puissant, (lequel, de notoriété publique, est apparu à tant de gens, qui l’ont affirmé, depuis les vieux siècles, ― nul ne saurait le contester sans hérésie ― et dont tant de mauvais peintres et de sculpteurs médiocres s’évertuent à vulgariser de chic les prétendus traits) ― oui, penser que s’Il daignait nous laisser prendre la moindre, la plus humble photographie de Lui, voire me permettre, à moi, Thomas Alva Edison, ingénieur américain, sa créature, de clicher une simple épreuve videographique de Sa vraie Nez et Voix (car le tonnerre a bien mué, depuis Franklin), dès le lendemain il n’y aurait plus un seul athée sur la terre !
xxx/ellauri193.html on line 823: Rather, the death penalty has a paradoxical “imitative effect” on potential murderers: “It sets an official governmental example that killing someone is a proper way to resolve feelings of resentment and to take revenge”. And what the fuck, you can as well hang for 10 murders given you have committed 1.
xxx/ellauri229.html on line 444: Another choice some people won’t agree with, but I let the post-death Elvira in, why be afraid to take the same step in the opposite direction? It’s a puzzle this book, and it would be a shame to attempt to unpick it for anyone who’s not yet had the joy of swimming in its paradoxical, philosophical, intoxicating waters. It’s sometimes been called a grown-up Alice In Wonderland and that seems close enough. It’s a great treat for the enquiring teenager (or any) mind, especially an enquiring mind not in search of anything specific. It’s a book that should be read twice, at least. And you’ll never look at a bicycle the same again.
xxx/ellauri250.html on line 245: Kritikerna menar att detta, paradoxalt nog, kan resultera i tillstånd där en majoritet förtrycker en eller t flera minoriteter, och i rangordning av människovärde, rentav i eugenik, alltså stålfascistisk rashygien. Då vi mäter kvalitetsjusterade levnadsår: vem är egentligen värdig att räddas, vem utgör ett "slöseri" av värdefulla resurser?
xxx/ellauri312.html on line 354: "The establishment of Israel is an event which actively engages the conscience of this generation....It is, therefore, a bitter paradox to find that a State which was destined to be a shelter for a martyred people is itself a Nazi State." Tämä puhe jäi Pertiltä pitämässä Israelissa kun maha-aortta halkesi.
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