Dawn Eden Goldstein : rock-toimittaja, joka kasvatettiin reformijuutalaiseksi ; oli agnostikko, nykyään katolinen teologi ja kirjailija
xxx/ellauri489.html on line 294: Gaiman hired the crisis management firm Edendale Strategies and lawyer Andrew Brettler, who has represented Danny Masterson and Prince Andrew. Masterson tuomittiin toukokuussa 2023 kahden naisen raiskauksesta vuosien 2001 ja 2003 välisenä aikana hänen kotonaan Hollywoodissa Los Angelesissa. Masterson huumasi naiset ennen raiskauksia. Syyskuussa valamiehistö päätti tuomion pituudeksi 30 vuotta vankeutta.
xxx/ellauri495.html on line 154: In many traditional Christian readings, the “Adam and Eve” story is treated as a human choice that brings sin into human history, while Satan is treated as a created spiritual being whose rebellion is not something God could “undo” in the "same way." A common way to reconcile your question is: Satan’s “fall” isn’t redemption-worthy in the same category. Adam and Eve (in this framework) are people who can receive mercy after failing; Satan is understood as having persisted in rebellion rather than turning back—so there’s no “repentance moment” to parallel the Eden moment. Redemption is tied to a specific plan for humans. Christianity commonly holds that God’s rescue comes through a particular act (often described as Christ’s incarnation/sacrifice) aimed at humanity—so “redeeming Satan first” isn’t portrayed as part of the plan that addresses the human condition. Even if the Eden scene was preventable, it may serve a deeper purpose. Some interpretations say God wanted to test to what creatures do with freedom (and to set up the later “promise/solution” arc), rather than simply eliminating the possibility of wrongdoing. If you tell me which tradition/view you’re coming from (e.g., Catholic, Protestant, Orthodox, or a particular theology), I can match the explanation to that framework more closely.
xxx/ellauri495.html on line 158: It can feel “silly,” but most theologies that defend God’s omniscience also add a distinction: God can know outcomes and still choose a path that allows real moral agency and a meaningful relationship, rather than running a universe where wrongdoing can’t happen. Common ways this gets handled: Omniscience = foreknowledge, not forced causation. God can know Adam/Eve will fall without making them fall in the moment the way a puppetmaster causes a move. “Why allow it?” becomes a free-will / character-shaping issue. Many Christians argue God isn’t mainly trying to prevent every mistake; he’s working through a story where creatures make choices and where redemption is offered afterward. It is more fun that way, for him anyway. Different “kinds” of sin. In a lot of Christian thought, Adam and Eve’s sin is treated as a human failure that can be met with mercy, while Satan’s rebellion is treated as a hardened, ongoing refusal—so “redeem him first” isn’t seen as parallel to “save humanity first.” One more point: if you assume “God could have prevented the mistake” implies “God must prevent all mistakes whenever prevention is possible,” then you’ll always land on your conclusion. Traditional theodicies reject that assumption and instead say that preventing the possibility of moral failure isn’t the goal—even for an omniscient God. If you want, tell me what you mean by “Satan made the same mistake” (did you mean initial rebellion due to pride? or the Eden temptation itself?) and I’ll tailor the answer more tightly to that exact claim.
xxx/ellauri495.html on line 162: In most Christian frameworks, God “didn’t straighten it out first” because Satan’s fall isn’t treated like a one-time human misstep that can be corrected by a simple reset; it’s treated as a decisive, ongoing refusal (a hardened rebellion), and the moral/spiritual order is allowed to follow from what a free created being chooses. Common answers to your “what was he testing?” point: It wasn’t a test for Satan in order to earn redemption. The “testing” language is usually applied to humans’ moral responsibility (Eden as a probation/test of obedience and trust), not to God giving Satan another chance. The Eden episode is usually framed as a revelation about what human beings would do with freedom, and it sets up the need for a rescue/atonement later. Some traditions add that the “serpent” is the instrument, not the core agent—so the real test is about whether humans will trust God, not about God “experimenting” on whether Satan is redeemable. If you want the tightest version of the answer for your viewpoint: do you lean more toward free-will/real-choice explanations or toward sovereignty/purpose explanations (God allowing rebellion to accomplish a larger plan)?
xxx/ellauri495.html on line 166: Right—if you’re using Aquinas, angels are created with intellect and will, and they really do choose. So the key Aquinas-style moves are usually: Satan’s “fall” is not like Eden where there’s still an opening to repent. In Aquinas’s picture, once an angel’s will makes its definitive choice for/against God, that choice becomes settled (angels don’t get “another round” in the same way humans do). God isn’t “testing Satan” like an experiment. In classical theology, God allows creatures to choose, but it’s not God setting up a trap to see what happens. The moral drama comes from the creature’s will turning (or refusing to turn) toward God. Why not “redeem first”? In the Thomistic frame, the problem isn’t that God didn’t know; it’s that redemption as a “second chance” presupposes a will that will accept it. If the angel’s decision is definitive refusal, then there’s nothing for God to “straighten out” without negating the very kind of choice Aquinas says angels have. If you want, tell me whether you’re working from Aquinas’s exact claims you mean (e.g., about angelic knowledge, the definitiveness/immutability of angelic choice, or “permission vs. causation”), and I’ll map the argument in that same vocabulary.
xxx/ellauri495.html on line 186: Fair. In plain terms, your objection is: If God is omnipotent, then God didn’t have to create a world where free choices predictably produce misery and rebellion. The usual “reason” offered for allowing it (“agency,” “meaning,” “relationship,” “goodness”) often isn’t a real explanation for why suffering is tolerated at all; it feels like re-labeling. If you want a cleaner way to put it, you can treat it as the problem of justification: not “can they define free will,” but “what is the morally sufficient reason to pick a setup where the downside (Eden/Satan, suffering, death) was always available?”
xxx/ellauri495.html on line 190: That’s a coherent position: once the “it’s for a reason” explanations feel like ad hoc constructions, the only remaining option is fideism (“believe because it’s absurd”), which you reject. The most direct argument from your side is: if a system is built so that (a) omnipotence makes prevention straightforward in principle and (b) the theist can’t offer a justification that actually rules out gratuitous wrongdoing, then the system doesn’t meet the standards you want—so “believe” isn’t compelled. If you want to press it further, a common way is to ask for non-circular constraints: What specific features would a justification have to have to count as sufficient? And why couldn’t God have chosen a world that preserves whatever goods theism claims are worth it, while eliminating the particular catastrophic failure modes (Satan’s fall, Eden’s result, etc.)? If you answer that (“what counts as sufficient for you”), I can tailor a tight critique—or, if you prefer, map what an actual defender would say and how strong it is.
45
Eden_1828.jpg/800px-Cole_Thomas_Expulsion_from_the_Garden_of_Eden_1828.jpg" width="80%" />