ellauri033.html on line 142: la forme. Beaucoup de pièces sont tout uniment inintelligibles; la
ellauri062.html on line 843: Sitä ei kiinnostanut ihmisen intelligiibeli minä, josta kaikki luonnossa muistuttaa, ihminen mikrokosmoksena, vaan valta. Weininger asetti ihmisen kaiken toiminnan ohjenuoraksi tietoisuuden omasta intelligiibelistä minästä, koska ainoastaan se tekee hänet tietoiseksi myös sinästä ja sinun Dingistä an sich, ja saa hänet luopumaan pyrkimyksistä käyttää toista (tai itseään) välineenä mihinkään tarkoitukseen. Sinun anus on arvo sinänsä.
ellauri082.html on line 502: This mind as society hypothesis has outward advantages which make it almost irresistibly attractive to the intellect, and yet it is inwardly quite unintelligible. Of its unintelligibility, however, half the writers on psychology seem unaware.
ellauri094.html on line 378: We shouldn’t miss that worldviews are at play even with the skeptic’s objection to Christianity. The worldview of the author of the Skeptic Annotated Bible actually doesn’t even allow for such a thing as the law of non-contradiction to be meaningful and intelligible. In other words for him to try to disprove the Bible by pointing out that there’s a Bible contradiction doesn’t even make sense within his own worldview. Check out our post “Skeptic Annotated Bible Author’s Self-Defeating Worldview.” Read also Stanford's bit on contradictory beliefs here. Lisää aiheesta:
ellauri153.html on line 494: confusions arise out of appeals to sufficient reasons for intelligibility and for moral justification. An
ellauri153.html on line 554: Now that the problem of evil has been exposed as a conceptual confusion, the way is clear for a Jamesian science of religions and worldviews. The methods of grammatical description can be extended to the practices and ways of sense-making in different worldviews: how they give meaning to moral practices and how do they approach the intelligibility of the world? What practical responses do they have for coping with evil? For example, the grammar of seeing-as for models and metaphors can be applied to the metaphors in the Hebrew Bible for God’s activity to understand what it is to see the world as God’s creation. The grammar of virtues can be used to describe Buddhist practices and explore, how these approaches contribute to the human good. Similar approaches can be taken to secular worldviews as well. These descriptions can then be used to assess the worldviews through dialogical encounters between them. However, one thing should be clear. There is no point in devaluing the world by arguing for the meaninglessness of life or atheism on the basis of evil, or in giving justifications for evils that can stand in the way of divine or human meliorist projects of fighting for justice. To paraphrase the judgment of the Divine Judge in the Book of Job, such approaches are not even wrong. They are as meaningless as life itself.

ellauri158.html on line 129: P. 1. axiom. 5. Quae nihil commune cum se invicem habent, etiam per se invicem intelligi non possunt, sive conceptus unius alterius conceptum non involvit. [in: P. 1. prop. 3.]
ellauri158.html on line 760: P. 3. defin. 1. Causam adaequatam appello eam, cuius effectus potest clare et distincte per eandem percipi. Inadaequatam autem seu partialem illam voco, cuius effectus per ipsam solam intelligi nequit. [in: P. 3. defin. 2., prop. 1., P. 4. prop. 2., prop. 5., prop. 23., prop. 33., P. 5. prop. 31.]
ellauri158.html on line 761: P. 3. defin. 2. Nos tum agere dico, cum aliquid in nobis aut extra nos fit, cuius adaequata sumus causa, hoc est cum ex nostra natura aliquid in nobis, aut extra nos sequitur, quod per eandem solam potest clare et distincte intelligi. At contra nos pati dico, cum in nobis aliquid fit vel ex nostra natura aliquid sequitur, cuius nos non nisi partialis sumus causa. [in: P. 3. prop. 1., P. 4. prop. 2., prop. 5., prop. 15., prop. 23., prop. 33., prop. 35., prop. 35. coroll. 1., prop. 52., prop. 59., prop. 61., prop. 64.]
ellauri158.html on line 993: P. 4. defin. 8. Per virtutem et potentiam idem intelligo; hoc est (per prop. 7. P. 3.) virtus, quatenus ad hominem refertur, est ipsa hominis essentia seu natura, quatenus potestatem habet, quaedam efficiend, quae per solas ipsius naturae leges possunt intelligi. [in: P. 4. prop. 18. schol., prop. 20., prop. 22., prop. 23., prop. 24., prop. 35. coroll. 2., prop. 56., P. 5. prop. 25., prop. 42.]
ellauri158.html on line 1001: P. 4. prop. 4. Fieri non potest, ut homo non sit naturae pars et ut nullas possit pati mutationes, nisi quae per solam suam naturam possint intelligi, quarumque adaequata sit causa. [in: P. 4. prop. 68. schol.]
ellauri158.html on line 1031: P. 4. prop. 23. Homo quatenus ad aliquid agendum determinatur ex eo, quod ideas habet inadaequatas, non potest absolute dici ex virtute agere; sed tantum quatenus determinatur ex eo, quod intelligit. [in: P. 4. prop. 28.]
ellauri158.html on line 1160: P. 5. prop. 6. Quatenus mens res omnes ut necessarias intelligit, eatenus maiorem in affectus potentiam habet, seu minus ab iisdem patitur. [in: P. 5. prop. 10. schol.]
ellauri158.html on line 1169: P. 5. prop. 12. Rerum imagines facilius imaginibus, quae ad res referuntur, quas clare et distincte intelligimus, iunguntur, quam aliis. [in: P. 5. prop. 20. schol.]
ellauri158.html on line 1172: P. 5. prop. 15. Qui se suosque affectus clare et distincte intelligit, Deum amat, et eo magis, quo se suosque affectus magis intelligit. [in: P. 5. prop. 16., prop. 20. schol., prop. 39.]
ellauri158.html on line 1189: P. 5. prop. 24. Quo magis res singulares intelligimus, eo magis Deum intelligimus. [in: P. 5. prop. 25., prop. 27.]
ellauri158.html on line 1195: P. 5. prop. 29. Quicquid mens sub specie aeternitatis intelligit, id ex eo non intelligit, quod corporis praesentem actualem existentiam concipit; sed ex eo, quod corporis essentiam concipit sub specie aeternitatis. [in: P. 5. prop. 31., prop. 32. coroll., prop. 37., prop. 38., prop. 40. coroll.]
ellauri158.html on line 1200: P. 5. prop. 32. Quicquid intelligimus tertio cognitionis genere, eo delectamur, et quidem concomitante idea Dei tamquam causa. [in: P. 5. prop. 32. coroll., prop. 36., prop. 42.]
ellauri158.html on line 1216: P. 5. prop. 38. Quo plures res secundo et tertio cognitionis genere mens intelligit, eo minus ipsa ab affectibus, qui mali sunt, patitur et mortem minus timet. [in: P. 5. prop. 42.]
ellauri158.html on line 1222: -- P. 5. prop. 40. schol. Mens nostra quatenus intelligit aeterna cogitandi modus est.
ellauri160.html on line 196: Harriet Monroe, editor of Poetry, published a letter in April 1919 from a professor of Latin, W. G. Hale, who found "about three-score errors" in the text; he said Pound was "incredibly ignorant of Latin", that "much of what he makes his author say is unintelligible", and that "If Mr. Pound were a professor of Latin, there would be nothing left for him but suicide" (adding "I do not counsel this"). Pound replied to Monroe: "Cat-piss and porcupines!! The thing is no more a translation than my 'Altaforte' is a translation, or than Fitzgerald's Omar is a translation."
ellauri183.html on line 168: In Fear and Trembling, Kierkegaard follows Kant in emphasising that Abraham's decision is morally repugnant and rationally unintelligible. However, he also shows that one consequence of Kant's view is that, if nothing is higher than human reason, then belief in God becomes dispensable. Unlike both Kant and Luther, Kierkegaard does not promote a particular judgment about Abraham, but rather presenz his readers with a dilemma: either Abraham is no better than a murderer, and there are no grounds for admiring him; or moral duties do not constitute the highest claim on the human being. Fear and Trembling does not resolve this dilemma, and perhaps for a religious person there is no entirely satisfactory way of resolving it.
ellauri197.html on line 684: ¹Bonne question. Ce début sans prétention, ce remuement des passions qui va d’abord en accroissant et puis s’appaise par degrés, ces élans de l’âme, ce retour soudain sur soi-même. Cette idée que je ne saisis pas parfaitement lui est peut-être aussi peu intelligible qu’à moi. PAULINE.

xxx/ellauri128.html on line 604: Il est le promoteur d´un réalisme critique et d´une philosophie de l´être et de l´exister supérieure, d´après lui, aux philosophies de l´Un, du vrai, du bien, de la liberté, de la durée, de l´existence (coupée de l´essence). Le principe fondateur de cette doctrine de l´être est le principe d´identité qui justifie en droit une « raison d´être » intelligible (causalité, finalité). Du principe d´identité découlent toutes les catégories de l´être (essence/existence ; acte/puissance ; substance ; quantité ; qualité ; relation, etc.), d´où l´on déduit l´être même subsistant (Dieu) qu´Heidegger a confondu à tort selon lui avec un existant suprême. Ota tuosta nyt selvää.
xxx/ellauri173.html on line 325: N’est-ce pas Hégel qui a dit : « Il faut comprendre l’inintelligible comme tel ? » Credo quia absurdumko taas?
xxx/ellauri225.html on line 412: Ongelmaxi muodostui ettei Kraanan runoissa ollut päätä eikä häntääkään. Even a young Tennessee Williams, then falling in love with Crane´s poetry, could "hardly understand a single line—of course the individual lines aren't supposed to be intelligible. The message, if there actually is one, comes from the total effect."
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