Marise-älä marise, ja Pyllistä-älä pyllistä. Siinä kaikki. Jotta jumalan tiimi voittaisi, sen pitää ensin marista ja sit pyllistää. Nain on meidankin elamassamme! Marise mitä mariset, mut muista pyllistää!
xxx/ellauri491.html on line 226: The term General Language (Portuguese: língua geral) refers to lingua francas that emerged in South America during the 16th and 17th centuries, the two most prominent being the Paulista General Language, which was spoken in the region of Paulistania but is now extinct, and the Amazonian General Language, whose modern descendant is Nheengatu. Both were simplified versions of the Tupi language, the native language of the Tupi people. Jostain syystä 5M tupista kuoli 99% mutta guaraneita jäi jälelle. Ilmeisesti dagot oli tehokkaampia genosidejä. Tupis and Guaranis are two major divisions of the Tupi-Guarani language family, with Tupis primarily found in eastern Brazil and Guaranis in Paraguay and Argentina. Top Questions in Jewish Britannica: What is language? Why do humans use language? What are some different types of languages? How do people learn languages?
xxx/ellauri491.html on line 238: The common characteristic of Brazilian indigenous peoples in terms of religion is shamanism. The shaman is responsible for conducting the rituals. Among the Tupi-Guarani peoples, the shaman is called a pajé, the person who deals with the connections between living beings, nature, living and dead humans. WTF what's the diff to any other religion? Not really anything, to be honest, said Isaac with little hair.
xxx/ellauri491.html on line 263: Nature of ultimate reality and salvation: Christianity as said has this single, personal God who redeems humans from sin; salvation is central (eternal destiny tied to acceptance of God/Christ). Shamanism just has plural, immanent spirits and relational balance; focus is on healing, harmony, and practical outcomes in this life rather than an overarching doctrine of salvation in the next.
xxx/ellauri493.html on line 118: It doesnt bode well for humans who wantonly kill and eat hens.
xxx/ellauri493.html on line 121: According to Genesis, God explicitly gave humans permission to eat animal meat right after the global flood.
xxx/ellauri493.html on line 147: Because lions have paws and are predators, they are strictly unclean (treif), like humans. The cannibslistic tupi and guarani did not know that until Padre Anjovis let them know. Unclean animals were never allowed on the hotplate of the altar of God. But biblical figures frequently had to fight them in self-defense, like Peri the guarani.
xxx/ellauri495.html on line 154: In many traditional Christian readings, the “Adam and Eve” story is treated as a human choice that brings sin into human history, while Satan is treated as a created spiritual being whose rebellion is not something God could “undo” in the "same way." A common way to reconcile your question is: Satan’s “fall” isn’t redemption-worthy in the same category. Adam and Eve (in this framework) are people who can receive mercy after failing; Satan is understood as having persisted in rebellion rather than turning back—so there’s no “repentance moment” to parallel the Eden moment. Redemption is tied to a specific plan for humans. Christianity commonly holds that God’s rescue comes through a particular act (often described as Christ’s incarnation/sacrifice) aimed at humanity—so “redeeming Satan first” isn’t portrayed as part of the plan that addresses the human condition. Even if the Eden scene was preventable, it may serve a deeper purpose. Some interpretations say God wanted to test to what creatures do with freedom (and to set up the later “promise/solution” arc), rather than simply eliminating the possibility of wrongdoing. If you tell me which tradition/view you’re coming from (e.g., Catholic, Protestant, Orthodox, or a particular theology), I can match the explanation to that framework more closely.
xxx/ellauri495.html on line 162: In most Christian frameworks, God “didn’t straighten it out first” because Satan’s fall isn’t treated like a one-time human misstep that can be corrected by a simple reset; it’s treated as a decisive, ongoing refusal (a hardened rebellion), and the moral/spiritual order is allowed to follow from what a free created being chooses. Common answers to your “what was he testing?” point: It wasn’t a test for Satan in order to earn redemption. The “testing” language is usually applied to humans’ moral responsibility (Eden as a probation/test of obedience and trust), not to God giving Satan another chance. The Eden episode is usually framed as a revelation about what human beings would do with freedom, and it sets up the need for a rescue/atonement later. Some traditions add that the “serpent” is the instrument, not the core agent—so the real test is about whether humans will trust God, not about God “experimenting” on whether Satan is redeemable. If you want the tightest version of the answer for your viewpoint: do you lean more toward free-will/real-choice explanations or toward sovereignty/purpose explanations (God allowing rebellion to accomplish a larger plan)?
xxx/ellauri495.html on line 166: Right—if you’re using Aquinas, angels are created with intellect and will, and they really do choose. So the key Aquinas-style moves are usually: Satan’s “fall” is not like Eden where there’s still an opening to repent. In Aquinas’s picture, once an angel’s will makes its definitive choice for/against God, that choice becomes settled (angels don’t get “another round” in the same way humans do). God isn’t “testing Satan” like an experiment. In classical theology, God allows creatures to choose, but it’s not God setting up a trap to see what happens. The moral drama comes from the creature’s will turning (or refusing to turn) toward God. Why not “redeem first”? In the Thomistic frame, the problem isn’t that God didn’t know; it’s that redemption as a “second chance” presupposes a will that will accept it. If the angel’s decision is definitive refusal, then there’s nothing for God to “straighten out” without negating the very kind of choice Aquinas says angels have. If you want, tell me whether you’re working from Aquinas’s exact claims you mean (e.g., about angelic knowledge, the definitiveness/immutability of angelic choice, or “permission vs. causation”), and I’ll map the argument in that same vocabulary.
xxx/ellauri495.html on line 178: You’re arguing that “genuine choice” buys you nothing you care about—because non-rational life already has attachment, play, loyalty, pleasure, etc.—while it also “buys” the option of rebellion. That’s a strong objection. Christian philosophy usually replies in a few ways, and you can see where you might still disagree: Love and worship aren’t the point (or not the only point) of “choice.” Many theologians say moral freedom is valuable because it’s the capacity to recognize truth as truth and to will the good as good, not just as appetite/affinity. Animals can form bonds, but they aren’t typically described as capable of knowing God (or the good) and choosing it knowingly. The real issue isn’t “choice causes trouble,” it’s “choice makes a certain kind of goodness possible.” In this view, a world with no wrongdoing-by-choice would have to either (a) remove the possibility of choosing against the good, or (b) control wills so thoroughly that they aren’t really themselves—so you’d lose more than worship; you’d lose the kind of relationship/virtue that requires responsibility. “Adam/Eve/Satan caused trouble” doesn’t settle the “why create?” question. The typical Christian claim is that God isn’t trying to create a world where no one ever fails; God is creating a world with intelligible order where failure can be addressed (at least for humans) and where the deeper moral drama of the story matters. You may reject that, but it’s the internal logic. If you want, tell me which part you find most unacceptable: (a) that moral freedom is a different kind of good than animal-like life, or (b) that losing that good is too high a price even if it prevents all this suffering?
xxx/ellauri495.html on line 181: Got it: if you don’t grant a special “humans are the only real moral agents” status, then the usual theist move (“love/worship require human-like choice”) won’t land. One consistent reply you’ll run into is that theism isn’t claiming animals lack “friendship” or “tool use”; it’s claiming they lack the specific kind of agency/understanding that grounds moral responsibility (e.g., grasping God as God, willing against known truth, covenant/obligation in a way animals don’t). If you reject that as well, then the whole “free choice is worth it” defense starts to collapse—because you’re basically saying: if nonhuman life can have all the good things without the same trouble, why not build the universe that way?—which is exactly the objection you’re raising. If you want a sharper discussion: are you rejecting the idea that moral responsibility requires knowledge/intent (so animals could, in principle, be morally blameworthy), or are you rejecting the claim that God couldn’t have created every creature with the good features but without the “Satan/Adam” failure mode?
xxx/ellauri509.html on line 516: It's a philosophical image: humans cannot be gods, the most we can do is stand firm like an oak [erect penis] or cling like a vine [a listless one]. No sexual measurement in it.
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