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ellauri065.html on line 147: Allekirjoittamalla Helsingin päätösasiakirjan vuonna 1975 sekä Länsi-Saksa että Itä-Saksa tunnustivat sodanjälkeisen Euroopan nykyiset rajat, mukaan lukien Oder-Neisse-linja, päteviksi kansainvälisessä oikeudessa. Vuonna 1990 osana Saksan jälleenyhdistämistä Länsi-Saksa hyväksyi Saksan osalta lopullista ratkaisua koskevan sopimuksen lausekkeet, joissa Saksa luopui kaikista vaatimuksista alueelle, joka sijaitsee Oder – Neisse-linjan itäpuolella. Saksan tunnustamista Oder-Neisse-linja rajalle se on vahvistettu uudelleen yhdistynyt Saksa on Saksan ja Puolan rajalla sopimuksen 14. marraskuuta 1990; ja kumoamalla Saksan liittotasavallan peruslain 23 §, jonka mukaan liittotasavallan ulkopuolella olevat Saksan osavaltiot voivat aiemmin hakea maahantuloa.
ellauri077.html on line 740: Vähän epäselväxi jää kenen lupauxia nää ovat. Voiko pulde luvata et sen rahahuolet katoaa (§10), tai eze havaizee yhtäkkiä jotain jumalan assisteja (§12). No siinähän se jekku onkin: lupaa izellesi niin se tapahtuu. Kolkuttavalle avataan, tai siis ainakin siltä alkaa vaikuttaa. Sinapinsiemen uskoa tekee ihmeitä, siirtää vuoria. Plasebovaikutus on mahtava. Jos sellaiseen on taipumusta uskoa. Lähes puolella porukoista on.
ellauri089.html on line 405: § 1. In order to define Ethics, we must discover what is both common and peculiar to all undoubted ethical judgements; ...
ellauri089.html on line 407: § 2. but this is not that they are concerned with human conduct, but that they are concerned with a certain predicate "good", and its converse "bad", which may be applied both to conduct and to other things. …
ellauri089.html on line 409: § 3. The subjects of the judgments of a scientific ethics are not, like those of some studies, "particular things"; …
ellauri089.html on line 411: § 4. but it includes all universal judgments which assert the relation of "goodness" to any subject, and hence includes Casuistry.
ellauri089.html on line 413: § 5. It must, however, enquire not only what things are universally related to goodness, but also, what this predicate, to which they are related, is: …
ellauri089.html on line 415: § 6. and the answer to this question is that it is indefinable … indefinable ja simple ei ole sama asia. G.E.Mooren määäritelmäteoria oli aika alkeellista tasoa. Kyllä "hyvä" on hajotettavissa tekijöihin ja sillä on oma logiikka, kuten olen osoittanut tärkeässä artikkelissani hyvästä joka ilmestyi Kouvolan julkaisusarjassa.
ellauri089.html on line 417: § 7. or simple: for if by definition be meant the analysis of an object of thought, only complex objects can be defined; …
ellauri089.html on line 419: § 8. and of the three senses in which "definition" can be used, this is the most important. …
ellauri089.html on line 421: § 9. What is thus indefinable is not "the good", or the whole of that which always possesses the predicate "good", but this predicate itself. …
ellauri089.html on line 423: § 10. "Good", then, denotes one unique simple object of thought among innumerable others; but this object has very commonly been identified with some other—a fallacy which may be called "the naturalistic fallacy" … Tässä Jyriltä alkaa lähteä riimu käsistä. Sillä on niin iso lehmälauma ojassa, ettei se pysty pitelemään sitä. 1 lehmistä on että ainoa merkizevä hyvä on termiittiapinoiden hyvä, lehmistä ei mitään väliä. Niitä on hyvä popsia aivan vapaasti. Koska lehmät ei ole meikäläisiä, niillä ei ole sielua, ei äänioikeutta eikä armeijaa, ja ne maistuu meistä apinoista hyvältä. So there!
ellauri089.html on line 425: § 11. and which reduces what is used as a fundamental principle of Ethics either to a tautology or to a statement about the meaning of a word. …
ellauri089.html on line 427: § 12. The nature of this fallacy is easily recognised; …
ellauri089.html on line 429: § 13. and if it were avoided, it would be plain that the only alternatives to the admission that "good" is indefinable, are either that it is complex, or that there is no notion at all peculiar to Ethics—alternatives which can only be refuted by an appeal to inspection, but which can be so refuted.
ellauri089.html on line 431: § 14. The "naturalistic fallacy" illustrated by Bentham; and the importance of avoiding it pointed out. …
ellauri089.html on line 433: § 15. The relation which ethical judgments assert to hold universally between "goodness" and other things are of two kinds: a thing may be asserted either to be good itself or to be causally related to something else which is itself good—to be "good as a means". …
ellauri089.html on line 435: § 16. Our investigations of the latter kind of relation cannot hope to establish more than that a certain kind of action will generally be followed by the best possible results; …
ellauri089.html on line 437: § 17. but a relation, of the former kind, if true at all, will be true of all cases. All ordinary ethical judgments assert causal relations, but they are commonly treated as if they did not, because the two kinds of relations are not distinguished. …
ellauri089.html on line 439: § 18. The investigation of intrinsic values is complicated by the fact that the value of a whole may be different from the sum of the value of its parts, …
ellauri089.html on line 441: § 19. in which case the part has to the whole a relation, which exhibits an equally important difference from and resemblance to that of means to end. …
ellauri089.html on line 443: § 20. The term "organic whole" might well be used to denote that a whole has this property, since, of the two other properties which it is commonly used to imply, …
ellauri089.html on line 445: § 21. one, that of reciprocal causal dependence between parts, has no necessary relation to this one, …
ellauri089.html on line 447: § 22. and the other, upon which most stress has been laid, can be true of no whole whatsoever, being a self-contradictory conception due to confusion. …
ellauri089.html on line 449: § 23. Summary of chapter.
ellauri089.html on line 453: § 24. This and the two following chapters will consider certain proposed answers to the second of ethical questions: What is good in itself? These proposed answers are characterised by the facts (1) that they declare some one kind of thing to be alone good in itself; and (2) that they do so, because they suppose this one thing to define the meaning of "good". …
ellauri089.html on line 455: § 25. Such theories may be divided into two groups (1) Metaphysical, (2) Naturalistic; and the second group may be subdivided into two others, (a) theories which declare some natural object, other than pleasure, to be sole good, (b) Hedonism. This present chapter will deal with (a). …
ellauri089.html on line 457: § 26. Definition of what is meant by "Naturalism".
ellauri089.html on line 459: § 27. The common argument that things are good, because they are "natural", may involve either (1) the false proposition that the "normal", as such, is good;
ellauri089.html on line 461: § 28. or (2) the false proposition that the "necessary", as such, is good. …
ellauri089.html on line 463: § 29. But a systematised appeal to Nature is now most prevalent in connection with the term "Evolution". An examination of Mr Herbert Spencer's Ethics will illustrate which are commonly associated with the latter term. …
ellauri089.html on line 465: § 30. Darwin's scientific theory of "natural selection," which has mainly caused the modern vogue of the term "Evolution," must be carefully distinguished from certain ideas which are commonly associated with the latter term. …
ellauri089.html on line 467: § 31. Mr Spencer's connection of Evolution with Ethics seems to shew the influence of the naturalistic fallacy; …
ellauri089.html on line 469: § 32. but Mr Spencer is vague as to the ethical relations of "pleasure" and "evolution", and his Naturalism may be mainly Naturalistic Hedonism. …
ellauri089.html on line 471: § 33. A discussion of the third chapter of the Data of Ethics serves to illustrate these two points and to shew that Mr Spencer is in utter confusion with regard to the fundamental principles of Ethics. …
ellauri089.html on line 473: § 34. Three possible views as to the relation of Evolution to Ethics are distinguished from the naturalistic view to which it is proposed to confine the name "Evolutionistic Ethics". On any of these three views the relation would be unimportant, and the "Evolutionistic" view, which makes it important, involves a double fallacy. …
ellauri089.html on line 475: § 35. Summary of chapter. Tulihan se sieltä. Tää on tää iänikuinen talousliberaali silmäänkuseskelu. Että me sielukkaat apinaolennot ollaan jotain luonnon yläpuolella kun me osataan näitä pelejä. Ilkka Niiniluoto 70-luvulla ivaili Ahmavaaran korkkiruuvia, että tosiasioista voitas muka päättää miten asioiden oisi paras olla. Senhän hydran pään katkaisi jo Hume sillä giljotiinilla. Ja eihän maailma ole satunnainen eikä deterministinen, eihän? Kai me ollaan muumipelin pelaajia jotka voi vaikka arvaamalla valkata jonkun parhaan reitin, jonka varrella on 2 näkinkenkiä ja muumitalon avain?
ellauri089.html on line 479: § 36. The prevalence of Hedonism is mainly due to the naturalistic fallacy. …
ellauri089.html on line 481: § 37. Hedonism may be defined as the doctrine that "Pleasure is the sole good"; this doctrine has always been held by Hedonists and used by them as a fundamental ethical principle, although it has commonly been confused with others. …
ellauri089.html on line 483: § 38. The method pursued in this chapter will consist in exposing the reasons commonly offered for the truth of Hedonism and in bringing out the reasons, which suffice to shew it untrue, by a criticism of J. S. Mill & H. Sidgwick. …
ellauri089.html on line 485: § 39. Mill declares that "Happiness is the only thing desirable as an end", and insists that "Questions of ultimate ends are not amenable to direct proof"; …
ellauri089.html on line 487: § 40. yet he gives a proof of the first proposition, which consists in (1) the fallacious confusion of "desirable" with "desired", …
ellauri089.html on line 489: § 41. (2) an attempt to shew that nothing but pleasure is desired. …
ellauri089.html on line 491: § 42. The theory that nothing but pleasure is desired seems largely due to a confusion between the cause and the object of desire, and, even if it is always among the causes of desire, that fact would not tempt anyone to think it a good. …
ellauri089.html on line 493: § 43. Mill attempts to reconcile his doctrine that pleasure is the sole object of desire with his admission that other things are desired, by the absurd declaration that what is a means to happiness is "a part" of happiness. …
ellauri089.html on line 495: § 44. Summary of Mill's argument and of my criticism.
ellauri089.html on line 497: § 45. We must now proceed to consider the principle of Hedonism as an "Intuition", as which it has been clearly recognised by Prof. Sidgwick alone. That it should be thus incapable of proof is not, in itself, any reason for dissatisfaction. …
ellauri089.html on line 499: § 46. In thus beginning to consider what things are good in themselves, we leave the refutation of Naturalism behind, and enter on the second division of ethical questions. …
ellauri089.html on line 501: § 47. Mill's doctrine that some pleasures are superior "in quality" to others implies both (1) that judgments of ends must be "intuitions"; …
ellauri089.html on line 503: § 48. and (2) that pleasure is not the sole good. …
ellauri089.html on line 505: § 49. Prof. Sidgwick has avoided those confusions made by Mill: in considering his arguments we shall, therefore, merely consider the question "Is pleasure the sole good?"
ellauri089.html on line 507: § 50. Prof. Sidgwick first tries to show that nothing outside of Human Existence can be good. Reasons are given for doubting this. …
ellauri089.html on line 509: § 51. He then goes on to the far more important proposition that no part of Human Existence, except pleasure, is desirable. …
ellauri089.html on line 511: § 52. But pleasure must be distinguished from consciousness of pleasure, and (1) it is plain that, when so distinguished, pleasure is not the sole good; …
ellauri089.html on line 513: § 53. and (2) it may be made equally plain that consciousness of pleasure is not the sole good, if we are equally careful to distinguish it from its usual accompaniments. …
ellauri089.html on line 515: § 54. Of Prof. Sidgwick's two arguments for the contrary view, the second is equally compatible with the supposition that pleasure is a mere criterion of what is right; …
ellauri089.html on line 517: § 55. and in his first, the appeal to reflective intuition, he fails to put the question clearly (1) in that he does not recognize the principle of organic unities; …
ellauri089.html on line 519: § 56. and (2) in that he fails to emphasize that the agreement, which he has tried to shew, between hedonistic judgments and those of Common Sense, only holds of judgments of means: hedonistic judgments of ends are flagrantly paradoxical. …
ellauri089.html on line 521: § 57. I conclude, then, that a reflective intuition, if proper precautions are taken, will agree with Common Sense that it is absurd to regard mere consciousness of pleasure as the sole good. …
ellauri089.html on line 523: § 58. It remains to consider Egoism and Utilitarianism. It is important to distinguish the former, as the doctrine that "my own pleasure is sole good," from the doctrine, opposed to Altruism, that to pursue my own pleasure exclusively is right as a means. …
ellauri089.html on line 525: § 59. Egoism proper is utterly untenable, being self-contradictory; it fails to perceive that when I declare a thing to be my own good, I must be declaring it to be good absolutely or else not good at all. …
ellauri089.html on line 527: § 60. This confusion is further brought out by an examination of Prof. Sidgwick's contrary view; …
ellauri089.html on line 529: § 61. and it is shewn that, in consequence of this confusion, his representation of "the relation of Rational Egoism to Rational Benevolence" as "the profoundest problem of Ethics", and his view that a certain hypothesis is required to "make Ethics rational", are grossly erroneous. …
ellauri089.html on line 531: § 62. The same confusion is involved in the attempt to infer Utilitarianism from Psychological Hedonism, as commonly held, e.g. by Mill. …
ellauri089.html on line 533: § 63. Egoism proper seems also to owe its plausibility to its confusion with Egoism, as a doctrine of means. …
ellauri089.html on line 535: § 64. Certain ambiguities in the conception of Utilitarianism are noticed; and it is pointed out (1) that, as a doctrine of the end to be pursued, it is finally refuted by the refutation of Hedonism, and (2) that, while the arguments most commonly urged in its favour could, at most, only shew it to offer a correct criterion of right action, they are quite insufficient even for this purpose. …
ellauri089.html on line 537: § 65. Summary of chapter. Tää luku on aivan joutava. Pelkkää olkimiehen mätkintää. Ei edes Epikuros ollut kiinnostunut noin paljon pyllynreijän kutkuttelusta.
ellauri089.html on line 542: § 66. The term "metaphysical" is defined as having reference primarily to any object of knowledge which is not a part of Nature—does not exist in time, as an object of perception; but since metaphysicians, not content with pointing out the truth about such entities, have always supposed that what does not exist in Nature, must, at least, exist, the term also has reference to a supposed "supersensible reality": …
ellauri089.html on line 544: § 67. and by "metaphysical Ethics" I mean those systems which maintain or imply that the answer to the question "What is good?" logically depends upon the answer to the question "What is the nature of supersensible reality?" All such systems obviously involve the same fallacy—the "naturalistic fallacy"—by the use of which Naturalism was also defined. …
ellauri089.html on line 546: § 68. Metaphysics, as dealing with a "supersensible reality" may have a bearing upon practical Ethics (1) if its supersensible reality is conceived as something future, which our actions can affect; and (2) since it will prove that every proposition of practical Ethics is false, if it can shew that an eternal reality is either the only real thing or the only good thing. Most metaphysical writers, believing in a reality of the latter kind, do thus imply the complete falsehood of every practical proposition, although they fail to see that their Metaphysics thus contradicts their Ethics. …
ellauri089.html on line 548: § 69. But the theory, by which I have defined Metaphysical Ethics, is not that Metaphysics has a logical bearing upon the question involved in practical Ethics "What effects will my action produce?", but that it has such a bearing upon the fundamental ethical question, "What is good in itself?" This theory has been refuted by the proof, in Chap. I, that the naturalistic fallacy is a fallacy; it only remains to discuss certain confusions which seem to have lent it plausibility. …
ellauri089.html on line 550: § 70. One such source of confusion seems to lie in the failure to distinguish between the proposition "This is good", when it means "This existing thing is good", and the same proposition, when it means "The existence of this kind of thing would be good"; …
ellauri089.html on line 552: § 71. and another seems to lie in the failure to distinguish between that which suggests a truth, or is a cause of our knowing it, and that upon which it logically depends, or which is a reason for believing it: in the former sense fiction has a more important bearing on Ethics than Metaphysics can have. …
ellauri089.html on line 554: § 72. But a more important source of confusion seems to lie in the supposition that "to be good" is identical with the possession of some supersensible property, which is also involved in the definition of "reality". …
ellauri089.html on line 556: § 73. One cause of this supposition seems to be the logical prejudice that all propositions are of the most familiar type—that in which subject and predicate are both existents. …
ellauri089.html on line 558: § 74. But ethical propositions cannot be reduced to this type: in particular, they are obviously to be distinguished …
ellauri089.html on line 560: § 75. (1) from Natural Laws; with which one of Kant's most famous doctrines confuses them, …
ellauri089.html on line 562: § 76. and (2) from Commands; with which they are confused both by Kant and by others. …
ellauri089.html on line 564: § 77. This latter confusion is one of the sources of the prevalent modern doctrine that "being good" is identical with "being willed"; but the prevalence of this doctrine seems to be chiefly due to other causes. I shall try to shew with regard to it (1) what are the chief errors which seem to have led to its adoption; and (2) that, apart from it, the Metaphysics of Volition can hardly have the smallest logical bearing upon Ethics. …
ellauri089.html on line 566: § 78. (1) It has been commonly held, since Kant, that "goodness" has the same relation to Will or Feeling, which "truth" or "reality" has to Cognition: that the proper method for Ethics is to discover what is implied in Will or Feeling, just as, according to Kant, the proper method for Metaphysics was to discover what is implied in Cognition. …
ellauri089.html on line 568: § 79. The actual relations between "goodness" and Will or Feeling, from which this false doctrine is inferred, seem to be mainly (a) the causal relation consisting in the fact that it is only by reflection upon the experiences of Will and Feeling that we become aware of ethical distinctions; (b) the facts that a cognition of goodness is perhaps always included in certain kinds of Willing and Feeling, and is generally accompanied by them: …
ellauri089.html on line 570: § 80. but from neither of these psychological facts does it follow that "to be good" is identical with being willed or felt in a certain way. The supposition that it does follow is an instance of the fundamental contradiction of modern Epistemology—the contradiction involved in both distinguishing and identifying the object and the act of Thought, "truth" itself and its supposed criterion: …
ellauri089.html on line 572: § 81. and, once this analogy between Volition and Cognition is accepted, the view that ethical propositions have an essential reference to Will or Feeling, is strengthened by another error with regard to the nature of Cognition—the error of supposing that "perception" denotes merely a certain way of cognising an object, whereas it actually includes the assertion that the object is also true. …
ellauri089.html on line 574: § 82. The argument of the last three §§ is recapitulated; and it is pointed out (1) that Volition and Feeling are not analogous to Cognition (2) that, even if they were, "to be good" could not mean "to be willed or felt in a certain way". …
ellauri089.html on line 576: § 83. (2) If "being good" and "being willed" are not identical then the latter could only be a criterion of the former; and, in order to shew that it was so, we should have to establish independently that many things were good—that is to say, we should have to establish most of our ethical conclusions before the Metaphysics of Volition could possibly give us the smallest assistance. …
ellauri089.html on line 578: § 84. The fact that the metaphysical writers who, like Green, attempt to base Ethics on Volition, do not even attempt this independent investigation, shows that they start from the false assumption that goodness is identical with being willed, and hence that their ethical reasonings have no value whatsoever. …
ellauri089.html on line 580: § 85. Summary of chapter.
ellauri089.html on line 587: § 86. The question to be discussed in this chapter must be clearly distinguished from the two questions hitherto discussed, namely (1) What is the nature of the proposition: "This is good in itself"? …
ellauri089.html on line 589: § 87. and (2) What things are good in themselves? to which we gave one answer in deciding that pleasure was not the only thing good in itself. …
ellauri089.html on line 591: § 88. In this chapter we shall deal with the third object of ethical enquiry: namely answers to the question "What conduct is a means to good results?" or "What ought we to do?" This is the question of Practical Ethics, and its answer involves an assertion of causal connection. …
ellauri089.html on line 593: § 89. It is shewn that the assertions "This action is right" or "is my duty" are equivalent to the assertion that the total results of the action in question will be the best possible; …
ellauri089.html on line 595: § 90. and the rest of the chapter will deal with certain conclusions, upon which light is thrown by this fact. Of which the first is (1) that Intuitionism is mistaken; since no proposition with regard to duty can be self-evident. …
ellauri089.html on line 597: § 91. (2) It is plain that we cannot hope to prove which among all the actions, which it is possible for us to perform on every occasion, will produce the best total results: to discover what is our "duty", in this strict sense, is impossible. It may, however, be possible to shew which among the actions, which we are likely to perform, will produce the best results. …
ellauri089.html on line 599: § 92. The distinction made in the last § is further explained; and it is insisted that all that Ethics has done or can do, is, not to determine absolute duties, but to point out which, among a few of the alternatives, possible under certain circumstances, will have the better result. …
ellauri089.html on line 601: § 93. (3) Even this latter task is immensely difficult, and no adequate proof that the total results of one action are superior to those of another, has ever been given. For (a) we can only calculate actual results within a comparatively near future. We must, therefore, assume that no results of the same action in the infinite future beyond, will reverse the balance—an assumption which perhaps can be, but certainly has not been, justified; …
ellauri089.html on line 603: § 94. and (b) even to decide that, of any two actions, one has a better total result than the other in the immediate future, is very difficult; and it is very improbable, and quite impossible to prove, that any single action is in all cases better as means than its probable alternative. Rules of duty, even in this restricted sense, can only, at most, be general truths. …
ellauri089.html on line 605: § 95. But (c) most of the actions, most universally approved by Common Sense, may perhaps be shewn to be generally better as means than any probable alternative, on the following principles. (1) With regard to some rules it may be shewn that their general observation would be useful in any state of society, where the instincts to preserve and propagate life and to possess property were as strong as they seem always to be; and this utility may be shewn, independently of a right view as to what is good in itself, since the observance is a means to things which are a necessary condition for the attainment of any great goods in considerable quantities. …
ellauri089.html on line 607: § 96. (2) Other rules are such that their general observance can only be shewn to be useful, as a means to the preservation of society, under more or less temporary conditions: if any of these are to be proved useful in all societies, this can only be done by shewing their causal relation to things good or evil in themselves, which are not generally recognised to be such. …
ellauri089.html on line 609: § 97. It is plain that rules of class (1) may also be justified by the existence of such temporary conditions as justify those of class (2); and among such temporary conditions must be reckoned the so-called sanctions. …
ellauri089.html on line 611: § 98. In this way, then, it may be possible to prove the general utility, for the present, of those actions, which in our society are both generally recognized as duties and generally practised; but it seems very doubtful whether a conclusive case can be established for any proposed change in social custom, without an independent investigation of what things are good or bad in themselves. …
ellauri089.html on line 613: § 99. And (d) if we consider the distinct question of how a single individual should decide to act (α) in cases where the general utility of the action in question is certain, (β) in other cases: there seems reason for thinking that, with regard to (α), he should always conform to it; but these reasons are not conclusive, if either the general observance or the general utility is wanting; …
ellauri089.html on line 615: § 100. and that (β) in all other cases, rules of action should not be followed at all, but the individual should consider what positive goods, he, in his particular circumstances, seems likely to be able to effect, and what evils to avoid. …
ellauri089.html on line 617: § 101. (4) It follows further that the distinction denoted by the terms "duty" and "expediency" is not primarily ethical; when we ask "Is this really expedient?" we are asking precisely the same question as "Is this my duty?", viz. "Is this a means to the best possible?" "Duties" are mainly distinguished by the non-ethical marks (1) that many people are often tempted to avoid them, (2) that their most prominent effects are on others than the agent, (3) that they excite the moral sentiments: so far as they are distinguished by an ethical peculiarity, this is not that they are peculiarly useful to perform, but that they are peculiarly useful to sanction. …
ellauri089.html on line 619: § 102. The distinction between "duty" and "interest" is also, in the main, the same non-ethical distinction; but the term "interested" does also refer to a distinct ethical predicate—that an action is to "my interest" asserts only that it will have the best possible effects of one particular kind, not that its total effects will be the best possible. …
ellauri089.html on line 621: § 103. (5) We may further see that "virtues" are not to be defined as dispositions that are good in themselves: they are not necessarily more than dispositions to perform actions generally good as means, and of these, for the most part, only those classed as "duties" in accordance with section (4). It follows that to decide whether a disposition is or is not "virtuous" involves the difficult causal investigation discussed in section (3); and that what is a virtue in one state of society may not be so in another. …
ellauri089.html on line 623: § 104. It follows that we have no reason to presume, as has commonly been done, that the exercise of virtue in the performance of "duties" is ever good in itself—far less, that it is the sole good: …
ellauri089.html on line 625: § 105. and, if we consider the intrinsic value of each exercise, it will appear (1) that, in most cases, it has no value, and (2) that even the cases, where it has some value, are far from constituting the sole good. The truth of the latter proposition is generally inconsistently implied, even by those who deny it; …
ellauri089.html on line 627: § 106. but in order fairly to decide upon the intrinsic value of virtue, we must distinguish three different kinds of disposition, each of which is commonly so called and has been maintained to be the only kind deserving the name. Thus (a) the mere unconscious "habit" of performing duties, which is the commonest type, has no intrinsic value whatsoever; Christian moralists are right in implying that mere "external rightness" has no intrinsic value, though they are wrong in saying that it is therefore not "virtuous", since this implies that it has no value as a means. …
ellauri089.html on line 629: § 107. (b) where virtue consists in a disposition to have, and be moved by, a sentiment of love towards really good consequences of an action and of hatred towards really evil ones, it has some intrinsic value, but its value may vary greatly in degree. …
ellauri089.html on line 631: § 108. finally (c) where virtue consists in "conscientiousness", i.e., the disposition not to act, in certain cases, until we believe or feel that our action is right, it seems to have some intrinsic value: the value of this feeling has been peculiarly emphasized by Christian Ethics, but it certainly is not, as Kant would lead us to think, either the sole thing of value, or always good even as a means. …
ellauri089.html on line 633: § 109. Summary of chapter.
ellauri089.html on line 640: § 110. By an "ideal" state of things may be meant either (1) the Summum Bonum or absolutely best, or (2) the best which the laws of nature allow to exist in this world, or (3) anything greatly good in itself: this chapter will be principally occupied with what is ideal in sense (3)—with answering the fundamental question of Ethics. …
ellauri089.html on line 642: § 111. but a correct answer to this question is an essential step towards a correct view as to what is "ideal" in senses (1) and (2). …
ellauri089.html on line 644: § 112. In order to obtain a correct answer to the question "What is good in itself?" we must consider what value things would have if they existed absolutely by themselves; …
ellauri089.html on line 646: § 113. and, if we use this method, it is obvious that personal affection and aesthetic enjoyments include by far the greatest goods with which we are acquainted. …
ellauri089.html on line 648: § 114. If we begin by considering I. Aesthetic Enjoyments, it is plain (1) that there is always essential to these some one of a great variety of different emotions, though these emotions may have little value by themselves: …
ellauri089.html on line 650: § 115. and (2) that a cognition of really beautiful qualities is equally essential, and has equally little value by itself. …
ellauri089.html on line 652: § 116. But (3) granted that the appropriate combination of these two elements is always a considerable good and may be a very great one, we may ask whether, where there is added to this a true belief in the existence of the object of cognition, the whole thus formed is not much more valuable still. …
ellauri089.html on line 654: § 117. I think that this question should be answered in the affirmative; but in order to ensure that this judgment is correct, we must carefully distinguish it …
ellauri089.html on line 656: § 118. from the two judgments (a) that knowledge is valuable as a means, (b) that, where the object of the cognition is itself a good thing, its existence, of course, adds to the value of the whole state of things: …
ellauri089.html on line 658: § 119. if, however, we attempt to avoid being biased by these two facts, it still seems that mere true belief may be a condition essential to great value. …
ellauri089.html on line 660: § 120. We thus get a third essential constituent of many great goods; and in this way we are able to justify (1) the attribution of value to knowledge, over and above its value as a means, and (2) the intrinsic superiority of the proper appreciation of a real object over the appreciation of an equally valuable object of mere imagination: emotions directed towards real objects may thus, even if the object be inferior, claim equality with the highest imaginative pleasures. …
ellauri089.html on line 662: § 121. Finally (4) with regard to the objects of the cognition which is essential to these good wholes, it is the business of Aesthetics to analyse their nature: it need only be here remarked (1) that, by calling them "beautiful", we mean that they have this relation to a good whole; and (2) that they are, for the most part, themselves complex wholes, such that the admiring contemplation of the whole greatly exceeds in value the sum of the values of the admiring contemplation of the parts. …
ellauri089.html on line 664: § 122. With regard to II. Personal Affection, the object is here not merely beautiful but also good in itself; it appears, however, that the appreciation of what is thus good in itself, viz. the mental qualities of a person, is certainly, by itself, not so great a good as the whole formed by the combination with it of an appreciation of corporeal beauty; but it is certain that the combination of both is a far greater good than either singly. …
ellauri089.html on line 666: § 123. It follows from what has been said that we have every reason to suppose that a cognition of material qualities, and even their existence, is an essential constituent of the Ideal or Summum Bonum: there is only a bare possibility that they are not included in it. …
ellauri089.html on line 668: § 124. It remains to consider positive evils and mixed goods. I. Evils may be divided into three classes, namely …
ellauri089.html on line 670: § 125. (1) evils which consist in the love, or admiration, or enjoyment of what is evil or ugly …
ellauri089.html on line 672: § 126. (2) evils which consist in the hatred or contempt of what is good or beautiful …
ellauri089.html on line 674: § 127. and (3) the consciousness of intense pain: this appears to be the only thing, either greatly good or greatly evil, which does not involve both a cognition and an emotion directed towards its object; and hence it is not analogous to pleasure in respect of its intrinsic value, while it also seems not to add to the vileness of the whole, as a whole, in which it is combined with another bad thing, whereas pleasure does add to the goodness of a whole, in which it is combined with another good thing; …
ellauri089.html on line 676: § 128. but pleasure and pain are completely analogous in this, that pleasure by no means always increases, and pain by no means always decreases, the total value of a whole in which it is included: the converse is often true. …
ellauri089.html on line 678: § 129. In order to consider II. Mixed Goods, we must first distinguish between (1) the value of a whole as a whole, and (2) its value on the whole or total value: (1)=the difference between (2) and the sum of the values of the parts. In view of this distinction, it then appears: …
ellauri089.html on line 680: § 130. (1) That the mere combination of two or more evils is never positively good on the whole, although it may certainly have great intrinsic value as a whole; …
ellauri089.html on line 682: § 131. but (2) That a whole which includes a cognition of something evil or ugly may yet be a great positive good on the whole: most virtues, which have any intrinsic value whatever, seem to be of this kind, e.g. (a) courage and compassion, and (b) moral goodness; all these are instances of the hatred or contempt of what is evil or ugly; …
ellauri089.html on line 684: § 132. but there seems no reason to think that, where the evil object exists, the total state of things is ever positively good on the whole, although the existence of the evil may add to its value as a whole. …
ellauri089.html on line 686: § 133. Hence (1) no actually existing evil is necessary to the Ideal, (2) the contemplation of imaginary evils is necessary to it, and (3) where evils already exist, the existence of mixed virtues has a value independent both of its consequences and of the value which it has in common with the proper appreciation of imaginary evils. …
ellauri089.html on line 688: § 134. Concluding remarks.
ellauri089.html on line 691: § 135. Summary of chapter.
ellauri097.html on line 418: Kant wanted to prove, in a way that would dumbfound the common man, that the common man was right: that was the secret of this soul. He wrote against the scholars in support of popular prejudice, but for the scholars and not for the people. [§193.]
ellauri097.html on line 424: The Protestant parson is the grandfather of German philosophy. The theologians’ instinct in the German scholars divined what Kant had once again made possible. The conception of a “true world,” the conception of morality as the essence of the world … were once again, thanks to a wily and shrewd skepticism, if not provable, at least no longer refutable. Kant’s success is merely a theologian’s success. [The Antichrist §10.]
ellauri097.html on line 428: A virtue must be our own invention. The fundamental laws of self-preservation and growth demandthat everyone invent his own virtue, his own categorical imperative. How could one fail to feel how Kant’s categorical imperative endangered life itself! The theologians’ instinct alone protected it! [§11.]
ellauri118.html on line 1089: 5§ Nainen älköön käyttäkö miehen tamineita, älköönkä mies pukeutuko naisen vaatteisiin; sillä jokainen, joka niin tekee, on kauhistus Herralle, sinun Jumalallesi. Rouvalle, sinun emännällesi se on ihan sama.
ellauri118.html on line 1091: 6§ Jos järbä väittää vastoin faktoja että sen vaimo ei ollut neizykäinen, ja vaimon vanhemmat tuo jonkun rätin todisteexi vastakkaisesta, niin mies maxakoon sakkoa 100 hopeasekeliä ja olkoon pääsemättömissä vaimostaan (ja vaimo siitä, tietysti).
ellauri118.html on line 1093: 7§ Mutta jos syytös on tosi, jos tytössä ei tavattu neitsyyden merkkiä, silloin ei riitä 100 hopeasekeliä, vaan vietäköön tyttö isänsä talon ovelle, ja kaupungin miehet kivittäkööt hänet kuoliaaksi, koska hän teki häpeällisen teon Israelissa, harjoittaen haureutta isänsä kodissa. Poista paha keskuudestasi.
ellauri118.html on line 1095: 23§ Jos joku neitsyt on kihloissa miehen kanssa ja toinen tapaa hänet kaupungissa ja makaa hänen kanssaan, niin viekää molemmat sen kaupungin portille ja kivittäkää heidät kuoliaaksi, tyttö siksi, että hän ei huutanut apua kaupungissa, ja mies siksi, että hän teki väkivaltaa lähimmäisensä morsiamelle. Poista paha keskuudestasi.
ellauri118.html on line 1097: 25§ Mutta jos mies tapaa kihlatun tytön kedolla, käy häneen käsiksi ja makaa hänen kanssaan, niin mies, joka makasi hänen kanssaan, kuolkoon yksin.
ellauri118.html on line 1099: 26§ Mutta tytölle ei tarvi tehdä mitään, sillä tyttö ei ole tehnyt kuoleman rikosta; tässä on samanlainen tapaus, kuin jos mies karkaa toisen kimppuun ja tappaa hänet.
ellauri118.html on line 1101: 27§ Sillä hän tapasi hänet kedolla; kihlattu tyttö mahdollisesti huusi lisää, mutta hänellä ei ollut auttajaa.
ellauri118.html on line 1103: 28§ Jos joku tapaa neitsyen, joka ei ole kihlattu, ja ottaa hänet kiinni ja makaa hänen kanssaan ja heidät siitä tavataan, 29niin mies, joka makasi hänen kanssaan, antakoon tytön isälle viisikymmentä hopeasekeliä, ja tyttö tulkoon hänen vaimokseen, koska hän raiskasi hänet; hän älköön hyljätkö häntä koko elinaikanansa.
ellauri118.html on line 1105: 30§ Älköön kukaan ottako vaimoksi äitipuoltaan älköönkä nostako isänsä peitettä niinkuin se tyhmä Haam. Isäpuoli on kyllä ihan jepa.
ellauri158.html on line 76: P.1. defin. 2. Ea res dicitur in suo genere finita, quae alia eiusdem naturae terminari potest. [in: P. 1. prop. 8., prop. 21., etiam in: Ep. 4. §. 3.]
ellauri158.html on line 82: P.1. defin. 3. Per substantiam intelligo id quod in se est et per se concipitur; hoc est id, cuius conceptus non indiget conceptu alterius rei, a quo formari debeat. [in: P. 1. prop. 1., prop. 2., prop. 4., prop. 5., prop. 6. coroll., prop. 10., prop. 15., prop. 18., prop. 28., etiam in: Ep. 26. §. 6., Ep. 27. §. 8.]
ellauri158.html on line 84: P.1. defin. 4. Per attributum intelligo id quod intellectus de substantia percipit, tanquam eiusdem essentiam constituens. [in: P. 1. prop. 4., prop. 9., prop. 10., prop. 12., prop. 19., prop. 20., P. 2. prop. 1. schol., etiam in: Ep. 27. §. 8.]
ellauri158.html on line 95: P.1. defin. 6. Per Deum intelligo ens absolute infinitum, hoc est, substantiam constantem infinitis attributis, quorum unumquodque aeternam et infinitam essentiam exprimit. [in: P. 1. prop. 10. schol., prop. 11., prop. 14., prop. 14. coroll. 1., prop. 16., prop. 19., prop. 23., prop. 31., P. 2. prop. 1., prop. 1. schol., prop. 45., P. 4. prop. 28., P. 5. prop. 35., etiam in: Ep. 3. §. 1., Ep. 4. §. 2., Ep. 26. §. 8., Ep. 64. §. 3.]
ellauri158.html on line 117: P. 1. axiom. 2. Id quod per aliud non potest concipi, per se concipi debet. [in: Ep. 3. §. 4.]
ellauri158.html on line 133: P. 1. axiom. 6. Idea vera debet cum suo ideato convenire. [in: P. 1. prop. 5., prop. 30., P. 2. prop. 29., prop. 32., prop. 44., prop. 44. coroll. 2., etiam in: Ep. 66. §. 3.]
ellauri158.html on line 145: P. 1. prop. 1. Substantia prior est natura suis affectionibus. [in: P. 1. prop. 5., etiam in: Ep. 3. §. 4.]
ellauri158.html on line 150: P. 1. prop. 2. Duae substantiae diversa attributa habentes nihil inter se commune habent. [in: P. 1. prop. 6., prop. 11., prop. 12., etiam in: Ep. 3. §. 4.]
ellauri158.html on line 154: P. 1. prop. 3. Quae res nihil commune inter se habent, earum una alterius causa esse non potest. [in: P. 1. prop. 6., etiam in: Ep. 3. §. 4., Ep. 65. §. 2.]
ellauri158.html on line 166: P. 1. prop. 5. In rerum natura non possunt dari duae aut plures substantiae eiusdem naturae sive attributi. [in: P. 1. prop. 6., prop. 8., prop. 12., prop. 13., prop. 14., prop. 15. schol., P. 2. prop. 10. schol., lem. 1., etiam in: Ep. 3. §. 7.]
ellauri158.html on line 170: P. 1. prop. 6. Una substantia non potest produci ab alia substantia. [in: P. 1. prop. 6. coroll., prop. 11. schol., prop. 12., etiam in: Ep. 3. §. 7., Ep. 4. §. 8.]
ellauri158.html on line 174: P. 1. prop. 7. Ad naturam substantiae pertinet existere. [in: P. 1. prop. 8., prop. 8. schol. 1., prop. 8. schol. 2., prop. 11., prop. 12., prop. 19., P. 2. prop. 10., etiam in: Ep. 4. §. 3.]
ellauri158.html on line 180: -- P. 1. prop. 8. schol. 2. Substantiae et earum modificationes. [in: P. 1. prop. 15. schol., etiam in: Ep. 4. §. 2.]
ellauri158.html on line 188: P. 1. prop. 10. Unumquodque unius substantiae attributum per se concipi debet. [in: P. 1. prop. 12., P. 2. prop. 5., prop. 6., etiam in: Ep. 66. §. 4., Ep. 68. §. 1.]
ellauri158.html on line 189: -- P. 1. prop. 10. schol. Substantiarum et attributorum distinctio. [in: P. 1. prop. 14. coroll. 1., etiam in: Ep. 26. §. 7., Ep. 27. §. 6., Ep. 65. §. 3., Ep. 66. §. 7.]
ellauri158.html on line 270: -- P. 1. prop. 25. schol. Deus est causa sui et omnium rerum causa. [in: Ep. 66. §. 6.]
ellauri158.html on line 271: -- P. 1. prop. 25. coroll. Res particulares nihil sunt nisi Dei attributorum affectiones, sive modi, quibus Dei attributa certo et determinato modo exprimuntur. [in: P. 1. prop. 25. schol., prop. 28., prop. 36., P. 2. defin. 1., prop. 1., prop. 5., prop. 10. coroll., P. 3. prop. 6., P. 5. prop. 24., prop. 36., etiam in: Ep. 66. §. 6.]
ellauri158.html on line 410: P. 2. prop. 6. Cuiuscumque attributi modi Deum, quatenus tantum sub illo attributo, cuius modi sunt, et non quatenus sub ullo alio consideratur, pro causa habent. [in: P. 2. prop. 9., lem. 3., prop. 45., P. 3. prop. 2., prop. 11. schol., P. 4. prop. 7., prop. 29., etiam in: Ep. 66. §. 3.]
ellauri158.html on line 423: -- P. 2. prop. 7. schol. Substantia cogitans et substantia extensa una eademque est substantia. [in: P. 2. prop. 8., prop. 12. schol., prop. 21. schol., P. 3. prop. 2. schol., etiam in: Ep. 66. §. 4., Ep. 67. §. 1., Ep. 68. §. 1.]
ellauri158.html on line 461: P. 2. prop. 13. Obiectum ideae humanam mentem constituentis est corpus, sive certus extensionis modus actu existens, et nihil aliud. [in: P. 2. prop. 15., prop. 19., prop. 21., prop. 21. schol., prop. 23., prop. 24., prop. 26., prop. 29., prop. 38., prop. 39., P. 3. prop. 3., prop. 10., gener. aff. defin., P. 5. prop. 23., prop. 29., etiam in: Ep. 66. §. 2.]
ellauri158.html on line 479: [in: P. 2. lem. 3., lem. 4., etiam in: Ep. 63. §. 1.]
ellauri158.html on line 526: ------ schol. [in: Ep. 66. §. 8.]
ellauri158.html on line 776: P. 3. prop. 7. Conatus, quo unaquaeque res in suo esse perseverare conatur, nihil est praeter ipsius rei actualem essentiam. [in: P. 3. prop. 9., prop. 10., prop. 37., prop. 54., P. 4. defin. 8., prop. 4., prop. 5., prop. 8., prop. 15., prop. 18., prop. 18. schol., prop. 20., prop. 21., prop. 22., prop. 25., prop. 26., prop. 32., prop. 33., prop. 53., prop. 60., prop. 64., P. 5. axiom. 2., prop. 8., prop. 9., prop. 25., etiam in: Ep. 66. §. 2.]
ellauri158.html on line 984: P. 4. praef. [in: P. 4. defin. 2., prop. 39., prop. 59., prop. 65., etiam in: TIE §. 12.]
ellauri163.html on line 110: Ei kuvia. Tässä luvussa §§ 15ff rajotetaan kuvainpalvontaa. Kuvainraastaminen on katolisilta sittemmin unohtunut, protestantit käyttivät ahkerasti kalkkimaalia.
ellauri163.html on line 140: Hammurapin lakeja. Tässä pykälässä on amoriittilainana kostamista koskevia rajoituxia. Jos joku nirhaa jonkun epähuomiossa, joutuu vankilaan, eikä omaiset pääse siellä sille kostamaan. Kainin merkkikin oli vankitazka: älkää nirhatko tätä veikkoa, hän on maxanut jo velkansa yhteiskunnalle. Muuten pätee yleisperiaate § 21: henki hengestä, silmä silmästä, hammas hampaasta, käsi kädestä, jalka jalasta.
ellauri216.html on line 166: Proclus argues that evil does not have an existence of its own, but only a derivative or parasitic existence (par-hypostasis, sc. on the good) (De mal. § 50).
ellauri249.html on line 170: Cicero's Orator (ad Marcum Brutum) §154 confirms its obscene status. Cicero writes:
ellauri278.html on line 300: Huomaatte yhden jutun: termiittiapinoillakin alueet joista kärhämöidään useiten on kaikista surkeimmat habitaatit parempien habitaattien rajaseuduilla, tollasia Oder-Neisse linjoja, soita, vuoristoja, aavikoita, missä kieli, kulttuuri ja uskonto sekoittuvat koska mikään niistä ei ole siellä enää elinkelpoinen. Samat seudut mihin villi§elukatkin ajetaan paremmilta mailta kyhjöttämään niille sopimattomiin reservaatteihin. Niihin on kiva sijoittaa näitä nuaar-skoudesarjoja, karseet kulissit on näät siellä valmiina. Me mentiin autolla siitä aika läheltä Dresdenistä Puolan puolelle.
ellauri281.html on line 299: Huomaatte yhden jutun: termiittiapinoillakin alueet joista kärhämöidään useiten on kaikista surkeimmat habitaatit parempien habitaattien rajaseuduilla, tollasia Oder-Neisse linjoja, soita, vuoristoja, aavikoita, missä kieli, kulttuuri ja uskonto sekoittuvat koska mikään niistä ei ole siellä enää elinkelpoinen. Samat seudut mihin villi§elukatkin ajetaan paremmilta mailta kyhjöttämään niille sopimattomiin reservaatteihin. Niihin on kiva sijoittaa näitä nuaar-skoudesarjoja, karseet kulissit on näät siellä valmiina. Me mentiin autolla siitä aika läheltä Dresdenistä Puolan puolelle.
ellauri299.html on line 660: § 1.2. Herra alkoi puhua Hoosealle ja sanoi näin: »Mene ja ota portto vaimoksesi ja ota lapsiksesi ne lapset, jotka hän saa. Tämä maa on uskoton Herraa kohtaan, se on kuin portto, se palvelee vieraita jumalia.» 3 Niin Hoosea otti vaimokseen Gomerin, Diblaimin tyttären, ja tämä tuli raskaaksi ja synnytti hänelle pojan ym ym.
ellauri299.html on line 662: § 3.1. Herra sanoi minulle: »Sinun tulee vielä rakastaa naista, jolla nyt on rakastaja ja joka rikkoo avion. Samoin minä, Herra, rakastan israelilaisia, vaikka he kääntyvät muiden jumalien puoleen ja rakastavat rypälekakkuja, joita tuovat uhrilahjoiksi.» Minä ostin naisen ja maksoin hänestä viisitoista hopeasekeliä ja puolitoista homer-mittaa ohria. 3 Sanoin hänelle: »Sinun täytyy nyt kauan aikaa olla täällä ja odottaa. Varo, ettet ole uskoton ja mene muiden miesten mukaan. Kun tottelet minua, niin aikanaan minä tulen luoksesi.»
ellauri310.html on line 525: etnisessä puhdistuksessa. Turkin rikoslain 301 §:n mukaan turkkilaisuuden
ellauri322.html on line 383: Odelsretten er befestet i Grunnlovens § 117: «Odels- og åsetesretten må ikke oppheves.»
ellauri382.html on line 185: Ottelun jälkeen Heibati pyysi anteeksi kehätytöltä sosiaalisessa mediassa. "Hei kaikki. Tämä on Marialle. En käyttäytynyt oikein hänen kanssaan", hän kirjoitti. "Syynä oli se, että ennen MMA-ottelua käytiin paljon nyrkkitaistelua. Pysyin siellä häkissä ja halusin vain mennä ulos taistelemaan. Joku piti saada, fiilis oli sellainen." Anteexi pyytely ja kyynelöinti ei auttanut. MMA-taistelija sai elinkautisen pelikiellon potkittuaan kehätyttöä pyllyyn ennen ottelua vastoin Geneven sopimusta (§ 341).
ellauri382.html on line 278: (§§ 334, xxx/ellauri120.html on line 245: Valiokunta kiinnittää tässä yhteydessä huomiota myös siihen, että vuoden 2019 aikana pääjohtajan maksuaikakortilla tehtyjä kululaskuja on tarkastusvirastossa hyväksytty palvelukeskuksen ja valtiovarainministeriön suositusten vastaisesti. Kyseessä on ollut pääjohtajan kampaamo- ja stailauspalveluista aiheutuneita kuluja. Talousarvion yksityiskohtaisten perusteluiden mukaan tarkastusviraston toimintamäärärahaa saa käyttää VTV-laissa säädettyjen tehtävien hoidosta aiheutuviin menoihin. Talousarvioasetuksen 38 §:n mukaan viraston on varmistettava menon laillisuus ja tarkoituksenmukaisuus sekä lisäksi meno on asiatarkastettava ja hyväksyttävä. Menon hyväksyjän on myös varmistettava menoperusteen oikeellisuus. Jotta meno voitaisiin maksaa viraston toimintamenoista, sen tulisi olla laillisuuden ja tarkoituksenmukaisuuden kannalta perusteltua. Kampaamo- ja stailauspalveluista aiheutuvat kulut eivät palvelukeskuksen ja valtiovarainministeriön suosituksen mukaan ole sellaisia menoja, joita olisi perusteltua maksaa viraston toimintamenoista, sillä niitä ei voi katsoa tarkastusviraston tehtävien hoidon kannalta välttämättömiksi menoiksi.
xxx/ellauri166.html on line 61: Because Aaron's rod and Moses' rod are both given similar, seemingly interchangeable, powers, Rabbinical scholars debated whether or not the two rods were one and the same. According to the Midrash Yelammedenu (Yalḳ. on Ps. ex. § 869):
xxx/ellauri177.html on line 681: Sinä iltana isä Mouret tunsi kuitenkin olevansa liian väsynyt. Hän lykkäsi lähtöään seuraavaan päivään. Seuraavana päivänä hän antoi itselleen uuden tekosyyn: hän ei voinut jättää sisartaan yksin La Teusen kanssa; hän jätti kirjeen vietäväksi Pascal-setälle. Kolmen päivän ajan hän lupasi itselleen kirjoittaa tämän kirjeen; paperiarkki, kynä ja muste olivat valmiina pöydällä hänen huoneessaan. Ja kolmantena päivänä hän lähti pois kirjoittamatta kirjettä. Yhtäkkiä hän oli noussut hattuaan, hän oli lähtenyt Paradouhun, tyhmyydestä, pakkomielle, luopumassa, meno s§inne oli kuin urakkatyötä, jota hän ei tiennyt välttää. Albinen kuva oli taas haalistunut; hän ei enää nähnyt häntä, hän totteli vanhoja tahtoa, kuolleena hänessä sillä hetkellä, mutta jonka työntövoima säilyi hänen olemuksensa suuressa hiljaisuudessa.
xxx/ellauri228.html on line 324: Olemme humanitaarisia ja ritarillisia; emme halua orjuuttaa muita rotuja, haluamme vain testamentata heille arvomme ja vallata heidän perintönsä vastineeksi. Ajattelemme itseämme Pyhän kontaktin ritareina. Tämä on toinen valhe. Me etsimme vain ihmistä. Emme tarvitse muita maailmoja. Tarvitsemme peräpeilejä (zerkalo). - Solaris (§6:72), 1970 englanninkielinen käännös
xxx/ellauri228.html on line 536: Kirjan ensimmäinen suomenkielinen versio ilmestyi jo 1847 Otto Tandefeltin suomentamana mukaelmana, nimellä Robinpoika Kruuse. Vuonna 1961 julkaistun mukaelman maahantuonti ja levittäminen kiellettiin nk. Kynäbaari-jutussa. Kynäbaari-juttu (myös Liisa ihmemaassa -tapaus) on ollut ainut kerta, jolloin tekijänoikeuslain klassikkosuojapykälää on sovellettu käytäntöön Suomessa. Asia ratkaistiin korkeimman oikeuden ennakkopäätöksellä vuonna 1967 (KKO 1967-II-10). Opetusministeriö päätti 11. toukokuuta 1962 kieltää kyseisten kirjojen maahantuonnin ja levittämisen Suomessa. Menettely perustui tuoreen tekijänoikeuslain 53 §:ään, jossa mainitaan sivistyksellisten arvojen vaarantaminen: teoksia ei saa muunnella tekijän kuoltua tavalla, joka on omiaan halventamaan tekijää.
xxx/ellauri229.html on line 101: 21. The Knowledg of the First Attesters is ascertain’d by what has been prov’d. §. §. 15.16. Their Veracity must be prov’d by shewing there could be no Apparent Good to move their Wills to deceive us; and the best proof (omitting the Impossibility of joyning in such an Universal Conspiracy to deceive, the Certain loss of their Credit to tell a Lie against Notorious Matters of Fact &c.) is the seen Impossibility of Compassing their Immediate End, which was to Deceive. Which reason is grounded on this, that no one man, who is not perfectly Frantick, acts for an End that he plainly sees Impossible to be compassed. For example, to fly to the Moon (LOL), or to swim over Thames upon a Pig of Lead. (Except a really Big Hollow Pig of Lead.)
xxx/ellauri252.html on line 363: »1.§. Joca aicomuxesta, sanoilla eli kirjoituxilla, laitta ja pilcka Jumalata, hänen Pyhä Sanans ja Sacramentejä; olcon hengens rickonut. Jos se tapahtu ajattelemattomasti ja picaisudesta, ja hän catu; wetäkön sackoa sata talaria, ja rucoilcan ricoxens julkisesti Seuracunnasa andexi. Jos hän sitä teke toisen erän; tehkön cahdenkertaisen sacon. Joca ei woi sackoa maxaa; kärsikön ruumillans, nijncuin Rangaistus Caaresa sanotan.»
xxx/ellauri252.html on line 368: »1 § Joka julkisesti pilkkaa Jumalaa, rangaistakoon kuritushuoneella korkeintaan neljäksi vuodeksi tahi vankeudella. Jos se tapahtuu ajattelemattomuudesta tahi pikaisuudesta; olkoon rangaistus sakkoa tahi vankeutta korkeintaan kuusi kuukautta.»
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