ellauri030.html on line 246: Etenim, cum complector animo, quattuor reperio causas, cur senectus misera videatur: unam, quod avocet a rebus gerendis; alteram, quod corpus faciat infirmius; tertiam, quod privet fere omnibus voluptatibus; quartam, quod haud procul absit a morte.
ellauri046.html on line 65: Sufficientemente colta nella letteratura, nell'arte e nella musica, Gaspara fu portata dalla forte carica della sua personalità a vivere in modo libero diverse esperienze amorose, che segnano profondamente la sua vita e la sua produzione poetica. I romantici videro in lei una novella Saffo, anche per la sua breve esistenza, vissuta in maniera intensamente passionale. La vicenda della poetessa va però ridimensionata e collocata nel quadro della vita mondana del tempo, dove le relazioni sociali, comprese quelle amorose, rispondono spesso a un cerimoniale e ad una serie di convenzioni precise. Fra queste è da segnalare l'amore per il conte Collaltino di Collalto, uomo di guerra e di lettere, che durò circa tre anni (1548-1551): tuttavia a causa di lunghi periodi di lontananza Collaltino non ricambiò il sentimento intenso che Gaspara provò per lui, e la relazione si concluse con l'abbandono della poetessa, che attraversò anche una profonda crisi spirituale e religiosa. Leimasimella oli taipumusta depixiin. Kun tuli vastoinkäymisiä (veli kuoli, kreivi jätti), se meni aina rapakuntoon ja meinas mennä nunnaxi. Onnexi ei mennyt.
ellauri062.html on line 635: Quod sum causa tuæ viæ: kirjastasi nimeni. että oon sun heimoveli, Mine the playful hand that gave your
ellauri079.html on line 303: Surprisingly, I use as an example of a free agent here a pingpong player. Presumably because my tennis-playing son has proved unsatisfactory. What I end up saying is distinguish agent causation from event causation. Futile squirming, it does not change anything.
ellauri083.html on line 338: Hendershot recalls that, in the Schreber case, God was believed to manifest his creative and destructive power as celestial rays (Freud 22). As with spider-webs and hedgehogs quills, this radial pattern describing dilation and contraction, movement back and forth from center to circumference and from circumference to center, is the essential figure for the paranoid narcissism of a subject who feels threatened by the world and guilty for having taken "his own body [...] as his love-object" (Freud 60). Signaling Fistule's repressed homosexuality, the rays of his intelligence had first been focused on the masochistic annihilation of his genitals, which he denies were the original object of his love ("organes hideux," "vomitoires de dejections"), and then had been used in reconstructing a sexless new reality. Insisting on his exemption from the Naturalist law of biological determinism, Fistule denies his human parentage and maintains that he was born of a star, which, shining like the rays of his genius, had inseminated him and allowed him to be the father of himself, causa sui. Homosexual guilt initially projected as the corruptibility of matter is overcome by Fistule's principle of Stellogenesis, which turns flesh into radiance and bodies into starlight. As Hendershot concludes: "In Freud's theory, the paranoiac withdraws from the world (decathexis), directs his or her cathectic energy to the ego resulting in self-aggrandizement, and then attempts to reestablish a cathectic relationship with the world in the form of a delusional system"
ellauri089.html on line 433: § 15. The relation which ethical judgments assert to hold universally between "goodness" and other things are of two kinds: a thing may be asserted either to be good itself or to be causally related to something else which is itself good—to be "good as a means". …
ellauri089.html on line 437: § 17. but a relation, of the former kind, if true at all, will be true of all cases. All ordinary ethical judgments assert causal relations, but they are commonly treated as if they did not, because the two kinds of relations are not distinguished. …
ellauri089.html on line 445: § 21. one, that of reciprocal causal dependence between parts, has no necessary relation to this one, …
ellauri089.html on line 568: § 79. The actual relations between "goodness" and Will or Feeling, from which this false doctrine is inferred, seem to be mainly (a) the causal relation consisting in the fact that it is only by reflection upon the experiences of Will and Feeling that we become aware of ethical distinctions; (b) the facts that a cognition of goodness is perhaps always included in certain kinds of Willing and Feeling, and is generally accompanied by them: …
ellauri089.html on line 591: § 88. In this chapter we shall deal with the third object of ethical enquiry: namely answers to the question "What conduct is a means to good results?" or "What ought we to do?" This is the question of Practical Ethics, and its answer involves an assertion of causal connection. …
ellauri089.html on line 607: § 96. (2) Other rules are such that their general observance can only be shewn to be useful, as a means to the preservation of society, under more or less temporary conditions: if any of these are to be proved useful in all societies, this can only be done by shewing their causal relation to things good or evil in themselves, which are not generally recognised to be such. …
ellauri089.html on line 621: § 103. (5) We may further see that "virtues" are not to be defined as dispositions that are good in themselves: they are not necessarily more than dispositions to perform actions generally good as means, and of these, for the most part, only those classed as "duties" in accordance with section (4). It follows that to decide whether a disposition is or is not "virtuous" involves the difficult causal investigation discussed in section (3); and that what is a virtue in one state of society may not be so in another. …
ellauri090.html on line 177: Embora seja chamada de "realista", os críticos não deixam de notar que a riqueza de gêneros e elementos nessas obras também adere resíduos do Romantismo e impressionistas. Além disso, nessas obras Machado de Assis não compactua com o esquematismo determinista dos realistas, nem procura causas muito explícitas ou claras para a explicação das suas personagens e situações.
ellauri096.html on line 136: Foundationalists reject (1). They take some propositions to be self-evident. Coherentists reject (2). They tolerate some forms of circular reasoning. For instance, Nelson Goodman (1965) has characterized the method of reflective equilibrium as virtuously circular. Charles Peirce (1933–35, 5.250) rejected (3), an approach later refined by Peter Klein (2007) and championed at book-length by Scott F. Aikin (2011). Infinitists believe that infinitely long chains of justification are no more impossible than infinitely long chains of causation. Finally, the epistemological anarchist rejects (4). As Paul Feyerabend refrains in Against Method, “Anything goes” (1988, vii, 5, 14, 19, 159).
ellauri100.html on line 479: Scientific causation: the belief that people’s actions are fully explained by a combination of biological and environmental forces
ellauri106.html on line 666: Si bene quid memini, causae sunt quinque bibendi: Hospitis adventus, praesens sitis atque futura, Aut vini bonitas, aut quaelibet altera causa.
ellauri118.html on line 589: George kannattaa nykyään tämmöstä kuin embodied mind ajatusta: Many features of cognition are embodied in that they are deeply dependent upon characteristics of the physical body of an agent, such that the agent's beyond-the-brain body plays a significant causal role, or a physically constitutive role, in that agent's cognitive processing. No tottahan se on, ainakin miesten ajatteluun osallistuu voimakkaasti pikkuveli.
ellauri150.html on line 271: Toutes ces singeries, ces parades de petit chien, cette ingénuité frelatée, ne plaisaient à Christophe en aucune façon. Il avait autre chose à faire qu’à se prêter aux manèges d’une petite fille rouée, ou même qu’à les considérer, d’un œil amusé. Il avait à gagner son pain, à sauver de la mort sa vie et ses pensées. Le seul intérêt pour lui de ces perruches de salon était de lui en fournir les moyens. En échange de leur argent, il leur donnait ses leçons, en conscience, le front plissé, l’esprit tendu vers la tâche, afin de ne se laisser distraire ni par l’ennui qu’elle lui causait, ni par les agaceries de ses élèves, quand elles étaient aussi coquettes que Colette Stevens. Il ne faisait guère plus d’attention à elle qu’à la petite cousine de Colette, une enfant de douze ans, silencieuse et timide, que les Stevens avaient prise chez eux, et à qui Christophe enseignait aussi le piano.
ellauri151.html on line 680: Munz (2000) discusses Wittgenstein’s reply to Frazer at length. Frazer argues that magic is based on loose associations that lead to erroneous views on causation. According to Munz, Wittgenstein holds that the distinction between beliefs and practices cannot be made, as language is at its core mythological.
ellauri153.html on line 869: Our knowing consciousness is divisible solely into subject and object. To be object for the subject and to be our representation or mental picture are one and the same. All our representations are objects for the subject, and all objects of the subject are our representations. These stand to one another in a regulated connection which in form is determinable a priori, and by virtue of this connection nothing existing by itself and independent, nothing single and detached, can become an object for us. The first aspect of this principle is that of becoming, where it appears as the law of causality and is applicable only to changes. Thus if the cause is given, the effect must of necessity follow. The second aspect deals with concepts or abstract representations, which are themselves drawn from representations of intuitive perception, and here the principle of sufficient reason states that, if certain premises are given, the conclusion must follow. The third aspect of the principle is concerned with being in space and time, and shows that the existence of one relation inevitably implies the other, thus that the equality of the angles of a triangle necessarily implies the equality of its sides and vice versa. Finally, the fourth aspect deals with actions, and the principle appears as the law of motivation, which states that a definite course of action inevitably ensues on a given character and motive.
ellauri155.html on line 719: The incompatibilist maintains that if our willings and choices are themselves determined by antecedent causes then we could never choose otherwise than we do. Given the antecedent causal conditions, we must always act as we do. We cannot, therefore, be held responsible for our conduct since, on this account, we have no “genuine alternatives” or “open possibilities” available to us. Incompatibilists, as already noted, do not accept that Hume’s notion of “hypothetical liberty”, as presented in the Enquiry, can deal with this objection. It is true, of course, that hypothetical liberty leaves room for the truth of conditionals that suggest that we could have acted otherwise if we had chosen to do so. However, it still remains the case, the incompatibilist argues, that the agent could not have chosen otherwise given the actual circumstances. Responsibility, they claim, requires categorical freedom to choose otherwise in the same circumstances. Hypothetical freedom alone will not suffice. One way of expressing this point in more general terms is that the incompatibilist holds that for responsibility we need more than freedom of action, we also need freedom of will – understood as a power to choose between open alternatives. Failing this, the agent has no ultimate control over her conduct.
ellauri155.html on line 870: Strawson’s purposed to dissolve the so-called problem of determinism and responsibility by drawing a contrast between two different perspectives we can take on the world: the ‘participant’ and ‘objective’ standpoints. These perspectives involve different explanations of other people’s actions. From the objective point of view, we see people as elements of the natural world, causally manipulated and manipulable in various ways. From the participant point of view, we see others as appropriate objects of ‘reactive attitudes’, attitudes such as gratitude, anger, sympathy and resentment, which presuppose the responsibility of other people. These two perspectives are opposed to one another, but both are legitimate. In particular, Strawson argues that our reactive attitudes towards others and ourselves are natural and irrevocable. They are a central part of what it is to be human. The truth of determinism cannot, then, force us to give up the participant standpoint, because the reactive attitudes are too deeply embedded in our humanity. Fuck humanity, and fuck viewpoints. Game theory is an optimization technology used by animals. As such it forms a part of the causal net.
ellauri158.html on line 68: P.1. defin. 1. Per causam sui intelligo id, cuius essentia involvit existentiam, sive id, cuius natura non potest concipi nisi existens. [in: P. 1. prop. 7., prop. 24., P. 5. prop. 35.]
ellauri158.html on line 121: P. 1. axiom. 3. Ex data causa determinata necessario sequitur effectus, et contra si nulla detur determinata causa, impossibile est ut effectus sequatur. [in: P. 1. prop. 27., P. 4. prop. 31., P. 5. prop. 33.]
ellauri158.html on line 125: P. 1. axiom. 4. Effectus cognitio a cognitione causae dependet et eandem involvit. [in:P. 1. prop. 3., prop. 6. coroll., prop. 25., P. 2. prop. 5., prop. 6., prop. 7., prop. 16., prop. 45., P. 5. prop. 22.]
ellauri158.html on line 154: P. 1. prop. 3. Quae res nihil commune inter se habent, earum una alterius causa esse non potest. [in: P. 1. prop. 6., etiam in: Ep. 3. §. 4., Ep. 65. §. 2.]
ellauri158.html on line 221: -- P. 1. prop. 16. coroll. 1. Hinc sequitur, Deum omnium rerum, quae sub intellectum infinitum cadere possunt, esse causam efficientem. [in: P. 1. prop. 17. schol., prop. 18., prop. 34.]
ellauri158.html on line 222: -- P. 1. prop. 16. coroll. 2. Sequitur 2. Deum causam esse per se, non vero per accidens.
ellauri158.html on line 223: -- P. 1. prop. 16. coroll. 3. Sequitur 3. Deum esse absolute causam primam.
ellauri158.html on line 228: -- P. 1. prop. 17. coroll. 1. Hinc sequitur 1. nullam dari causam, quae Deum extrinsece vel intrinsece praeter ipsius naturae perfectionem incitet ad agendum.
ellauri158.html on line 229: -- P. 1. prop. 17. coroll. 2. Sequitur 2. solum Deum esse causam liberam. [in: P. 1. prop. 29. schol., P. 2. prop. 48.]
ellauri158.html on line 234: P. 1. prop. 18. Deus est omnium rerum causa immanens, non vero transiens.
ellauri158.html on line 265: -- P. 1. prop. 24. coroll. Hinc sequitur, Deum non tantum esse causam, ut res incipiant existere; sed etiam, ut in existendo perseverent, sive (ut termino scholastico utar) Deum esse causam essendi rerum. [in: P. 1. prop. 28., prop. 28. schol., prop. 29., P. 2. prop. 45. schol., P. 4. prop. 4.]
ellauri158.html on line 269: P. 1. prop. 25. Deus non tantum est causa efficiens rerum existentiae, sed etiam essentiae. [in:P. 1. prop. 26., P. 5. prop. 22.]
ellauri158.html on line 270: -- P. 1. prop. 25. schol. Deus est causa sui et omnium rerum causa. [in: Ep. 66. §. 6.]
ellauri158.html on line 283: P. 1. prop. 28. Quodcumque singulare, sive quaevis res quae finita est et determinatam habet existentiam, non potest existere nec ad operandum determinari, nisi ad existendum et operandum determinetur ab alia causa, quae etiam finita est et determinatam habet existentiam; et rursus haec causa non potest etiam existere neque ad operandum determinari, nisi ab alia, quae etiam finita est et determinatam habet existentiam, determinetur ad existendum et operandum, et sic in infinitum. [in: P. 1. prop. 32., P. 2. prop. 9., lem. 3., prop. 30., prop. 31., prop. 48., P. 4. prop. 29., P. 5. prop. 6.]
ellauri158.html on line 284: -- P. 1. prop. 28. schol. De Deo rerum causa.
ellauri158.html on line 302: P. 1. prop. 32. Voluntas non potest vocari causa libera, sed tantum necessaria.
ellauri158.html on line 354: P. 2. defin. 7. Per res singulares intelligo res, quae finitae sunt et determinatam habent existentiam. Quod si plura individua in una actione ita concurrant, ut omnia simul unius effectus sint causa, eadem omnia eatenus ut unam rem singularem considero.
ellauri158.html on line 406: P. 2. prop. 5. Esse formale idearum Deum, quatenus tantum ut res cogitans consideratur, pro causa agnoscit et non, quatenus alio attributo explicatur; hoc est, tam Dei attributorum, quam rerum singularium ideae non ipsa ideata sive res perceptas pro causa efficiente agnoscunt, sed ipsum Deum, quatenus est res cogitans.
ellauri158.html on line 410: P. 2. prop. 6. Cuiuscumque attributi modi Deum, quatenus tantum sub illo attributo, cuius modi sunt, et non quatenus sub ullo alio consideratur, pro causa habent. [in: P. 2. prop. 9., lem. 3., prop. 45., P. 3. prop. 2., prop. 11. schol., P. 4. prop. 7., prop. 29., etiam in: Ep. 66. §. 3.]
ellauri158.html on line 438: P. 2. prop. 9. Idea rei singularis actu existentis Deum pro causa habet, non quatenus infinitus est, sed quatenus alia rei singularis actu existentis idea affectus consideratur, cuius etiam Deus est causa, quatenus alia tertia affectus est, et sic in infinitum. [in: P. 2. prop. 9. coroll., prop. 19., prop. 20., prop. 24., prop. 25., P. 3. prop. 1.]
ellauri158.html on line 719: P. 2. prop. 41. Cognitio primi generis unica est falsitatis causa, secundi autem et tertii est necessario vera. [in: P. 2. prop. 44., prop. 44. coroll. 2., P. 4. prop. 27., prop. 35., prop. 62.]
ellauri158.html on line 746: P. 2. prop. 48. In mente nulla est absoluta sive libera voluntas, sed mens ad hoc vel illud volendum determinatur a causa, quae etiam ab alia determinata est, et haec iterum ab alia, et sic in infinitum. [in: P. 2. prop. 49., prop. 49. coroll., P. 3. aff. defin. 6., etiam in: TP cap. 2. art. 1.]
ellauri158.html on line 761: P. 3. defin. 2. Nos tum agere dico, cum aliquid in nobis aut extra nos fit, cuius adaequata sumus causa, hoc est cum ex nostra natura aliquid in nobis, aut extra nos sequitur, quod per eandem solam potest clare et distincte intelligi. At contra nos pati dico, cum in nobis aliquid fit vel ex nostra natura aliquid sequitur, cuius nos non nisi partialis sumus causa. [in: P. 3. prop. 1., P. 4. prop. 2., prop. 5., prop. 15., prop. 23., prop. 33., prop. 35., prop. 35. coroll. 1., prop. 52., prop. 59., prop. 61., prop. 64.]
ellauri158.html on line 773: P. 3. prop. 4. Nulla res nisi a causa externa potest destrui. [in: P. 3. prop. 5., prop. 6., prop. 8., prop. 11. schol., P. 4. prop. 1., prop. 4., prop. 18. schol., prop. 20., prop. 30.]
ellauri158.html on line 788: P. 3. prop. 15. Res quaecumque potest esse per accidens causa laetitiae, tristitiae vel cupiditatis. [in: P. 3. prop. 16., prop. 36., prop. 50., prop. 52. schol.]
ellauri158.html on line 789: -- P. 3. prop. 15. coroll. Ex eo solo, quod rem aliquam affectu laetitiae vel tristitiae, cuius ipsa non est causa efficiens, contemplati sumus, eandem amare vel odio habere possumus. [in: P. 3. prop. 16., prop. 35., prop. 35. schol., prop. 41., prop. 50. schol., prop. 52. schol.]
ellauri158.html on line 791: P. 3. prop. 16. Ex eo solo, quod rem aliquam aliquid habere imaginamur simile obiecto, quod mentem laetitia vel tristitia afficere solet, quamvis id, in quo res obiecto est similis, non sit horum affectuum efficiens causa, eam tamen amabimus vel odio habebimus. [in: P. 3. prop. 15. schol., prop. 17., prop. 41., prop. 46., P. 4. prop. 34.]
ellauri158.html on line 819: P. 3. prop. 30. Si quis aliquid egit, quod reliquos laetitia afficere imaginatur, is laetitia concomitante idea sui, tanquam causa, afficietur, sive se ipsum cum laetitia contemplabitur. Si contra aliquid egit, quod reliquos tristitia afficere imaginatur, se ipsum cum tristitia contra contemplabitur. [in: P. 3. prop. 34., prop. 40. schol., prop. 41. schol., prop. 43.]
ellauri158.html on line 834: P. 3. prop. 38. Si quis rem amatam odio habere inceperit, ita ut amor plane aboleatur, eandem maiore odio ex pari causa prosequetur, quam si ipsam nunquam amavisset, et eo maiore, quo amor antea maior fuerat. [in: P. 3. prop. 44.]
ellauri158.html on line 837: P. 3. prop. 40. Qui se odio haberi ab aliquo imaginatur, nec se ullam odii causam illi dedisse credit, eundem odio contra habebit. [in: P. 3. prop. 40. coroll. 1., prop. 40. coroll. 2., prop. 41., prop. 43., prop. 45., prop. 49. schol., P. 4. prop. 34.]
ellauri158.html on line 842: P. 3. prop. 41. Si quis ab aliquo se amari imaginatur, nec se ullam ad id causam dedisse credit, eundem contra amabit. [in: P. 3. prop. 43.]
ellauri158.html on line 851: P. 3. prop. 46. Si quis ab aliquo cuiusdam classis, sive nationis a sua diversae, laetitia vel tristitia affectus fuerit, concomitante eius idea sub nomine universali classis vel nationis tanquam causa, is non tantum illum, sed omnes eiusdem classis vel nationis amabit vel odio habebit.
ellauri158.html on line 854: P. 3. prop. 48. Amor et odium ex. gr. erga Petrum destruitur, si tristitia, quam hoc, et laetitia, quam ille involvit, ideae alterius causae iungatur; et eatenus uterque diminuitur, quatenus imaginamur Petrum non solum fuisse alterutrius causam. [in: P. 3. prop. 49. , P. 5. prop. 6., prop. 9.]
ellauri158.html on line 855: P. 3. prop. 49. Amor et odium erga rem, quam liberam esse imaginamur, maior ex pari causa uterque debet esse, quam erga necessariam. [in: P. 3. prop. 51. schol., P. 5. prop. 5.]
ellauri158.html on line 857: P. 3. prop. 50. Res quaecumque potest esse per accidens spei aut metus causa.
ellauri158.html on line 937: P. 3. aff. defin. 6. Amor est laetitia concomitante idea causae externae. [in: P. 3. aff. defin. 7., P. 4. prop. 34. schol., prop. 44., prop. 57., P. 5. prop. 2., prop. 15., prop. 17. coroll., prop. 32. coroll.]
ellauri158.html on line 938: P. 3. aff. defin. 7. Odium est tristitia concomitante idea causae externae. [in: P. 4. prop. 34., P. 5. prop. 2., prop. 17. coroll., prop. 18.]
ellauri158.html on line 939: P. 3. aff. defin. 8. Propensio est laetitia concomitante idea alicuius rei, quae per accidens causa est laetitiae.
ellauri158.html on line 940: P. 3. aff. defin. 9. Aversio est tristitia concomitante idea alicuius rei, quae per accidens causa est tristitiae.
ellauri158.html on line 945: P. 3. aff. defin. 14. Securitas est laetitia orta ex idea rei futurae vel praeteritae, de qua dubitandi causa sublata est.
ellauri158.html on line 946: P. 3. aff. defin. 15. Desperatio est tristitia orta ex idea rei futurae vel praeteritae, de qua dubitandi causa sublata est.
ellauri158.html on line 989: P. 4. defin. 4. Easdem res singulares voco possibiles, quatenus, dum ad causas, ex quibus produci debent, attendimus, nescimus, an ipsae determinatae sint ad easdem producendum. [in: P. 4. prop. 12.]
ellauri158.html on line 992: P. 4. defin. 7. Per finem, cuius causa aliquid facimus, appetitum intelligo.
ellauri158.html on line 1000: P. 4. prop. 3. Vis, qua homo in existendo perseverat, limitata est et a potentia causarum externarum infinite superatur. [in: P. 4. prop. 4., prop. 6., prop. 15., prop. 43., prop. 69.]
ellauri158.html on line 1001: P. 4. prop. 4. Fieri non potest, ut homo non sit naturae pars et ut nullas possit pati mutationes, nisi quae per solam suam naturam possint intelligi, quarumque adaequata sit causa. [in: P. 4. prop. 68. schol.]
ellauri158.html on line 1003: P. 4. prop. 5. Vis et incrementum cuiuscumque passionis, eiusque in existendo perseverantia non definitur potentia, qua nos in existendo perseverare conamur, sed causae externae potentia cum nostra comparata. [in: P. 4. prop. 6., prop. 7., prop. 15., prop. 43., prop. 69., P. 5. prop. 8., prop. 20. schol.]
ellauri158.html on line 1008: P. 4. prop. 9. Affectus, cuius causam in praesenti nobis adesse imaginamur, fortior est, quam si eandem non adesse imaginaremur. [in: P. 4. prop. 10., prop. 11., prop. 13
ellauri158.html on line 1033: P. 4. prop. 25. Nemo suum esse alterius rei causa conservare conatur. [in: P. 4. prop. 26., prop. 52. schol.]
ellauri158.html on line 1123: -- P. 4. prop. 65. coroll. Malum minus pro maiore bono ex rationis ductu sequemur, et bonum minus, quod causa est maioris mali, negligemus. [in: P. 4. prop. 66. coroll.]
ellauri158.html on line 1124: P. 4. prop. 66. Bonum maius futurum prae minore praesenti, et malum praesens, quod causa est futura alicuius mali, ex rationis ductu appetemus. [in: P. 4. prop. 66. coroll.]
ellauri158.html on line 1125: -- P. 4. prop. 66. coroll. Malum praesens minus, quod est causa maioris futuri boni, ex rationis ductu appetemus, et bonum praesens minus, quod causa est maioris futuri mali, negligemus.
ellauri158.html on line 1150: P. 5. axiom. 2. Effectus potentia definitur potentia ipsius causae, quatenus eius essentia per ipsius causae essentiam explicatur vel definitur. [in: P. 5. prop. 8. schol.]
ellauri158.html on line 1153: P. 5. prop. 2. Si animi commotionem seu affectum a causae externae cogitatione amoveamus et aliis iungamus cogitationibus, tum amor seu odium erga causam externam, ut et animi fluctuationes quae ex his affectibus oriuntur, destruentur. [in: P. 5. prop. 4. schol., prop. 20. schol.]
ellauri158.html on line 1165: P. 5. prop. 9. Affectus, qui ad plures et diversas causas refertur, quas mens cum ipso affectu simul contemplatur, minus noxius est, et minus per ipsum patimur, et erga unamquamque causam minus afficimur, quam alius aeque magnus affectus, qui ad unam solam vel pauciores causas refertur. [in: P. 5. prop. 20. schol.]
ellauri158.html on line 1198: P. 5. prop. 31. Tertium cognitionis genus pendet a mente, tamquam a formali causa, quatenus mens ipsa aeterna est. [in: P. 5. prop. 33.]
ellauri158.html on line 1200: P. 5. prop. 32. Quicquid intelligimus tertio cognitionis genere, eo delectamur, et quidem concomitante idea Dei tamquam causa. [in: P. 5. prop. 32. coroll., prop. 36., prop. 42.]
ellauri172.html on line 167: Si entusiasmò per la Rivoluzione francese, durante il suo soggiorno parigino, nel 1789, ma ben presto, a causa del degenerare della rivoluzione dopo il 1792, il suo atteggiamento favorevole si trasformò in una forte avversione per la Francia. Tornò in Italia, dove continuò a scrivere, opponendosi idealmente al regime di Napoleone, e dove morì, a Firenze, nel 1803, venendo sepolto tra i grandi italiani nella Basilica di Santa Croce. Già dagli ultimi anni della sua vita Alfieri divenne un simbolo per gli intellettuali del Risorgimento, a partire da Ugo Foscolo.
ellauri172.html on line 172: «L'illuminismo è l'uscita dell'uomo dallo stato di minorità che egli deve imputare a se stesso. Minorità è l'incapacità di valersi del proprio intelletto senza la guida di un altro. Imputabile a sé stesso è questa minorità, se la causa di essa non dipende da difetto d'intelligenza, ma dalla mancanza di decisione e del coraggio di far uso del proprio intelletto senza essere guidati da un altro. Sapere aude! Abbi il coraggio di servirti della tua propria intelligenza! È questo il motto dell'Illuminismo.»(Immanuel Kant, Risposta alla domanda: che cos'è l'Illuminismo?, 1784)
ellauri172.html on line 175: Come scrive nell'autobiografia, era un bambino molto sensibile, a tratti vivace, solitario, insofferente alle regole, descritto dai biografi moderni come tendente alla nevrosi, una condizione che si protrarrà per tutta la vita, causandogli spesso anche disturbi psicosomatici. Soffrirà di frequenti disturbi gastrici per la sua intera esistenza.
ellauri172.html on line 222: Dopo un breve periodo di altalenanti problemi di salute e attacchi di gotta e artrite, in cui diminuì il cibo per i problemi gastrici ma continuò a lavorare alacramente. il 3 ottobre 1803 si ammalò gravemente di una febbre gastrointestinale, da cui inizialmente sembrò rimettersi. Tuttavia, alcuni giorni dopo, Vittorio Alfieri si spense improvvisamente a Firenze l'8 ottobre 1803 all'età di 54 anni, probabilmente a causa di infarto cardiaco. Alfieri ebbe un malore, riuscendo solo a far chiamare la contessa d'Albany, a cui aveva lasciato i suoi beni per testamento, e poco dopo, seduto sul letto, si accasciò e non riprese più conoscenza. Vänrikki Nappulassa oli paljon samaa kuin 8kk nuoremmassa Goethessa. Vänrikki Nappula ei tosin perustanut Napsusta.
ellauri183.html on line 242: Ortega, en este período de falta de democracia, escribe en La rebelión de las masas que la historia, el progreso, se llevan a cabo por el trabajo de las minorías. Si va a haber una renovación, entonces, esto debe ser hecho por los mejores, que van a ser, sin embargo, reclutados de una manera liberal-democrática. Ortega teme que las masas van a pedirle todo al estado y que este les conceda todo a cambio de obediencia ciega: esto causaría un fracaso para emancipar a las masas. Su visión de la vida es básicamente libertaria con referencias principalmente anarquistas presentes en todos sus escritos. Trae consigo el liberalismo y el socialismo: el liberalismo debe perseguir una emancipación total del individuo (cualquiera que sea la clase a la que pertenezca), el socialismo debe abandonar el estado de estadolatría y terminar persiguiendo un igualitarismo excesivamente extremo.
ellauri249.html on line 377: 105 sed pater in causa, cui septima quaeque fuit lux

ellauri266.html on line 79: Desmond John Morris, Linnean seuran heppu honoris causa. (s. 24. tammikuuta 1928) on Bo Egovin ikätoveri englantilainen eläintieteilijä, etologi ja surrealistinen taidemaalari sekä suosittu kirjailija ihmisen sosiobiologiassa. Desmond ei ole vielä kuollut. Se muistetaan vuoden 1967 kirjastaan ​​The Naked Ape ja 50-luvun televisio-ohjelmasta Zoo Time. Myrkkykäärme karkasi, juontaja kuristui mikrofonijohtoon, leijonat naivat livenä, siinä kohokohtia. Öisin Desmond maalailee matkien Congo apinaa ja Dalin Salvadoria. Ne on kyllä vainaita.
ellauri301.html on line 76: Nuori Wallander on yhtä pseudo svedu kuin kiinalaisvalmisteinen Electrolux pesukone, johon bränditarra lyödään tehtaan ovella. Toisesta ovesta menee ulos Siemensit ja kolmannesta Whirlpoolit. Tää on globalisaatiota, jota beady eye Kurt puolustaa puhtain tuliasein Malmön kaduilla. Ense candido causa pro candida, valkoisen asian puolesta valkoisella miekalla, venelakki päässä kuin Carl Gustav Emil Mannerheim. Paizi että näyttää hyvältä nakukuvissa, nuori Kurt on lainvalvonnan nero kuten kolleegansa DI Lewis. Sitäpaizi ne on hienoja ihmisiä paizi remmissä myös siviilissä. Sarjan token ruozalaiset näyttää maansa myyneiltä solkatessaan kökköenkkua, ja hyvästä syystä, senhän ne on tehneetkin.
ellauri353.html on line 235: Don Rafael Acosta embajador de Miranda, el matrimonio Thévenot, y Florence la hermana de Madame Thévenot, están invitados a cenar en casa del matrimonio Sénechal. Sin embargo, hay una confusión, y Monsieur Sénechal ha salido rumbo a otra cita. Como alternativa, se proponen ir a un restaurante cercano, pero al llegar se dan cuenta de que el dueño del establecimiento ha muerto. A partir de este momento, las reuniones entre este selecto grupo de burgueses se verán interrumpidas por una serie de eventos extraordinarios, algunos reales y otros producto de su imaginación. La alternancia entre lo real y lo onírico produce giros inesperados en la trama, en la que intervienen otros personajes como militares, un obispo, policías, guerrilleros y campesinos, todos causantes de interrupciones durante los frustrados intentos de los seis primeros por sentarse a comer y disfrutar del encanto de ser burgueses.
xxx/ellauri068.html on line 197: Galardonado con numerosas distinciones,​ fue también polémico por sus posturas políticas conservadoras; su importancia continúa siendo causa de debate, particularmente por la posibilidad de que estas le hayan impedido obtener el Premio Nobel de Literatura,​ al que fue candidato durante casi treinta años.
xxx/ellauri091.html on line 300: In 1885 Hauptmann set up a home with his wife in the little lakeside village of Erkner. Abandoning his early romantic ideals, he became convinced that life should be depicted as it is. From the intellectual currents of his day he adopted a belief in scientific causality and materialism. His early stories 'Fasching' (1887) and 'Bahnwärter Thiel' (1888) were tales of simple people, although there is also a level which transcends the boundaries of realism.
xxx/ellauri123.html on line 796: L’archer volant qui causait mes ennuis; L’archer volant qui causait mes ennuis Lentävä jousimies joka ennen vaivasi;
xxx/ellauri128.html on line 611: Il est le promoteur d´un réalisme critique et d´une philosophie de l´être et de l´exister supérieure, d´après lui, aux philosophies de l´Un, du vrai, du bien, de la liberté, de la durée, de l´existence (coupée de l´essence). Le principe fondateur de cette doctrine de l´être est le principe d´identité qui justifie en droit une « raison d´être » intelligible (causalité, finalité). Du principe d´identité découlent toutes les catégories de l´être (essence/existence ; acte/puissance ; substance ; quantité ; qualité ; relation, etc.), d´où l´on déduit l´être même subsistant (Dieu) qu´Heidegger a confondu à tort selon lui avec un existant suprême.
xxx/ellauri167.html on line 50: Nell'episodio infernale è Francesca la sola a parlare, mentre Paolo tace e piange alla fine del racconto della donna. Le due anime volano affiancate nella bufera infernale che trascina i lussuriosi e Dante chiede a Virgilio il permesso di parlare con loro; Francesca dapprima si presenta e ricorda l'assassinio subìto ad opera del marito, poi (su richiesta di Dante) spiega la causa del loro peccato, ovvero la lettura del romanzo di Lancillotto e Ginevra che li spinse a intrecciare una relazione amorosa.
xxx/ellauri174.html on line 63: Malebranche was giving in to laws of cause an effect by placing a greater emphasis than he had previously done on his occasionalist account of causation, and particularly on his contention that God acted for the most part through "general volitions" and only rarely, as in the case of miracles, through "particular volitions". A bitter dispute ensued between Malebranche and his fellow Cartesian, Arnauld, whose name I remember from Chomsky's airy forays to Port-Royal grammar in the 60's. Over the next few years, the two men wrote enough polemics against one another to fill four volumes of Malebranche's collected works and three of Arnauld's. Arnauld's supporters managed to persuade the Roman Catholic Church to place Nature and Grace on its Index of Prohibited Books in 1690, and it was followed there by the Search nineteen years later in 1709. (Ironically, the Index already contained several works by the Jansenist Arnauld himself.) Somebody blamed Malebranche for being a Spinozan, which Nick himself vehemently demented. 1715 - Malebranche dies.
xxx/ellauri179.html on line 608: Young Hemingway vilified James for his choice of themes and characters, but more importantly, he viciously maligned him for the traumatic but obscure accident that had occurred in his youth. Leon Edel has summarized the known facts of the injury as gathered from James´ writings and other sources. The "obscure hurt" was reported by James to have happened at the "same dark hour" of the onset of the Civil War, in other words, May 1861 (Edel, Years 176-77). But actually the causative factor, the fire at West Stables in Newport, occurred on the night of October 28, 1861 (177). James relates that he had jammed himself into "an acute angle between two fences" trying to make "a rusty, quasi-extemporised old engine work" in order to help put out the stable fire. Injured in this attempt, James later provided only incomplete details and stated that the disaster was "intimate, odious, horrid, catastrophe, obscure, and most entirely personal" (175).
xxx/ellauri237.html on line 774: No olvides que la causa de tu presente
xxx/ellauri237.html on line 775: es tu pasado así como la causa de tu
xxx/ellauri237.html on line 901: Piensan que las causas de los problemas son externas
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