ellauri082.html on line 498: The reader who found himself swamped with too much metaphysics in the last chapter will have a still worse time of it in this one, which is exclusively metaphysical. Metaphysics means nothing but an unusually obstinate effort to avoid thinking clearly.
ellauri089.html on line 546: § 68. Metaphysics, as dealing with a "supersensible reality" may have a bearing upon practical Ethics (1) if its supersensible reality is conceived as something future, which our actions can affect; and (2) since it will prove that every proposition of practical Ethics is false, if it can shew that an eternal reality is either the only real thing or the only good thing. Most metaphysical writers, believing in a reality of the latter kind, do thus imply the complete falsehood of every practical proposition, although they fail to see that their Metaphysics thus contradicts their Ethics. …
ellauri089.html on line 548: § 69. But the theory, by which I have defined Metaphysical Ethics, is not that Metaphysics has a logical bearing upon the question involved in practical Ethics "What effects will my action produce?", but that it has such a bearing upon the fundamental ethical question, "What is good in itself?" This theory has been refuted by the proof, in Chap. I, that the naturalistic fallacy is a fallacy; it only remains to discuss certain confusions which seem to have lent it plausibility. …
ellauri089.html on line 552: § 71. and another seems to lie in the failure to distinguish between that which suggests a truth, or is a cause of our knowing it, and that upon which it logically depends, or which is a reason for believing it: in the former sense fiction has a more important bearing on Ethics than Metaphysics can have. …
ellauri089.html on line 564: § 77. This latter confusion is one of the sources of the prevalent modern doctrine that "being good" is identical with "being willed"; but the prevalence of this doctrine seems to be chiefly due to other causes. I shall try to shew with regard to it (1) what are the chief errors which seem to have led to its adoption; and (2) that, apart from it, the Metaphysics of Volition can hardly have the smallest logical bearing upon Ethics. …
ellauri089.html on line 566: § 78. (1) It has been commonly held, since Kant, that "goodness" has the same relation to Will or Feeling, which "truth" or "reality" has to Cognition: that the proper method for Ethics is to discover what is implied in Will or Feeling, just as, according to Kant, the proper method for Metaphysics was to discover what is implied in Cognition. …
ellauri089.html on line 576: § 83. (2) If "being good" and "being willed" are not identical then the latter could only be a criterion of the former; and, in order to shew that it was so, we should have to establish independently that many things were good—that is to say, we should have to establish most of our ethical conclusions before the Metaphysics of Volition could possibly give us the smallest assistance. …
ellauri097.html on line 420: Kant held that all rational persons have an a priori understanding of the basic principles of morality. These consist of duties, both to oneself and to others, and above all the duty to respect rational agents. Most persons, however, do not understand that morality is a priori, and their moral commitments are therefore vulnerable to corrosive skeptical criticism. In The Metaphysics of Morals Kant formulates the ultimate standard for moral judgment, namely universalizability, and establishes the rational necessity of morality.
ellauri260.html on line 260: Apart from economic matters and (admittedly superfluous) democratization, there is zealous effort, which we may call statism, sorry, anachronism, let's call it Politism, to enlarge the power and the province of States as far as possible. Very bad! In addition, we lost theocracy, the collective order that had an undisputed superiority, and gave meaning and purpose to human life. In the course of modern times this job has passed more and more to the side of the deserving individuals. Metaphysics was succeeded by psychology, and religion by entertainment.
xxx/ellauri075.html on line 194: More recently, alongside Dostoyevsky's philosophy, many have found solace in Shestov's battle against the rational self-consistent and self-evident; for example Bernard Martin of Case Western Reserve University, who translated his works now found online [external link below]; and the scholar Liza Knapp, who wrote The Annihilation of Inertia: Dostoevsky and Metaphysics. This book was an evaluation of Dostoyevsky's struggle against the self-evident "wall", and refers to Shestov on several occasions.
xxx/ellauri174.html on line 69: Mitä tulee tähän älylliseen tietoon, Malebranche seurasi enemmän tai vähemmän Pyhää Augustinusta. Hänen suurena innovaationsa oli selittää, kuinka nämä samat jumalalliset ideat voisivat toimia myös ihmismielen välittöminä kohteina aistillisessa havainnoissa. Ongelma on siinä, että jumalalliset ideat ovat universaaleja, kun taas kaikki havainto näyttää olevan yksityiskohtia. Malebranchen ratkaisu oli ehdottaa, että vaikka mielen älyllinen käsitys näistä ideoista on puhdas ja suora, sen aistillinen käsitys niistä muuttuu "tunteilla". Nämä tuntemukset, toisin kuin ideat, ovat todellakin omituisia yksittäisille luoduille mielille ja elävät niiden muotoina. Idea edustaa vain kappaleiden geometrisia tai mekaanisia ominaisuuksia (koko, muoto, liike), kun taas aistiminen muodostuu väristä tai muusta järkevästä laadusta. Jälkimmäinen rajoittaa mielen käsitystä edellisestä siten, että se edustaa tiettyä yksilöä tälle mielelle. Toiselle mielelle, jolla on erilainen tunne, sama idea voisi edustaa erilaista saman yleisen tyypin yksilöä. Teoksessa Dialogues On Metaphysics and Religion (dialogi 1) Malebranche lisäsi, että sama perusrakenne voi selittää myös mielikuvituksen (mentaalisen fysiologisen elementin vastakohtana) mielikuvituksen, tässä tapauksessa, jossa ajatus vain "koskettaa kevyesti" mieltä.
xxx/ellauri174.html on line 81: Vaikka Malebranche seurasi Augustinusta älyllisen tiedon kuvauksessa, hänen lähestymistapansa mielen ja kehon ongelmiin hän aloitti Descartesin seuraajana. Mutta toisin kuin Descartes, joka piti mahdollisena muodostaa selkeä ja selkeä käsitys mielestä, Malebranche väittää Dialogues on Metaphysics -kirjassa, Theodoren ja Aristeksen välisessä dialogissa, että meillä ei ole täydellistä käsitystä mielen voimista, eikä siten ole selkeää käsitystä mielen luonteesta.
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