ellauri033.html on line 142: la forme. Beaucoup de pièces sont tout uniment inintelligibles; la
ellauri062.html on line 846: Sitä ei kiinnostanut ihmisen intelligiibeli minä, josta kaikki luonnossa muistuttaa, ihminen mikrokosmoksena, vaan valta. Weininger asetti ihmisen kaiken toiminnan ohjenuoraksi tietoisuuden omasta intelligiibelistä minästä, koska ainoastaan se tekee hänet tietoiseksi myös sinästä ja sinun Dingistä an sich, ja saa hänet luopumaan pyrkimyksistä käyttää toista (tai itseään) välineenä mihinkään tarkoitukseen. Sinun anus on arvo sinänsä.
ellauri082.html on line 501: This mind as society hypothesis has outward advantages which make it almost irresistibly attractive to the intellect, and yet it is inwardly quite unintelligible. Of its unintelligibility, however, half the writers on psychology seem unaware.
ellauri094.html on line 378: We shouldn’t miss that worldviews are at play even with the skeptic’s objection to Christianity. The worldview of the author of the Skeptic Annotated Bible actually doesn’t even allow for such a thing as the law of non-contradiction to be meaningful and intelligible. In other words for him to try to disprove the Bible by pointing out that there’s a Bible contradiction doesn’t even make sense within his own worldview. Check out our post “Skeptic Annotated Bible Author’s Self-Defeating Worldview.” Read also Stanford's bit on contradictory beliefs here. Lisää aiheesta:
ellauri153.html on line 494: confusions arise out of appeals to sufficient reasons for intelligibility and for moral justification. An
ellauri153.html on line 554: Now that the problem of evil has been exposed as a conceptual confusion, the way is clear for a Jamesian science of religions and worldviews. The methods of grammatical description can be extended to the practices and ways of sense-making in different worldviews: how they give meaning to moral practices and how do they approach the intelligibility of the world? What practical responses do they have for coping with evil? For example, the grammar of seeing-as for models and metaphors can be applied to the metaphors in the Hebrew Bible for God’s activity to understand what it is to see the world as God’s creation. The grammar of virtues can be used to describe Buddhist practices and explore, how these approaches contribute to the human good. Similar approaches can be taken to secular worldviews as well. These descriptions can then be used to assess the worldviews through dialogical encounters between them. However, one thing should be clear. There is no point in devaluing the world by arguing for the meaninglessness of life or atheism on the basis of evil, or in giving justifications for evils that can stand in the way of divine or human meliorist projects of fighting for justice. To paraphrase the judgment of the Divine Judge in the Book of Job, such approaches are not even wrong. They are as meaningless as life itself.


ellauri158.html on line 129: P. 1. axiom. 5. Quae nihil commune cum se invicem habent, etiam per se invicem intelligi non possunt, sive conceptus unius alterius conceptum non involvit. [in: P. 1. prop. 3.]
ellauri158.html on line 762: P. 3. defin. 1. Causam adaequatam appello eam, cuius effectus potest clare et distincte per eandem percipi. Inadaequatam autem seu partialem illam voco, cuius effectus per ipsam solam intelligi nequit. [in: P. 3. defin. 2., prop. 1., P. 4. prop. 2., prop. 5., prop. 23., prop. 33., P. 5. prop. 31.]
ellauri158.html on line 763: P. 3. defin. 2. Nos tum agere dico, cum aliquid in nobis aut extra nos fit, cuius adaequata sumus causa, hoc est cum ex nostra natura aliquid in nobis, aut extra nos sequitur, quod per eandem solam potest clare et distincte intelligi. At contra nos pati dico, cum in nobis aliquid fit vel ex nostra natura aliquid sequitur, cuius nos non nisi partialis sumus causa. [in: P. 3. prop. 1., P. 4. prop. 2., prop. 5., prop. 15., prop. 23., prop. 33., prop. 35., prop. 35. coroll. 1., prop. 52., prop. 59., prop. 61., prop. 64.]
ellauri158.html on line 995: P. 4. defin. 8. Per virtutem et potentiam idem intelligo; hoc est (per prop. 7. P. 3.) virtus, quatenus ad hominem refertur, est ipsa hominis essentia seu natura, quatenus potestatem habet, quaedam efficiend, quae per solas ipsius naturae leges possunt intelligi. [in: P. 4. prop. 18. schol., prop. 20., prop. 22., prop. 23., prop. 24., prop. 35. coroll. 2., prop. 56., P. 5. prop. 25., prop. 42.]
ellauri158.html on line 1003: P. 4. prop. 4. Fieri non potest, ut homo non sit naturae pars et ut nullas possit pati mutationes, nisi quae per solam suam naturam possint intelligi, quarumque adaequata sit causa. [in: P. 4. prop. 68. schol.]
ellauri158.html on line 1033: P. 4. prop. 23. Homo quatenus ad aliquid agendum determinatur ex eo, quod ideas habet inadaequatas, non potest absolute dici ex virtute agere; sed tantum quatenus determinatur ex eo, quod intelligit. [in: P. 4. prop. 28.]
ellauri158.html on line 1148: P. 5. prop. 6. Quatenus mens res omnes ut necessarias intelligit, eatenus maiorem in affectus potentiam habet, seu minus ab iisdem patitur. [in: P. 5. prop. 10. schol.]
ellauri158.html on line 1157: P. 5. prop. 12. Rerum imagines facilius imaginibus, quae ad res referuntur, quas clare et distincte intelligimus, iunguntur, quam aliis. [in: P. 5. prop. 20. schol.]
ellauri158.html on line 1160: P. 5. prop. 15. Qui se suosque affectus clare et distincte intelligit, Deum amat, et eo magis, quo se suosque affectus magis intelligit. [in: P. 5. prop. 16., prop. 20. schol., prop. 39.]
ellauri158.html on line 1177: P. 5. prop. 24. Quo magis res singulares intelligimus, eo magis Deum intelligimus. [in: P. 5. prop. 25., prop. 27.]
ellauri158.html on line 1183: P. 5. prop. 29. Quicquid mens sub specie aeternitatis intelligit, id ex eo non intelligit, quod corporis praesentem actualem existentiam concipit; sed ex eo, quod corporis essentiam concipit sub specie aeternitatis. [in: P. 5. prop. 31., prop. 32. coroll., prop. 37., prop. 38., prop. 40. coroll.]
ellauri158.html on line 1188: P. 5. prop. 32. Quicquid intelligimus tertio cognitionis genere, eo delectamur, et quidem concomitante idea Dei tamquam causa. [in: P. 5. prop. 32. coroll., prop. 36., prop. 42.]
ellauri158.html on line 1204: P. 5. prop. 38. Quo plures res secundo et tertio cognitionis genere mens intelligit, eo minus ipsa ab affectibus, qui mali sunt, patitur et mortem minus timet. [in: P. 5. prop. 42.]
ellauri158.html on line 1210: -- P. 5. prop. 40. schol. Mens nostra quatenus intelligit aeterna cogitandi modus est.
ellauri160.html on line 231: Harriet Monroe, editor of Poetry, published a letter in April 1919 from a professor of Latin, W. G. Hale, who found "about three-score errors" in the text; he said Pound was "incredibly ignorant of Latin", that "much of what he makes his author say is unintelligible", and that "If Mr. Pound were a professor of Latin, there would be nothing left for him but suicide" (adding "I do not counsel this"). Pound replied to Monroe: "Cat-piss and porcupines!! The thing is no more a translation than my 'Altaforte' is a translation, or than Fitzgerald's Omar is a translation."
ellauri197.html on line 684: 1Bonne question. Ce début sans prétention, ce remuement des passions qui va d’abord en accroissant et puis s’appaise par degrés, ces élans de l’âme, ce retour soudain sur soi-même. Cette idée que je ne saisis pas parfaitement lui est peut-être aussi peu intelligible qu’à moi. PAULINE.

ellauri398.html on line 1007: If all reality is completely intelligible, then God exists.

ellauri398.html on line 1008: But all reality is completely intelligible.

ellauri428.html on line 275: is (i) true and (ii) adheres to a set of (salient) narrative conventions, contributes to the meaningfulness of one’s life. It does so by making the life more intelligible to oneself and others, thereby enabling the goods of understanding and community.
ellauri428.html on line 283: There’s lots more to say, but I should stop here. I’ll just flag an elephant in the room: the concept of meaningfulness. What the fuck is that supposed to mean? I think the concern about whether my life is meaningful has very little to do with whether it’s understandable or intelligible to me or others. But that’s for further discussion!
xxx/ellauri128.html on line 613: Il est le promoteur d´un réalisme critique et d´une philosophie de l´être et de l´exister supérieure, d´après lui, aux philosophies de l´Un, du vrai, du bien, de la liberté, de la durée, de l´existence (coupée de l´essence). Le principe fondateur de cette doctrine de l´être est le principe d´identité qui justifie en droit une « raison d´être » intelligible (causalité, finalité). Du principe d´identité découlent toutes les catégories de l´être (essence/existence ; acte/puissance ; substance ; quantité ; qualité ; relation, etc.), d´où l´on déduit l´être même subsistant (Dieu) qu´Heidegger a confondu à tort selon lui avec un existant suprême.
xxx/ellauri173.html on line 331: N’est-ce pas Hégel qui a dit : « Il faut comprendre l’inintelligible comme tel ? » Credo quia absurdumko taas?
xxx/ellauri183.html on line 168: In Fear and Trembling, Kierkegaard follows Kant in emphasising that Abraham's decision is morally repugnant and rationally unintelligible. However, he also shows that one consequence of Kant's view is that, if nothing is higher than human reason, then belief in God becomes dispensable. Unlike both Kant and Luther, Kierkegaard does not promote a particular judgment about Abraham, but rather presenz his readers with a dilemma: either Abraham is no better than a murderer, and there are no grounds for admiring him; or moral duties do not constitute the highest claim on the human being. Fear and Trembling does not resolve this dilemma, and perhaps for a religious person there is no entirely satisfactory way of resolving it.
xxx/ellauri225.html on line 413: Ongelmaxi muodostui ettei Kraanan runoissa ollut päätä eikä häntääkään. Even a young Tennessee Williams, then falling in love with Crane´s poetry, could "hardly understand a single line—of course the individual lines aren't supposed to be intelligible. The message, if there actually is one, comes from the total effect."
xxx/ellauri495.html on line 174: Your reaction is coherent: if God can do anything, then why create beings who can definitively choose against him, and why not create “happy animals” instead. In Christian philosophy (including Aquinas-adjacent lines), the standard response is essentially: God isn’t choosing between “happiness with no freedom” and “chaos,” but between kinds of goods. A common version goes like this:     Freedom is a real good. Created persons can love, obey, worship, and genuinely choose. “No free choice” trades away not just the possibility of sin, but also the possibility of love and moral/covenant relationship.     Omnipotence doesn’t mean “make any set of values compatible.” The classic view is that there are realities like “created agency” and “definitive choices” that can’t both be preserved while also guaranteeing that no creature ever chooses wrongly.     The “circus” is not trial-and-error but a created order with intelligible consequences. God permits the misuse of freedom rather than coercing away misuse, because coercion would undermine the kind of relationship and moral order being created. That still leaves the emotional/ethical punch of your last line (“I’d rather have no freedom than sin-capable freedom”), and many people who find the metaphysics unpersuasive land there: freedom is too expensive. If you’re open to it, I can answer in the most direct way by taking your preference seriously: do you want the argument for why “no freedom” is worse than it sounds, or do you want the argument for why God’s omnipotence allows more than “could have prevented this one outcome” (i.e., a deeper take on the “why create at all” question)?
xxx/ellauri495.html on line 178: You’re arguing that “genuine choice” buys you nothing you care about—because non-rational life already has attachment, play, loyalty, pleasure, etc.—while it also “buys” the option of rebellion. That’s a strong objection. Christian philosophy usually replies in a few ways, and you can see where you might still disagree:     Love and worship aren’t the point (or not the only point) of “choice.” Many theologians say moral freedom is valuable because it’s the capacity to recognize truth as truth and to will the good as good, not just as appetite/affinity. Animals can form bonds, but they aren’t typically described as capable of knowing God (or the good) and choosing it knowingly.     The real issue isn’t “choice causes trouble,” it’s “choice makes a certain kind of goodness possible.” In this view, a world with no wrongdoing-by-choice would have to either (a) remove the possibility of choosing against the good, or (b) control wills so thoroughly that they aren’t really themselves—so you’d lose more than worship; you’d lose the kind of relationship/virtue that requires responsibility.     “Adam/Eve/Satan caused trouble” doesn’t settle the “why create?” question. The typical Christian claim is that God isn’t trying to create a world where no one ever fails; God is creating a world with intelligible order where failure can be addressed (at least for humans) and where the deeper moral drama of the story matters. You may reject that, but it’s the internal logic. If you want, tell me which part you find most unacceptable: (a) that moral freedom is a different kind of good than animal-like life, or (b) that losing that good is too high a price even if it prevents all this suffering?
xxx/ellauri506.html on line 246: his use of language is "frequently unintelligible because he [Cummings] disregards the historical accumulation of meaning in words in favor of merely private and personal associations". I do the same! Vem bryr sig vaikkei kukaan muu ymmärrä. Kuten eräskin kriitikko ämmä sanoi Edistä: there is fine writing and powerful writing as well as some of the most pompous nonsense I ever let slip to the floor with a wide yawn. Like he wrote an intro for a collection of the comic strip Krazy Kat. a kike is the most dangerous machine as yet invented, he also aptly said. Estil was disappointed with materialism and science but just loved Santa Claus. He thought himself as Santa when he told Nancy I AM YOUR FATHER in 1946. Some Xmas present. Tässä vaiheessa Scofield ei olis voinut välittää vähempää.
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