ellauri035.html on line 1033: ”The move from a structuralist account in which capital is understood to structure social relations in relatively homologous ways to a view of hegemony in which power relations are subject to repetition, convergence, and rearticulation brought the question of temporality into the thinking of structure, and marked a shift from a form of Althusserian theory that takes structural totalities as theoretical objects to one in which the insights into the contingent possibility of structure inaugurate a renewed conception of hegemony as bound up with the contingent sites and strategies of the rearticulation of power.”
ellauri096.html on line 67: In response to the apparent conflict between freedom and foreknowledge, medieval philosophers denied that future contingent propositions have a truth-value. That´s silly. They took themselves to be extending a solution Aristotle discusses in De Interpretatione to the problem of logical fatalism. According to this truth-value gap approach, ‘You will take a dump tomorrow’ is not true now. The prediction will become true tomorrow. A morally serious theist can agree with the Rubaiyat of Omar Khayyam:
ellauri158.html on line 664: -- P. 2. prop. 31. coroll. Hinc sequitur, omnes res particulares contingentes et corruptibiles esse. [in: P. 3. aff. defin. 14., aff. defin. 15.]
ellauri158.html on line 729: P. 2. prop. 44. De natura rationis non est res ut contingentes, sed ut necessarias contemplari. [in: prop. 44. coroll. 2.]
ellauri158.html on line 730: -- P. 2. prop. 44. coroll. 1. Hinc sequitur, a sola imaginatione pendere, quod res tam respectu praeteriti, quam futuri, ut contingentes contemplemur.
ellauri158.html on line 988: P. 4. defin. 3. Res singulares voco contingentes, quatenus, dum ad earum solam essentiam attendimus, nihil invenimus, quod earum existentiam necessario ponat, vel quod ipsam necessario secludat. [in: P. 4. prop. 12., prop. 13.]
ellauri158.html on line 1014: P. 4. prop. 11. Affectus erga rem, quam ut necessariam imaginamur, ceteris paribus intensior est, quam erga possibilem vel contingentem, sive non necessariam. [in: P. 5. prop. 5.]
ellauri158.html on line 1015: P. 4. prop. 12. Affectus erga rem, quam scimus in praesenti non existere et quam ut possibilem imaginamur, ceteris paribus intensior est, quam erga contingentem. [in: P. 4. prop. 12. coroll.]
ellauri158.html on line 1016: -- P. 4. prop. 12. coroll. Affectus erga rem, quam scimus in praesenti non existere et quam ut contingentem imaginamur, multo remissior est, quam si rem in praesenti nobis adesse imaginaremur. [in: P. 4. prop. 17.]
ellauri158.html on line 1017: P. 4. prop. 13. Affectus erga rem contingentem, quam scimus in praesenti non existere, ceteris paribus remissior est, quam affectus erga rem praeteritam.
ellauri158.html on line 1021: P. 4. prop. 17. Cupiditas, quae oritur ex vera boni et mali cognitione, quatenus haec circa res contingentes versatur, multo adhuc facilius coerceri potest cupiditate rerum, quae praesentes sunt.
ellauri158.html on line 1159: P. 5. prop. 5. Affectus erga rem, quam simpliciter et non ut necessariam neque ut possibilem, neque ut contingentem imaginamur, ceteris paribus omnium est maximus. [in: P. 5. prop. 6.]
ellauri189.html on line 211: There is no escape from the infinity of being that is spontaneously experienced as contingent, lacking an ultimate justification, a goal that, in order to
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