ellauri095.html on line 137: In life and poetry he was serious and playful – even whimsical. Spiritually, despite an early scrupulosity which he never fully lost, he followed the Jesuit way of finding God in all things, and rejoiced in “God in the world”: “The world is charged wíth the grándeur of God.” He was very, very bright, with an extensive knowledge of words and languages — he knew so many words ! His intellectual hero was the medieval philosopher Duns Scotus, whose philosophy of selfhood he held dear. Hopkins himself had a strong sense of self, appreciated his own individuality, and was immensely self-confident.
ellauri095.html on line 190: An important element in Hopkins work is his own concept of inkscape, which was derived in part from the medieval theologian Duns Scotus.
ellauri095.html on line 240: In September 1868 Hopkins began his Jesuit novitiate at Manresa House, Roehampton, under the guidance of Alfred Weld. Two years later he moved to St Mary´s Hall, Stonyhurst, for philosophical studies, taking vows of poverty, chastity and obedience on 8 September 1870. He felt that his interest in poetry had stopped him devoting himself wholly to religion. However, on reading Duns Scotus in 1872, he saw how the two need not conflict.
ellauri095.html on line 242: Hilja Haahdenkin ois kannattanut lukea Duns Scotusta. Mutta se ei osannut latinaa, eikä Dunce suomea. Kielivaikeudet ovat aina esteenä. Haaste ainakin, liikennepomppumainen hidaste.
ellauri096.html on line 199: Several commentators on the surprise test paradox object that interpreting surprise as unprovability changes the topic. Instead of posing the surprise test paradox, it poses a variation of the liar paradox. Other concepts can be blended with the liar. For instance, mixing in alethic notions generates the possible liar: Is ‘This statement is possibly false’ true? (Post 1970) (If it is false, then it is false that it is possibly false. What cannot possibly be false is necessarily true. But if it is necessarily true, then it cannot be possibly false.) Since the semantic concept of validity involves the notion of possibility, one can also derive validity liars such as Pseudo-Scotus’ paradox: ‘Squares are squares, therefore, this argument is invalid’ (Read 1979). Suppose Pseudo-Scotus’ argument is valid. Since the premise is necessarily true, the conclusion would be necessarily true. But the conclusion contradicts the supposition that argument is valid. Therefore, by reductio, the argument is necessarily invalid. Wait! The argument can be invalid only if it is possible for the premise to be true and the conclusion to be false. But we have already proved that the conclusion of ‘Squares are squares, therefore, this argument is invalid’ is necessarily true. There is no consistent judgment of the argument’s validity. A similar predicament follows from ‘The test is on Friday but this prediction cannot be soundly deduced from this announcement’.
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