ellauri131.html on line 752: Gallagher on kirjoittanut suurimman osan Oasiksen tuotannosta. Tunnetuimpia hänen säveltämiään Oasis-kappaleita ovat muun muassa ”Live Forever”, ”Wonderwall” ja ”Don’t Look Back in Anger”. Näistä en ole kuullut yhtäkään. Hänen kirjoittamansa kappaleet ovat keränneet paljon arvostusta sekä yleisön että kriitikoiden keskuudessa, ja Gallagherin on muun muassa sanottu olevan ”oman sukupolvensa paras lauluntekijä.” Gallagher soitti Oasiksen kitaristina vuoteen 2009, jolloin erosi yhtyeestä.
ellauri219.html on line 1022: Cheever opetti yliopistoissa luovaa kirjoittamista. Hänen teostensa aiheena ovat varakkaat mutta henkisesti köyhät keskiluokkaiset ihmiset. Kuvauksessa on sekä myötätuntoa että purevaa moralisointia. Cheever says, famously, “the task of the American writer is not to describe the misgivings of a woman taken in adultery as she looks out of the window at the rain but to describe four hundred people under the lights reaching for a foul ball”. Kumpi on tomppelimpaa, sietää kysyä
ellauri408.html on line 367: Stars are tiny pinpricks of light that can “fall” to earth without ripping our solar system apart.
xxx/ellauri179.html on line 731: Lots of roosters will do a kind of “roll call” in the evening.
xxx/ellauri225.html on line 662: Borgare och en del ledande socialdemokrater "valde," liksom SvD och Nationalencyklopedin att betrakta Ådalshändelserna som en ”kravall”, en sammanstötning mellan en ansvarfull ”polisiär” bevarare av ordningen gentemot en ansvarslös och ”våldsbejakande” anarki.
xxx/ellauri268.html on line 348: Many argue that the pervasive nature of antisemitic tropes means the Gringotts goblins and their ilk do no harm. Most children watching the “Harry Potter” films wouldn’t have picked up on the reference. The British charity Campaign Against Antisemitism, for example, tweeted a statement arguing that there are “centuries of association of Jews with grotesque and malevolent creatures in folklore” and that “those who continue to use such representations are often not thinking of Jews at all” but are innocently thinking “of how readers or viewers will imagine goblins to look.”
xxx/ellauri281.html on line 540: With Monroe out of the picture — she died in 1962 — Mr. Bigsby pretty much folds up this big, busy tent. Miller went on to write important plays, notably “After the Fall” (1964), but his best work was in the distant rearview mirror.
xxx/ellauri495.html on line 154: In many traditional Christian readings, the “Adam and Eve” story is treated as a human choice that brings sin into human history, while Satan is treated as a created spiritual being whose rebellion is not something God could “undo” in the "same way." A common way to reconcile your question is:     Satan’s “fall” isn’t redemption-worthy in the same category. Adam and Eve (in this framework) are people who can receive mercy after failing; Satan is understood as having persisted in rebellion rather than turning back—so there’s no “repentance moment” to parallel the Eden moment.     Redemption is tied to a specific plan for humans. Christianity commonly holds that God’s rescue comes through a particular act (often described as Christ’s incarnation/sacrifice) aimed at humanity—so “redeeming Satan first” isn’t portrayed as part of the plan that addresses the human condition.     Even if the Eden scene was preventable, it may serve a deeper purpose. Some interpretations say God wanted to test to what creatures do with freedom (and to set up the later “promise/solution” arc), rather than simply eliminating the possibility of wrongdoing. If you tell me which tradition/view you’re coming from (e.g., Catholic, Protestant, Orthodox, or a particular theology), I can match the explanation to that framework more closely.
xxx/ellauri495.html on line 166: Right—if you’re using Aquinas, angels are created with intellect and will, and they really do choose. So the key Aquinas-style moves are usually:     Satan’s “fall” is not like Eden where there’s still an opening to repent. In Aquinas’s picture, once an angel’s will makes its definitive choice for/against God, that choice becomes settled (angels don’t get “another round” in the same way humans do).     God isn’t “testing Satan” like an experiment. In classical theology, God allows creatures to choose, but it’s not God setting up a trap to see what happens. The moral drama comes from the creature’s will turning (or refusing to turn) toward God.     Why not “redeem first”? In the Thomistic frame, the problem isn’t that God didn’t know; it’s that redemption as a “second chance” presupposes a will that will accept it. If the angel’s decision is definitive refusal, then there’s nothing for God to “straighten out” without negating the very kind of choice Aquinas says angels have. If you want, tell me whether you’re working from Aquinas’s exact claims you mean (e.g., about angelic knowledge, the definitiveness/immutability of angelic choice, or “permission vs. causation”), and I’ll map the argument in that same vocabulary.
xxx/ellauri495.html on line 174: Your reaction is coherent: if God can do anything, then why create beings who can definitively choose against him, and why not create “happy animals” instead. In Christian philosophy (including Aquinas-adjacent lines), the standard response is essentially: God isn’t choosing between “happiness with no freedom” and “chaos,” but between kinds of goods. A common version goes like this:     Freedom is a real good. Created persons can love, obey, worship, and genuinely choose. “No free choice” trades away not just the possibility of sin, but also the possibility of love and moral/covenant relationship.     Omnipotence doesn’t mean “make any set of values compatible.” The classic view is that there are realities like “created agency” and “definitive choices” that can’t both be preserved while also guaranteeing that no creature ever chooses wrongly.     The “circus” is not trial-and-error but a created order with intelligible consequences. God permits the misuse of freedom rather than coercing away misuse, because coercion would undermine the kind of relationship and moral order being created. That still leaves the emotional/ethical punch of your last line (“I’d rather have no freedom than sin-capable freedom”), and many people who find the metaphysics unpersuasive land there: freedom is too expensive. If you’re open to it, I can answer in the most direct way by taking your preference seriously: do you want the argument for why “no freedom” is worse than it sounds, or do you want the argument for why God’s omnipotence allows more than “could have prevented this one outcome” (i.e., a deeper take on the “why create at all” question)?
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