ellauri089.html on line 433: § 15. The relation which ethical judgments assert to hold universally between "goodness" and other things are of two kinds: a thing may be asserted either to be good itself or to be causally related to something else which is itself good—to be "good as a means". …
ellauri089.html on line 437: § 17. but a relation, of the former kind, if true at all, will be true of all cases. All ordinary ethical judgments assert causal relations, but they are commonly treated as if they did not, because the two kinds of relations are not distinguished. …
ellauri089.html on line 445: § 21. one, that of reciprocal causal dependence between parts, has no necessary relation to this one, …
ellauri089.html on line 568: § 79. The actual relations between "goodness" and Will or Feeling, from which this false doctrine is inferred, seem to be mainly (a) the causal relation consisting in the fact that it is only by reflection upon the experiences of Will and Feeling that we become aware of ethical distinctions; (b) the facts that a cognition of goodness is perhaps always included in certain kinds of Willing and Feeling, and is generally accompanied by them: …
ellauri089.html on line 591: § 88. In this chapter we shall deal with the third object of ethical enquiry: namely answers to the question "What conduct is a means to good results?" or "What ought we to do?" This is the question of Practical Ethics, and its answer involves an assertion of causal connection. …
ellauri089.html on line 607: § 96. (2) Other rules are such that their general observance can only be shewn to be useful, as a means to the preservation of society, under more or less temporary conditions: if any of these are to be proved useful in all societies, this can only be done by shewing their causal relation to things good or evil in themselves, which are not generally recognised to be such. …
ellauri089.html on line 621: § 103. (5) We may further see that "virtues" are not to be defined as dispositions that are good in themselves: they are not necessarily more than dispositions to perform actions generally good as means, and of these, for the most part, only those classed as "duties" in accordance with section (4). It follows that to decide whether a disposition is or is not "virtuous" involves the difficult causal investigation discussed in section (3); and that what is a virtue in one state of society may not be so in another. …
ellauri118.html on line 589: George kannattaa nykyään tämmöstä kuin embodied mind ajatusta: Many features of cognition are embodied in that they are deeply dependent upon characteristics of the physical body of an agent, such that the agent's beyond-the-brain body plays a significant causal role, or a physically constitutive role, in that agent's cognitive processing. No tottahan se on, ainakin miesten ajatteluun osallistuu voimakkaasti pikkuveli.
ellauri153.html on line 868: Our knowing consciousness is divisible solely into subject and object. To be object for the subject and to be our representation or mental picture are one and the same. All our representations are objects for the subject, and all objects of the subject are our representations. These stand to one another in a regulated connection which in form is determinable a priori, and by virtue of this connection nothing existing by itself and independent, nothing single and detached, can become an object for us. The first aspect of this principle is that of becoming, where it appears as the law of causality and is applicable only to changes. Thus if the cause is given, the effect must of necessity follow. The second aspect deals with concepts or abstract representations, which are themselves drawn from representations of intuitive perception, and here the principle of sufficient reason states that, if certain premises are given, the conclusion must follow. The third aspect of the principle is concerned with being in space and time, and shows that the existence of one relation inevitably implies the other, thus that the equality of the angles of a triangle necessarily implies the equality of its sides and vice versa. Finally, the fourth aspect deals with actions, and the principle appears as the law of motivation, which states that a definite course of action inevitably ensues on a given character and motive.
ellauri155.html on line 715: The incompatibilist maintains that if our willings and choices are themselves determined by antecedent causes then we could never choose otherwise than we do. Given the antecedent causal conditions, we must always act as we do. We cannot, therefore, be held responsible for our conduct since, on this account, we have no “genuine alternatives” or “open possibilities” available to us. Incompatibilists, as already noted, do not accept that Hume’s notion of “hypothetical liberty”, as presented in the Enquiry, can deal with this objection. It is true, of course, that hypothetical liberty leaves room for the truth of conditionals that suggest that we could have acted otherwise if we had chosen to do so. However, it still remains the case, the incompatibilist argues, that the agent could not have chosen otherwise given the actual circumstances. Responsibility, they claim, requires categorical freedom to choose otherwise in the same circumstances. Hypothetical freedom alone will not suffice. One way of expressing this point in more general terms is that the incompatibilist holds that for responsibility we need more than freedom of action, we also need freedom of will – understood as a power to choose between open alternatives. Failing this, the agent has no ultimate control over her conduct.
ellauri155.html on line 866: Strawson’s purposed to dissolve the so-called problem of determinism and responsibility by drawing a contrast between two different perspectives we can take on the world: the ‘participant’ and ‘objective’ standpoints. These perspectives involve different explanations of other people’s actions. From the objective point of view, we see people as elements of the natural world, causally manipulated and manipulable in various ways. From the participant point of view, we see others as appropriate objects of ‘reactive attitudes’, attitudes such as gratitude, anger, sympathy and resentment, which presuppose the responsibility of other people. These two perspectives are opposed to one another, but both are legitimate. In particular, Strawson argues that our reactive attitudes towards others and ourselves are natural and irrevocable. They are a central part of what it is to be human. The truth of determinism cannot, then, force us to give up the participant standpoint, because the reactive attitudes are too deeply embedded in our humanity. Fuck humanity, and fuck viewpoints. Game theory is an optimization technology used by animals. As such it forms a part of the causal net.
xxx/ellauri091.html on line 300: In 1885 Hauptmann set up a home with his wife in the little lakeside village of Erkner. Abandoning his early romantic ideals, he became convinced that life should be depicted as it is. From the intellectual currents of his day he adopted a belief in scientific causality and materialism. His early stories 'Fasching' (1887) and 'Bahnwärter Thiel' (1888) were tales of simple people, although there is also a level which transcends the boundaries of realism.
xxx/ellauri128.html on line 604: Il est le promoteur d´un réalisme critique et d´une philosophie de l´être et de l´exister supérieure, d´après lui, aux philosophies de l´Un, du vrai, du bien, de la liberté, de la durée, de l´existence (coupée de l´essence). Le principe fondateur de cette doctrine de l´être est le principe d´identité qui justifie en droit une « raison d´être » intelligible (causalité, finalité). Du principe d´identité découlent toutes les catégories de l´être (essence/existence ; acte/puissance ; substance ; quantité ; qualité ; relation, etc.), d´où l´on déduit l´être même subsistant (Dieu) qu´Heidegger a confondu à tort selon lui avec un existant suprême. Ota tuosta nyt selvää.
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