ellauri089.html on line 423: § 10. "Good", then, denotes one unique simple object of thought among innumerable others; but this object has very commonly been identified with some other—a fallacy which may be called "the naturalistic fallacy" … Tässä Jyriltä alkaa lähteä riimu käsistä. Sillä on niin iso lehmälauma ojassa, ettei se pysty pitelemään sitä. 1 lehmistä on että ainoa merkizevä hyvä on termiittiapinoiden hyvä, lehmistä ei mitään väliä. Niitä on hyvä popsia aivan vapaasti. Koska lehmät ei ole meikäläisiä, niillä ei ole sielua, ei äänioikeutta eikä armeijaa, ja ne maistuu meistä apinoista hyvältä. So there!
ellauri089.html on line 431: § 14. The "naturalistic fallacy" illustrated by Bentham; and the importance of avoiding it pointed out. …
ellauri089.html on line 467: § 31. Mr Spencer's connection of Evolution with Ethics seems to shew the influence of the naturalistic fallacy; …
ellauri089.html on line 473: § 34. Three possible views as to the relation of Evolution to Ethics are distinguished from the naturalistic view to which it is proposed to confine the name "Evolutionistic Ethics". On any of these three views the relation would be unimportant, and the "Evolutionistic" view, which makes it important, involves a double fallacy. …
ellauri089.html on line 479: § 36. The prevalence of Hedonism is mainly due to the naturalistic fallacy. …
ellauri089.html on line 544: § 67. and by "metaphysical Ethics" I mean those systems which maintain or imply that the answer to the question "What is good?" logically depends upon the answer to the question "What is the nature of supersensible reality?" All such systems obviously involve the same fallacy—the "naturalistic fallacy"—by the use of which Naturalism was also defined. …
ellauri089.html on line 548: § 69. But the theory, by which I have defined Metaphysical Ethics, is not that Metaphysics has a logical bearing upon the question involved in practical Ethics "What effects will my action produce?", but that it has such a bearing upon the fundamental ethical question, "What is good in itself?" This theory has been refuted by the proof, in Chap. I, that the naturalistic fallacy is a fallacy; it only remains to discuss certain confusions which seem to have lent it plausibility. …
ellauri096.html on line 102: Science is about what is the case rather than what ought to be case. This seems to imply that science does not tell us what we ought to believe. The traditional way to fill the normative gap is to delegate issues of justification to epistemologists. However, Quine is uncomfortable with delegating such authority to philosophers. He prefers the thesis that psychology is enough to handle the issues traditionally addressed by epistemologists (or at least the issues still worth addressing in an Age of Science). This “naturalistic epistemology” seems to imply that ‘know’ and ‘justified’ are antiquated terms – as empty as ‘phlogiston’ or ‘soul’.
ellauri097.html on line 481: What you ought to be saying if you don’t believe in God is, It’s just molecules clashing in the universe. There is no right and wrong, so you have no justification for claiming that I’m wrong. Now, that would be consistent - the relativistic view of a materialistic universe. But, of course, then they can’t complain their “rights” because rights don’t have any place in a purely naturalistic system. Rights are part of teleology, endowed with creation.
ellauri144.html on line 596: Bitter Bierceä haukuttiin aikanaan naturalistixi. Silloin tarkoitettiin varmaan Emile Zolan "pahaa" naturalismia, johon kuului tieteisusko ja determinismi, eikä Norrisin hampaatonta amerikkalaista "naturalismia", joka oli potpurri realismista ja romantiikasta. Zola´s concept of a naturalistic novel traces philosophically to Auguste Comte´s positivism, but also to physiologist Claude Bernard and historian Hippolyte Taine. Hippolyte on jo esiintynyt näissä paasauxissa, kai Akukin on saanut jotain mainintoja. Claude on toistaisexi n.h. (never heard).
ellauri164.html on line 232: A pupil of William "Will to Believe" James, whose Essays in Radical Empiricism he edited (1912), Perry became one of the leaders of the New Realism movement. Perry argued for a naturalistic theory of value and a New Realist theory of perception and knowledge. He wrote a celebrated biography of William James, which won the 1936 Pulitzer Prize for Biography or Autobiography, and proceeded to a revision of his critical approach to natural knowledge. An active member among a group of American New Realist philosophers, he elaborated around 1910 the program of new realism. However, he soon dissented from moral and spiritual ontology, and turned to a philosophy of disillusionment. Perry was an advocate of a militant democracy: in his words "total but not totalitarian". Puritanism and Democracy (1944) is a famous wartime attempt to reconcile two fundamental concepts in the origins of modern America. Durkheim oli taas aivan oikeassa: sodan aikana vedetään moraalin korsetinnauhat kireälle.
ellauri183.html on line 59: In the 20th century, the word was further refined, acquiring iz contemporary meaning of a naturalistic approach to life, focusing on the well-being and freedom of humans. Siinä on luoja korvattu luomakunnan herralla. Termiittiapina palvoo avoimesti omaa raidallista persettään. Jotakinhan pitää aina palvoa. Lähteet:
xxx/ellauri091.html on line 285: Gerhart (Johann Robert) Hauptmann (1862-1946: prominent German dramatist of the early 20th century. Hauptmann won the Nobel Prize for Literature in 1912. His naturalistic plays are still frequently performed. Hauptmann's best-known works include The Weavers (1893), a humanist drama of a rebellion against the mechanisms of the Industrial Revolution, and Hannele (1884), about the conflict between reality and fantasy.
xxx/ellauri168.html on line 297: Notable ideas: Hard problem of consciousness, extended mind, two-dimensional semantics, naturalistic dualism, philosophical zombie.
xxx/ellauri168.html on line 306: Chalmers argues for an "explanatory gap" from the objective to the subjective, and criticizes physicalist explanations of mental experience, making him a dualist. Chalmers characterizes his view as "naturalistic dualism": naturalistic because he believes mental states supervene "naturally" on physical systems (such as brains); dualist because he believes mental states are ontologically distinct from and not reducible to physical systems. He has also characterized his view by more traditional formulations such as property dualism.
xxx/ellauri179.html on line 201: Still, the fact that they bring up Hemingway’s Catholicism at all confirmed my own suspicions of a deeper, clear-eyed spiritual sensibility lurking behind all of Hemingway’s naturalistic plots — forcing me to reconsider everything I had previously thought about the man. I see Catholicism as playing a central role in Hemingway’s literary vision and moral landscape. Non-catholics just turn away from the religious clues in his work to focus on his public image, war exploits, and psychological instability — all the while missing that singularly under-reported and significant aspect of Hemingway’s life as a writer: his Catholicism.
xxx/ellauri179.html on line 224: The first time I read Hemingway’s books, I found an irrepressible piety and sense of the sacred permeating all his naturalistic plots. Had I known then about his Catholicism, it would have clarified things — and made the books better.
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