ellauri006.html on line 1835: Puhelinkeskusteluun viitaten, vedin Room.7 suomexi suoraan alkutextistä ottaen tavanomaisia paasausvapauxia. On aika selvää että Paavo ajaa tässä takaa freudilaista yliminä-minä-id erottelua. Kaluja ohjaa matelijanaivot, ja ohjaxissa oleva minä ei selviä ellei saa yläportaan porukoilta apua. Tämmösta akrasiavalitusta, pitäs ja pitäs mut kun ei hotsita.
ellauri096.html on line 767: Yhdenlainen tahdon murskatappio on perinteiseltä nimeltään akrasia, tahdonvoimattomuus. Mixi teet noin, kysyn Petteriltä. Koska se on kivaa. Matelijanaivo äänestää yhtä, aivokuori toista. No arvaa tuomari kuka siinä voitti, juu juu, kuka siinä voitti, kuka siinä voitti. Jos ei voittaisi, ei meitä varmaan enää olisi. Onko se sitten hyvä vai paha asia. Riippuu keneltä kysytään, Teppo hevoseltako vai Anulta.
ellauri096.html on line 775: In the dialogue Protagoras, Socrates attests that akrasia does not exist, claiming "No one goes willingly toward the bad" (358d). If a person examines a situation and decides to act in the way he determines to be best, he will pursue this action, as the best course is also the good course, i.e. man's natural goal. An all-things-considered assessment of the situation will bring full knowledge of a decision's outcome and worth linked to well-developed principles of the good. A person, according to Socrates, never chooses to act poorly or against his better judgment; and, therefore, actions that go against what is best are simply a product of being ignorant of facts or knowledge of what is best or good.
ellauri096.html on line 777: Aristotle, on the other hand, took a more empirical approach to the question, acknowledging that we intuitively believe in akrasia. He distances himself from the Socratic position by locating the breakdown of reasoning in an agent’s opinion, not his appetition. Now, without recourse to appetitive desires, Aristotle reasons that akrasia occurs as a result of opinion. Opinion is formulated mentally in a way that may or may not imitate truth, while appetites are merely desires of the body. Thus, opinion is only incidentally aligned with or opposed to the good, making an akratic action the product of opinion instead of reason. For Aristotle, the antonym of akrasia is enkrateia, which means "in power" (over oneself).
ellauri096.html on line 779: The word akrasia occurs twice in the Koine Greek New Testament. In Matthew 23:25 Jesus uses it to describe hypocritical religious leaders, translated "self-indulgence" in several translations, including the English Standard version. Paul the Apostle also gives the threat of temptation through akrasia as a reason for a husband and wife to not deprive each other of sex (1 Corinthians 7:5). In another passage (Rom. 7:15–25) Paul, without actually using the term akrasia, seems to reference the same psychological phenomenon in discussing the internal conflict between, on the one hand, "the law of God," which he equates with "the law of my mind"; and "another law in my members," identified with "the flesh, the law of sin." "For the good that I would do, I do not; but the evil which I would not, that I do." (v.19)
xxx/ellauri259.html on line 226: Tässä elämässä emme näe asioita kovin selkeästi. Kohtaamme jatkuvasti ristiriitoja. Vaikka tiedämme, mikä on oikein, meillä on vaikeuksia tehdä sitä. Eli akrasia, sanoisi Ari. Ajatuksemme kohoavat korkealle, mutta tekomme eivät voi nousta ajatuksemme tasolle.
6